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There are two themes contained in this thesis: firstly, the 
examination of British Government policy towards Palestine during 
the period 1937 to 195.0 and secondly, the analysis of attitudes within 
the British Labour and Conservative Parties towards this issue. 
British Government policy is, therefore, juxtaposed with party policy 
and the thesis illustrates,, on the one hand, that policy formulated in 
Opposition is often unviable in Government and, on the other, that 
this is invariably occasioned by domestic and international 
constraints imposed on successive administrations. 
Exigencies in the context of this study are defined as the nature of 
the Palestine problem itself; the violent conflict between Arabs and 
Jews; the Second World War and its attendant ramifications for 
Palestine; the role of the United States; Britain's pogt-war decline as 
a World Power; domestic public opinion; the influence of Parliament 
and the impact of intra-party division. 
The study suggests that policy towards Palestine was conditioned by 
these constraints which profoundly influenced Britain's perception of 
her own 'national interests'. The Conservative Party through its 
pragmatic acknowledgement of the realities of office escaped the 
ignominy of the affair, while the Labour Party, by establishing a 
strongly pro-Zionist line in Opposition successfully managed to inflict 
the greatest possible damage on itself when it was seen to renege on 
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Britain's period of Mandatory responsibility for Palestine has been 
the subject of much contemporary study and investigation by both 
historians and political scientists. Of course.. Palestine was, indeed 
is still today, a contentious issue and can lend itself to partisan 
interpretations and opinions as to its historical development. Those 
academics sympathetic to either Zionist or Arab viewpoints have been 
profoundly criticial of the direction of British policy. 
Gabriel Sheffer(l) investigating the period 1929 to 1939 arrives at the 
conclusion that British policy towards Palestine was dictated by a 
pro-Arab clique within the Colonial and Foreign Offices. He 
concentrates on the officials who were, on their own admission, 
sympathetic to the Arabs and focuses attention on what he terms the 
'official class' dismissing politicians as mere victims of their Whitehall 
advisers. In essence, Sheffer, in adopting such a model of the 
policy-making process places British responses solely within the 
context of imperialistic ambition, that is, the maintenance of Palestine 
within the sphere of British interests, at any cost to the local 
communities. 
Michael Cohen, in his study of the Mandatory period 1936 to 1945, 
takes imperialism one step further and argues that "British policy 
was determined by one single hard-headed criterion, not liberal 
ideals, but economic and strategic interests. "(2) He considers the 
attitudes of Whitehall to be of profound importance but is equally 
critical of certain Prime Ministers and Secretaries of State. Winston 
Churchill, who by any reasonable yardstick of assessment could 
never be described as anti-Zionist, for it was he who gave flesh and 
blood to the concept of a Jewish National Home in 1922, is condemned 
by Cohen as "something of an enigma" who adopted "an ambiguous 
attitude which accounts for the many vacillations of British 
policy. "(3) His admittedly well-written and thorough account falls 
into the rather fashionable category of attacking the British 
Government for pursuing any policy regardless of the often limited 
environment in which it operated. Despite his plethora of research 
material, he fails to critically assess the Zionists' changing demands 
throughout the 1930s, and 1940s, and the impact of Jewish terrorism 
on the ultimate direction of British policy. 
Norman "Rose in his study of Gentile Zionism and Anglo Zionist 
Diplomacy considers the period 1929 to 1939 from a rather -different 
perspective. He looks at Zionists and their sympathisers in the 
context of pressure group activity on the Governments of that 
decade. His analysis is uncritical of what can only be interpreted as 
'behind the scenes' manouevring of a narrow interest group, the 
Jewish Agency, particularly in light of the fact that the Arabs did 
not have the same facility of access to those in 'high places'. Tie 
argues that Britain's commitment to establish a Jewish National Home 
stemmed from Britain's own interests, yet fails to explain why, in 
1922, this commitment , which was not overwhelmingly popular even 
amongst Britain's most jingoistic ministers, was incorporated into the 
Palestine Mandate at the League of Nations. His conclusions by 1939 
and the advent of the White Paper, which limited Jewish immigration 
into Palestine rest on the assumption that Britain had no further use 
for the Jews and could only "serve their imperial interests" by 
"placing the Zionists into cold storage. "(4) 
The theme running through all these studies is that Britain acted 
purely from self-interest, disregarding the Jews and pursuing 
anti-Zionist policies which had either been formulated by partial 
Whitehall Mandarins or pro-Arab Ministers in Government. The 
tendency is invariably to fudge the role the Zionists played in the 
dispute and to portray them as innocents used and abused by a 
series of ill-intentioned British Administrations. 
However, if Zionist historians comfort themselves with the belief that 
Britain adopted pro-Arab policies, there is one group who manifestly 
disagree with this interpretation: the Arabs. Originating from the 
Balfour Declaration, it is the Arab contention -that Britain embarked 
on a pro-Zionist course. As A. W. Kayyali maintains: "The 
Palestinians were convinced that Britain was the real sponsor and 
defender of Zionism in Palestine. "(5) In his analysis of the major 
causes as to why the Palestinian Arab nationalists failed to prevent 
the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine he focuses 
on the inequity of the balance of power between themselves and what 
he calls . the 
11 British -backed Zionists". He argues that the 
"Palestinian Arabs formed an under-developed rural society with 
meagre resources and minimal effective orRanisation, while the 
Zionists constituted a highly organised, well-financed movement led 
by a highly intelligent and determined leadership. 11(6) of course, 
Palestinian Arab backwardness was often advanced by successive 
British Governments as exactly the reason why the Jews should be 
encouraged to establish a Homeland in Palestine. It was believed 
that the Jews would bring economic advancement and general 
prosperity to all Palestinian domiciles. 
Dr. Shahabuddin disagrees with this view, asserting that the 
undisputed Zionist prosperity within Palestine benefited the Jews 
only, and actually served to retard Arab development. Proceeding 
along this line of argument he condemns the British Government for 
deliberately debilitating Arab progress. (7) F. Khouri touches on the 
failure of the Palestinian Arabs to propagandise their resistance to 
Zionism and points his finger accusingly at Britain who, he asserts, 
must bear the responsibility for failing to "resolve the Palestine 
question peacefullvoll(8) 
Of the less partisan accounts, Elizabeth 'IJonroe both in her book(9) 
and article(10) favours the view that Britain somehow 'muddled 
through' in its policy towards Palestine. She looks to Britain's role 
within the wider Middle Eastern theatre and assesses Palestine as one 
factor in a larger arena. Her research is comprehensive, although 
constrained by the absence of certain documentary evidence made 
available after her writings were published, yet it is possible to feel 
a certain sense of unease at her unquestionably fulsome defence of 
Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary in th e post-war Labour 
Administration. As regards popular works on the Mandatory period, 
Nicholas Bethell's must rate reasonably highly. He offers a readable 
and informative description of events although his essentially 
journalistic appraisal confines itself to pure narrative and rejects any 
attempt at analysis. 
Clearly then, in spite of a wealth of literati-ire on the subject, 
questions remain unanswered. Can British policy towards Palestine 
only be seen in terms of biased Civil Servants? Does the pursuit of 
a foreign policy based on self interest, in itself, provide sufficient 
grounds for condemnation? Is it true that Britain actually dictated 
policy or was it the case that British responses were conditioned by 
the increasing animosity between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine, 
the ultimate recourse to violence, and often the contraints of office 
as perceived by successive governments? Why did Britain's many 
Commissions of Enquiry fail so dismally in arriving at any resolution 
of the Palestine problem? It is the intention of this thesis to 
confront and attempt to clarify these questions. In pursuance of 
this objective research has been conducted at the Public Record 
Office and other institutions holding important documents and private 
papers on this period. Unfortunately, due to financial limitations 
archival material held in foreign institutes, i. e. the Central Zionist 
Archives and Weizmann Archives in Israel and the Harry S. Truman 
Library and Zionist Archives in the United States were inaccessible. 
The thesis is not only concerned with the direction of British policy 
towards Palestine but also with policy-making in the context of 
British Party politics. Its central interest is situated in the analysis 
of attitudes., responses and policies of both the British Labour Party 
and the Conservative Party towards the Palestine issue, and how 
these intentions were translated when Office was attained. A crucial 
aspect of the thesis is an assessment of the power and influence of 
the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office in order to discern 
whether accusations of the existence of an all-powerful, partial, 
decision-making coterie within Whitehall can be substantiated. 
It is the contention of the thesis that British policy towards 
Palestine should not be seen in isolation from party political 
considerations and in this respect it will seek to explain why 
Governments of either the Labour Party or the Conservative Party 
chose to follow certain policies, many of which were at variance with 
declarations made whilst in Opposition. The thesis intends to 
explore the belief that parties in Government suffer severe limitation 
in the direction of policies pursued and that the adoption of a 
particular policy depends less on party opinions or the wishes of 
personnel within the Civil Service and rather more on the constraints 
of Office. In the context of this study, contraints of office will be 
defined as: the nature of the Palestine problem itself; the violent 
conflict between Arabs and Jews; the Second World War and its 
attendant ramifications for Palestine; the role of the United States; 
Britain's post-war decline as a World Power and domestic public 
opinion. The power of Parliament and the impact of intra-partv 
division on the direction of Government policy will also be examined. 
In essence., the thesis is concerned with what has hitherto been an 
unresearched area, that is, an analysis of party policy juxtaposed 
with Government policy towards Palestine and an understanding of 
the factors involved which influence policy makers to decide on their 
ultimate choice of policy direction. 
A comprehensive doctoral study(12) has been made of the attitude of 
the Labour Party towards Palestine, yet within this excellent account 
of the procedural aspects of the Party's shifting policy on Palestine 
there is little attempt to relate these developments to the evident 
realities and often unpalatable truths a party faces in Government. 
Another study has been advanced in which a section is devoted to 
the apparent 'betrayal' of the post-war Labour Administration to the 
Zionist cause. (13) The view proffered by J. Alderman is that of a 
Labour Party consciously espousing pro-Zionist policies in r,, )pposition 
for purposes of electoral advantage. It is his belief that once the 
Labour Party gained voting support from the Jewish community in 
Britain in the General Election of 1945, it deliberately reneged on its 
promises when it subsequently gained office. This thesis intends to 
offer a less simplistic analysis of the indisputable dilemma of 
reconciling policy intentions outlined in Opposition with those 
adopted in Government. 
Much has been written of the nature of Opposition in Britain and in 
the opinion of one leading political scientist, Opposition Parties fail 
to propose realistic policy options because of institutional structures 
and the lack of access to detailed Administrative information. (14) 
However, it is neither the purpose of this thesis to examine the 
Government -0 ppo sition cycle nor to prove or disprove the arguments 
of contemporary political scientists in what is essentially a studV of a 
single issue in an historical setting. 
Wider questions on the nature of British imperialism are not within 
the remit of this thesis and scholars of International 'Relations may 
well be disappointed as the study, whilst not ignoring Britain's 
post-war decline as a World Power, which rendered her vulnerable to 
external pressure and ultimately limited the policy options open to 
her, does not place British policy towards Palestine wholly in the 
context of International Power rivalry. 
There has, until now, been no study of both the Labour and 
Conservative Parties' response to the problem of P-alestine, maybe 
because of the inherent difficulties of such research. It will be 
apparent that an imbalance exists within the thesis as regards the 
treatment of the Conservative Party vis-a-vis the Labour Party. 
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The inequity is unfortunately unavoidable, given the relative paucity 
of archival material available at Central Office and the Bodleian 
Library Conservative Party Archive. The nature and structure of 
the Conservative Party organisation coupled with the devastation by 
fire of many records after 1946 profoundly hinder the researcher 
and., as such, the thesis has been obliged to rely on secondary 
sources. Of necessity, the use of private papers, biographies and 
press reports in order to gauge Conservative opinion inclines the 
thesis to arrive at conclusions which are more speculative than those 
with regard to the Labour Party. 
The thesis is concerned with the development of Party and 
Government policy within the period 1937 to 1950, although the first 
and second chapters are essentially introductory and consider the 
historical development of Palestine up to 1936 and the attitudes of the 
Conservative Party, the Labour Party and the Foreign and Colonial 
Offices throughout the years prior to 1937. The choice of such a 
period is not an arbitrary one for it marks a time in which the 
changes occurring within the political spectrum of Government 
corresponded with the profound impact external exigencies had on 
the entire question of Palestine itself and the nature of Britain's 
Mandatory responsibility. As such, the Palestine issue assumed a 
significance and urgency hitherto unknown and ultimately became a 
major pre-occupation of the post-war Labour Administration. The 
decision to commence at 1937 is especially important for it was the 
year in which the authoritative Royal Commission headed by Lord 
Peel published its findings. The Peel Commission, appointed to 
investigate the serious disturbances within Palestine, recommended 
that the Mandate should be abrogated and that Palestine should be 
partitioned into two separate states; one Arab, the other Jewish. 
The notion of partition was to prove a divisive issue both in terms 
of party politics and the responses of Arabs and Jews. There has 
been a tendency amongst some Jewish academics to underplay the 
fact that Zionists, who strove violently to achieve this aim in the 
post-war years, initially rejected the proposal and have argued that 
the Peel partition plan: 11was not a genuine attempt at solving the 
problem for good ... the plan was primarily aimed at safeguarding 
British national interests and only secondarily at solving the 
inter-communal conflict. "(15) The thesis seeks to reject this narrow 
indictment of British Governmental policy intention and considers the 
question of partition throughout the whole period under review. 
The thesis, therefore, follows a chronological pattern as it attempts 
to expose and analyse the vacillating positions of all parties to the 
dispute. The fact that partition was, indeed, the final solution 
arrived at by a decision of the United Nations., and not by the 
British Labour Government requires examination, as do the responses 
of the Conservative and Labour Parties to this resolution of the 
issue. 
The thesis intends neither to apportion blame nor to concentrate on 
the iniquities of any party involved in the Palestine problem. it 
does, however., hope to illustrate that Governments have extremely 
restricted policy options which are often pursued at the cost of 
intra-party strife and personal opprobrium, and to explain something 
of the mechanisms at play in Government and Party decision making. 
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TORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PALESTINE 1917-1937 
M-The Origins of theIntractable Problem 
"Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the 
independence of the Arabs **oa9 11 
(Letter from Sir Henry McMahon to the Sharif Hussein, 24 October 
1915) 
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their 
best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object..... " 
(Balfour Declaration, 1917) 
Britain's conflicting promises to two different communities essentially 
characterised British Governmental policy towards Palestine for more 
than 30 years. Although this study is concerned primarily with the 
formation of British policy after 1937, due consideration must be 
given to the whole period of Mandatory rule, as the polarisation 
which developed during the interwar years violently manifested itself 
after 1945 and was to have a profound effect on the direction of 
British party policy. 
Palestine came into being as a distinct political unit in 1922 when 
Transiordan was removed from the original Palestine Mandate of 1920. 
When the Palestine Mandate Agreement between Britain and the 
League of Nations was signed with the Balfour Declaration 
incorporated into it, the Jewish community acquired their first 
internationally binding pledge of support, which greatly 
strengthened their political claims. (I) 
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Following the official announcement of the Mandate a wave of 
Palestinian Arab protests against the policies incorporated within it, 
engulfed the country. (2) The Arabs were embittered and considered 
its provisions unjust and contrary to all previous promises made to 
them. Britain, of course, had seized upon the growing Arab 
nationalism and disillusion with Turkish dominance during the First 
World War. Once the Ottoman Empire joined the Central powers in 
the war, Britain saw the advantages of an Arab revolt. Not only 
would it weaken Turkey militarily by depriving her of Arab 
manpower, but Arab forces could be used to augment the Allied 
armies in the Near East. 
However, some Arabs, particularly in Syria and Mesopotania, were 
wary of Joining the Allies until Britain made satisfactory promises to 
them. It was this scepticism which occasioned the British High 
Commissioner of Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, to write a series of 
letters to Sharif Hussein, the Arab representative. (3) The Sharif 
requested British recognition of Arab independence in the area 
bounded on the north by a line from Mersin-Adana to the Persian 
frontier, on the east by Persia and the Persian Gulf, on the south 
by the Indian Ocean and on the west by the Red and Mediterranean 
seas. In his letters of 24 October and 13 December 1915, Sir Henry 
agreed "to recognise and uphold the independence of the Arabs in 
all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif, " 
(4) with certain exceptions, none of which appeared, at least to the 
Arabs, to include the Palestine area. The British excluded the 
"districts of Mersin and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to 
the west of the districts of Damascus, H. oms, Hama, and Aleppo, " all 
of which lie well to the north of Palestine. (5) 
Nevertheless, the question as to whether Palestine was included 
within these frontiers or not was to become a controversial issue 
after the War. The Arabs were under the impression that Palestine 
was included in the proposed independent Arab state which Britain 
promised to recognise, and certain documentary evidence suggests a 
substantiation of this view. (6) 
Confusion arose over Palestine because simultaneousIv with the 
Hussein-McMahon correspondence, the B riti sh were secretly 
negotiating with their French allies the apportionment of the 
territorial area in the Ottoman Empire. These negotiations 
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culminated in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 16 May 1916, according to 
which Palestine was to have: "an international administration, the 
form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, 
and subsequently in consultation with the other Allies and the 
representatives of the Sharif of Mecca-11(7) 
Barely 18 months later, Britain undertook another major commitment 
regarding the future of Palestine in the form of a letter, dated 2 
November 1917, from Lord Balfour., the Foreign Secretary, to Lord 
Rothschild, a leading Jewish personality in Britain: "His Majesty's 
Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best 
endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object. "(8) At this 
stage, however, strong objections were urged by a section of the 
British Jewish community, relatively small in number, but eminent in 
their social and political standing, who viewed with alarm a movement 
which might seem to cast doubts on their own status as British 
citizens. Their view was voiced in the ranks of the Government 
itself, with passionate conviction by Edwin Montagu, who had 
recently succeeded Austen Cahmberlain as Secretary of State for 
India. Any doubts that the War Cabinet may have harboured 
regarding such a novel policy as the official endorsement of Zionism 
appeared to be reinforced. As such, decisions were postponed and 
for some months the issue seemed uncertain until Leo Amery was 
asked to draft a statement which would appease this element without 
impairing the substance of the proposed declaration. Amery included 
the words; ... object), it being clearly understood that nothing 
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and 
political status enjoyed by Jews in any other colintry, "(9) which 
effectively conveyed no suggestion that Jews essentially belonged to 
Palestine and left the future scope and authority of the National 
Home in Palestine to be decided by developments. 
The conflicting nature of these varied commitments was not unknown 
to the British Government who endeavoured to suppress the 
discussion of the issue for the duration of the War. Hussein did not 
learn of the Sykes-Picot Agreement until a year and a half later 
when Russia's new government published secret war agreements in 
December 1917. 
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Britain was also aware of Arab feeling regarding the future of 
Palestine, and as early as March 1916, Sir Marks Sykes of the 
Foreign Office, reported that: "When in Cairo, Dr. Ferris Nimr and 
Ma. jor Faruki, poles asunder on the political question, both told me 
that Arabs, Christians and Moslems alike would fight in the matter to 
the last man against Jewish Dominion in Palestine. 1100) 
Sir Mark Sykes became an enthusiastic Zionist and his enthusiasm 
found an entirely new scope when he became a secretary to the War 
Cabinet, which included such Zionists sympathisers as., LLoyd 
George, Milner, Smuts and, of course, Balfour. According to 
Amery's memoirst Sykes in his new capacity "practically took charge 
of all the negotiations which led up to the Balfour Declaration. The 
Zionist Movement owed much at a critical moment in its history to his 
infectious enthusiasm and to his indefatigable energy. 1101) 
The attitude of Sykes is interesting and strikes a contrast when 
compared with the opinion, admittedly in retrospect, of Sir Harold 
Beeley, also a member of the Foreign Office. In assessing the 
Balfour Declaration, Beeley considered it wrong on two counts; 
firstly, "It cut across complicated areas and almost destroyed the 
policy which we (the Foreign Office) were trying to pursue in the 
Middle East of establishing close relations with the Arab provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire as they became independent. Secondly, it was a 
policy which was totally out of date because it involved the 
colonisation of a territory in Asia of European settlers. And the 
whole trend of international political thinking was winging very fast 
against that kind of development. 1102) 
Early in 1918, Sir Reginald Wingate, the newly appointed High 
Commissioner, made an attempt to assuage the Arabs, when he sent 
Hussein two telegrams which reaffirmed Britain's former pledges to 
the Arabs; held that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was not a formal 
treaty, and concluded that in any case Russia's exit from the War 
"had long ago created an altogether different situation. 11(13) These 
messages reassured Hussein and prevented the erosion of Arab 
goodwill, at least for a short time, and the British troops were 
welcomed as liberators when General Allenby and his Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force (EEF) entered Jerusalem on 11 December 1917, 
less than six weeks after the Balfour Declaration. 
However, only days after Allenby's entry Colonel Deeds of the EEF 
reported the intial reactions in Jerusalem to the Declaration: "The 
news of Mr. Balfourls Declaration regarding Palestine is new to 
Jerusalem and has caused no little apprehension. 11(14) He also 
reported the exacerbation of relations between Arab and Jew. 
General Clayton, Chief Political Officer of the EEF and head of the 
Arab Bureau lost no time in drawing the attention of London to the 
ramifications and likely effects of the Declaration on future 
Anglo-Arab relations in Palestine: "The policy.... will meet with 
strong opposition from both Christian and Moslem Arabs who have 
already shown distrust of the lengths to which His Majesty's 
Government will go as a consequence of Mr. Balfour's announcement 
to the Zionists. "(15) 
The British response was to aim to achieve a level of Arab-Zionist 
understanding which was considered essential if Britain was to 
preserve its war position in the area. In pursuit of this objective, 
the Arab Committee in Cairo undertook to send emissaries to 
Palestine to persuade the Palestinian Arabs to take a more 
conciliatory attitude towards Zionism. The British Government was 
anxious that a Zionist Commission should visit Palestine, headed by 
Dr. Chaim Weizmann with Captain W. OrmsbV-Gore, a later Colonial 
Secretary, as its liaison officer. The Foreign Office stated that the 
object of the Commission: "is to carry out, subject to General 
Allenby's authority any steps required to give effect to the 
Government declaration in favour of the establishment in Palestine of 
a national home for Jewish people.... and at the same time to allay 
Arab suspicions regarding the true aims of Zionism. "(16) The British 
officials in the area endeavoured to create a conciliatory atmosphere 
on the eve of the Zionist Commission's visit, yet when Weizmann and 
the Commission reached Palestine in April 1918, they discovered that 
"Arab agitators were proclaiming that the British had sent for the 
Jews to take over the country. "(17) 
The Commission's visit did little to promote an Arab-Zionist entente. 
In a long report to Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, Ormsby-Gore 
gave a detailed account of the reception accorded to it by the 
various communities. The report, though restrained, did not fail to 
reflect Palestinian opposition to the Balfour Declaration: "It would be 
idle to deny the existence of a good deal of mutual suspicion on the 
part of both Jews and Arabs... The Arabs are generally 
apprehensive of expropriation by the Jews and the loss of social and 
political prestige; on the other side the Jews are frightened of Arab 
attempts at domination. "(18) 
There clearly existed . even at this early stage, a distinct 
incompatibility between the Palestinian Arab quest for 
self-determination and Zionist aims in Palestine. Although, according 
to Amery many government officials were both pro-Arab and 
pro-Zionist and apparently saw no inconsistency between the two 
ideals. (19) 
As the War drew nearer to its conclusion the British were 
increasingly taking account of the importance of retaining control 
over Palestine in view of its strategic benefits to the defence of the 
Suez Canal. A memorandum on 'The Future of Palestine' by Leo 
Amery of the War Office, stressed that : "Strategically Palestine and 
Egypt go together. Not only is Palestine a necessary buffer to the 
Suez Canal, but conversely, any defence of Palestine would have its 
main base at Kantara ...... Palestine is geographically practically in 
the centre of the British Empire. "(20) The conclusions of this line 
of thinking were drawn in a memorandum by the General Staff at the 
War Office: "The creation of a buffer Jewish State in Palestine., 
though this state will be weak in itself, is strategically desirable for 
Great Britain so long as it can be created without disturbing 
Mohammadan sentiment and is not controlled by a power which is 
potentially hostile to this countrv. "(21) It is interesting to note in 
this statement the first mention of a Jewish State which, of course, 
could be conceived as something rather different than a Jewish 
National Home. 
As Arab opposition to Zionism mounted, relations between the 
Palestinian Arabs and the British Administration became strained. 
The Foreign Secretary outlined in a letter to the Prime Minister a 
reason why Britain was disinclined to grant Palestine 
self-determination: "The weak point of our position of course is that 
in the case of Palestine we deliberately and rightly decline to accept 
the principle of self-determination. If the present inhabitants were 
consulted they would unquestionably give an anti-Jewish verdict. 
Our justification for our policy is that we regard Palestine as being 
absolutely exceptional, that we consider the question of the 
Jews 
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outside Palestine as one of world importance, "(22) 
The Paris Peace Conference in April 1919 decided to send an 
Inter-Allied Commission to Syria, Palestine and Mesopotania to 
ascertain the sentiments of the people with regard to the future 
administration of their affairs. The Commission found., not 
surprisingly, that "only the Zionist Jews, about one-tenth of the 
total population, favoured the establishment of a Jewish National 
Home in Palestine. 11(23) 
Arab opposition failed to influence British policy in the manner 
intended. On the contrary, the Palestine Mandate was announced 
with the Balfour Declaration included in its articles. Also Britain 
appointed a well-known Zionist sympathiser, Herbert Samuel, as the 
first post-Mandate High Commissioner in Palestine. In his published 
memoirs, Samuel states that he had been appointed "with full 
knowledge on the part of His Majesty's Government of my Zionist 
sympathies, and no doubt largely because of them". (24) 
Subsequently, Arab determination to resist Zionism and the Balfour 
Declaration was intensified. 
From 1921, Palestine, which had hitherto been under the aegis of the 
Foreign Office, became the responsibility of the Colonial Office. The 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, visited 
Palestine in March 1921, and found the Palestinians eager to convey 
to him their strong feelings against Zionism. On March 1921 a 
deputation met Churchill at Government House, Jerusalem and 
presented the Colonial Secretary with a memorandum outlining 
Palestinian Arab grievances and demands. The Memorandum called 
for the abolition of the Jewish National Home; stoppage of 
immigration and land sales, and the establishment of a national 
Palestinian government responsible to a Parliament. (25) In his reply 
Churchill informed the Palestinian leaders that it was not in his 
power to repudiate the Balfour Declaration and to veto Jewish 
immigration to Palestine, which the Jewish National Home policy 
inevitably involved. The Balfour Declaration was a fait accompli 
brought about by the War which the Arabs in Palestine could do 
nothing but accept. (26) He assured his visitors that the Government 
y intended to stand by the second part of the Balfour Declaration full- 
which imposed a dual obligation on the Government: "if one promise 
stands so does the other. "(27) 
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Churchill's comments disappointed the Arabs and Captain Brunton of 
the General Staff Intelligence in Palestine reported that Churchill's 
visit had added to the anxiety of the Palestinians because the 
Colonial Secretary "upheld the Zionist cause and treated the Arab 
demands like those of a negligible opposition to be put off by a few 
political phrases and treated like bad children. 11(2.8) 
Demonstrations and clashes between Arabs and Jews ensued which 
prompted the High Commissioner to send a report to Churchill. 
Herbert Samuel attributed the outbreaks of violence to political and 
economic considerations aggravated by the increase of Jewish 
immigration. "The Arabs". he added, "demanded representative 
institutions and regarded the Administration as unduly 
autocratic. 11(29) 
Samuel proposed the temporary suspension of Jewish immigration; a 
stricter regulation of immigration and a consideration of the "very 
early establishment of representative institutions. 11(30) Moreover, 
Samuel, presumably acting autonomously, made a speech at an 
Assembly in Jerusalem in which he re-interpreted the meaning of the 
Balfour Declaration in a manner designed to allay the fears of the 
Palestinian Arabs and to promote tranquility in Palestine. Samuel 
promised the Palestinians that Britain "would never impose upon them 
a policy which the people had reason to think was contrary to their 
religious, political or economic interests. 11(31) 
Churchillt however, was unwilling to conciliate the Palestinians by 
means of political concessions, but nevertheless raised the Palestine 
Question before Cabinet: "The situation in Palestine causes me 
perplexity and anxiety. The whole country is in a ferment. The 
Zionist policy is profoundly unpopular with all except Zionists. Both 
Arabs and Jews are ... ready to spring at each other's throats.... In 
the interests of the Zionist policy, all elective institutions have so 
far been refused to the Arabs. "(32) He concluded by requesting that 
the whole situation be reviewed by the Cabinet, which was accepted 
by the Members. After discussion the Cabinet agreed not to yield to 
Arab demands and a decision was made to allow the Mandate, 
inclusive of the Balfour Declaration, to stand. 
By the time the Palestine Mandate was brought into full operation by 
the League of Nations Council 'Resolution of 29 September 1923, the 
attitude of the three parties to the Palestine dispute had already 
crystallised. The British Government stood firmly by the Balfour 
Declaration and the Jewish National Home policy, guided by the 
theory of 'dual obligation' and the principle of 'economic absorptive 
capacity' on immigration policy. The Zionists were sati 
" 
sfied that the 
articles of the Mandate were conducive to the achievement of their 
immediate basic aim, the establishment of a National homeland. They 
were opposed to representative institutions and the application of 
self-determination on the grounds that the Arab majority would use 
such institutions to fight Zionism and revoke the Mandate. The 
Palestinian Arabs believed that Britain and the Mandate were the 
protectors of Zionism, and that the Jewish National Home policy 
represented the convergence of British imperial interests with Zionist 
colonialism in Palestine which was bound to lead to a Jewish majority 
and supremacy and the eventual eviction of the Arabs from 
Palestine. 
(ii)_The Period 1924 - 1936 
Between 1924 and 1928 the Palestinian political scene witnessed a 
period of stagnation and paralysis, although hostilities still existed 
beneath the surface calm. These hostilities manifested themselves 
when in 1925 Lord Balfour visited Palestine with the object of 
opening the Hebrew University. The day Balfour arrived in the 
country a general strike was observed by Muslims and Christians 
throughout Palestine. An Arab representative passed a motion to 
the High Commissioner inviting Lord Balfour to leave the country 
which, it was stated, he had entered against the wishes of the 
inhabitants. (33) 
When, shortly afterwards, the new Colonial Secretary, L. S. Amery 
visited Palestine he received a Palestinian Arab deputation, headed 
by Sheikh al-Farouki, who outlined the view that eventually Britain 
would reach the conclusions that the Zionist policy was 
inapplicable. (34) Of course, Amery was a Zionist svmpathiser who 
had originally been won over to the cause by Sir Mark Sykes. 
Amery revealed his views some years later: "I confess that mv 
interest (in Palestine) was, at first, largely strategical. I was keen 
on an advance into Palestine and Syria on military grounds and the 
idea of consolidating that advance by establishing in Palestine a 
prosperous community bound to Britain by ties of gratitude and 
interest naturally appealed to me ...... But it was not long before I 
realised what Jewish energy in every field of thought and action 
might mean for the regeneration of the whole of the Middle Eastern 
region. 11 (3 5) 
Amery was quite aware of the dissension between Arab and Jew 
although, nevertheless, felt that Lord Plumer, the successor to 
Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner would take over the country in 
good shape materially "even if Jew and Arab still remained 
diametrically opposed over the Mandate. "(36) Lord Plumer assumed 
office at a time when the Palestinian Arabs were adopting a more 
conciliatory approach to the Government. The factors involved in 
this change of policy were, firstly, the sharp decline in Jewish 
immigration. In 1927 immigration was represented by a negative 
figure and in 1928 immigration and emigration balanced one another; 
secondly, the degree of factionalism which existed between the 
Palestinian Arab leaders. To an extent the opposition to Zionism was 
overshadowed by power seeking within the Muslim community. (37) 
It was not until 1929 that the Arab-Jewish animosity intensified; and 
it was a religious issue, that of the 'Buraql or 'Wailing Wall' which 
triggered off the disturbances. The rising began as an anti-Jewish 
outburst but soon there were reprisal attacks from the Jewish 
community, until ultimately over 1000 persons were charged by the 
Palestine Administration. In January 1929, Sir John Chancellor, the 
new High Commissioner., reported to the Colonial Secretary, Lord 
Passfield, that as a consequence of the recent outbreaks "a wave of 
Pan Arab nationalist sentiment has swept over Palestine and the 
neighbouring Arab countries, and it is certain that the political 
situation will never again be as it was. "(38) Chancellor was clearly 
aware of the radical change in the Palestinian Arabs' political 
outlook. 
A sense of identity had undoubtedly been kindled in the 1920s, 
particularly after the establishment of the British Mandate. Political 
consciousness had developed as a response to Jewish nationalism. 
Throughout the 1920s, Palestinian Arab nationalism, led by a 
coalition of Muslim landed gentry and upper middle-class Christian 
Arab families, resembled political movements then emerging elsewhere 
in the Arab world. Some 80% of its constituency was a political1v 
unsophisticated rural peasantrv. There was little if any ideology, 
with the major emphasis placed on the elimination of British controls 
and European Jewish influences. (39) In a sense, the quest for 
self-determination was the precursor of Arab nationalism; a 
development which may not have occurred had Britain adopted a 
different policy towards Palestine. (40) 
In 1930 a Commission was set up by the Government to investigate 
the disturbances in Palestine (41) and reported that Zionist land 
acquisition and Jewish colonisation were the foremost Arab 
grievances. The Arabs, the Commission stated, wýre convinced that 
Zionist land settlement and immigration schemes would inevitably 
result in the complete subordination of the Arabs as a race, the 
expropriation of their people from the soil, and the unemployment of 
a large number and their displacement by Jews. (42) 
Responding to the findings of the Commission, the Prime Minister of 
the new Labour Administration, Ramsay MacDonald, together with 
Lord Passfield the Colonial Secretary, agreed to receive an Arab 
delegation in London on 30 March 1930. In the discussions which 
took place the Palestinian leaders demanded the prohibition of land 
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sales from Arabs to non-Arabs; the stoppage of Jewish immigration 
and the institution of a national parliamentary government in 
accordance with Article 22 of the League's covenant. The British 
Government maintained that they were under obligation to carry out 
the administration of Palestine in accordance with the Articles of the 
Mandate, and MacDonald and Passfield agreed to act on land sales 
and Jewish immigration after their envoy, Sir John Hope Simpson, 
had investigated the situation and submitted his recommendations. 
Simpson's findings were to become the basis of a Government 
Statement of Policy which was later known as Passfield's White Paper. 
Simpson's Report drew two conclusions: firstly, that if all the 
cultivable land in Palestine were divided up among the Arab 
agricultural population there would be insufficient to provide every 
family with a decent livelihood; secondly, that at the time of 
investigation, there was no room for additional settlers if the living 
standards of the Arab population were to be maintained. 
Furthermore., Simpson expressed his conviction that Arab 
unemployment was serious and widespread and that it was unwise to 
admit Jewish immigrants to fill vacancies in Palestine when 
unemployed Arabs were capable of filling the vacancy. (43) 
While upholding the theory of 'dual obligation' under the Mandate and 
the principle of 'economic absorptive capacity' as a regulative guide 
to the number of Jewish immigrants allowed into the country, 
Passfield's White Paper essentially promised to implement Simpson's 
recommendations. Predictably, the White Paper pleased the Arabs 
and incensed the Jews. 
The White Paper marked a shift in British Government policy in that 
it displayed a certain sympathy towards the Arab community in 
Palestine; a shift which was at odds with Labour Party commitments. 
In fact, at the Labour Party Conference in 1931, the National 
Executive Committee decided to appoint a sub-committee to study the 
White Paper and its possible ramifications. Discussions were to be 
held with the Jewish Socialist Labour Confederation (Poale Zion) 
which was affiliated to the Labour Party. Protests and criticism of 
the White Paper had been received from various Jewish Socialist 
organisations both in Europe and the United States. Arising from 
the NEC debate a statement was issued to the Press outlining 
Labour's views: "We are profoundly disturbed that our Jewish 
friends in Palestine and their colleagues abroad should doubt our 
sympathy with their ideals or suspect the British Labour Government 
of putting obstacles in the way of their practical realisation within 
the Mandate. " However, conceivably in the interests of Party unity, 
the statement went on to support the Government: "It is precisely 
the purpose of the British Labour Government's policy to provide the 
conditions for the orderly and consistent development of Palestine so 
as to avoid unintentional injustices to the non-Jewish sections of the 
community, and at the same time secure a broader and more certain 
basis for the growth of the Jewish National Home. "(44) 
As a result of the outcry against the White Paper, Passfield informed 
Chancellor of the necessity of finding a means of co-operation with 
the Jewish Organisation and to this end Passfield concluded that 
there seemed no alternative but to allow a letter from Ramsay 
MacDonald to Dr. Weizmann to be published. The letter, the 
Colonial Secretary stated, defined "our policy in Palestine in terms 
more precise and more acceptable to the Jews than those of the White 
Paper. "(45) Passfield recognised that the publication of such 
correspondence would increase Chancellor's difficulties with the Arab 
community but maintained that this outcome was unavoidable "for 
political and international reasons", arising from Zionist 
pressure. (46) 
In his letter to Weizmann, MacDonald asserted that His Majesty's 
Government intended to stand by the Mandate, which they viewed as 
an obligation to World Jewry and not only to the Jews of Palestine; 
to uphold the Jewish National Home policy by further land settlement 
and immigration by Jews and to condone the Zionist policy of 
insisting on Jewish labour for work on Jewish enterprises. (47) 
Weizmann considered the letter to be a decisive factor, "which 
enabled us to make the magnificent gains of the ensuing years"(48) 
Whether or not Weizmann's assessment was correct is open to 
con. jecture for in a matter of a few years international events were to 
have a profound effect on the internal strife in that troubled area. 
The rise of Fascism in Germany and the concomitant increase in 
Jewish immigration to Palestine exacerbated the existing hostilities 
between the two communities. 
The flow of Jewish immigration in 1933 assumed such proportions that 
it prompted the current High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope, in 
a despatch to the Colonial Secretary, to admit that "during the past 
twelve months the control of immigration into Palestine has broken 
down, and the principle of allowing settlers to enter in accordance 
with the absorptive capacity of the country has not been 
observed. "(49) In addition, the resolutions of the Zionist Congress 
in Prague which favoured unrestricted immigration to Palestine in 
view of the Nazi persecution, aggravated aný already existent volatile 
situation. (50) The Arab response took the form of demonstrations, 
strikes and a threat to Wauchope that they would take the situation 
into their own hands in order to prevent the flood of Jewish 
immigrants. Ultimately, riots ensued, the severity of which 
compelled the High Commissioner to appoint a Commission of Enquiry. 
The Enquiry found that the Arabs' disposition to the use of violence 
in order to deflect the Mandatory power from its commitments, 
clearly revealed the depth of their feelings against the Jewish 
National Home and in favour of a pursuit of national 
independence. (51) 
The British Government, too, viewed the deteriorating situation with 
concern. British interests in Palestine were no longer confined to 
the defence of the Suez Canal. The Mosul-Haifa pipeline, the Haifa 
harbour and the Imperial Airways route to India via Gaza, rendered 
Palestine an essential link in British strategy and the Empire's 
system of communication. 
However, explosive as the situation was, Wauchope, who was 
certainly politically attuned, (53) was not as alarmed as he might 
have been for three main reasons: firstly, because the character of 
because the fellaheen did the riots were purelV political; secondIV 
not Join in the riots; and thirdly, because of the factionalism and 
lack of organisation among the Arab leaders. (54) Subsequently, 
this 
reading of the situation was to change. 
An event occurred in 1935 which further damaged relations between 
the Arabs and the Palestine Administration. A young revolutionarv 
Arab, Oassam, who captured the spirit of Arab nationalismg tried to 
initiate an armed revolt against the British and the Zionists. it 
failed and Qassam, refusing to surrender, was killed in the abortive 
attempt. Qassam's seemingly heroic death to the Arab community 
soon became the symbol of self-sacrifice and martydom and his 
funeral occasioned a great demonstration in which the police were 
attacked. Following from this event the Arab communitv became 
more militant and issued a statement to the High Commissioner 
asserting that unless they received satisfactory replies to their 
requests: "extreme and irresponsible counsels will prevail and the 
political situation will rapidly deteriorate. 11(55) 
Alive to the dangerous state of Arab opinion in Palestine, the High 
Commissioner was authorised by J. H. Thomas, the Colonial 
Secretary, following a Cabinet decision, to make an announcement 
regarding the setting up of a legislative council. This statement 
went some way towards appeasing the Arab community, but aroused 
the opposition of the Jewish leaders. When the proposed Legislative 
Council, which would include a proportion of Arab and Jewish 
representatives relative to the respective siz e of their 
populations, came to be debated in the House Commons on 25 March 
1936(56) the existence of serious doubt was revealed in all parts of 
the House as to the desirability of proceeding with the proposals. 
The members considered the Jews to have made a significant 
contribution to the economic development of Palestine(57) and 
maintained that the introduction of a Legislative Council policy would 
contravene the aims of the Mandate. 
When the Arabs gleaned the news that doubts were arising within 
the British Government regarding the institution of a Legislative 
Council they reasserted their demand that all Jewish immigration 
should cease. The Government, however, announced a new Jewish 
Labour Schedule of 4,500 immigrants to be admitted for the following 
six months. It was this development which precipitated the Arab 
revolt against the British authorities and resulted in military 
reinforcements being sent into Palestine from Egypt and Malta. it 
was the scale of this violence, in part conditioned by British policy 
vacillations, which led the Government to appoint a Royal Commission 
of Enquiry to investigate the causes of the unrest. 
The Commission., headed by Lord Peel, and discussed in greater 
detail in a subsequent chapter, heralded a critical development in 
the relationship between the British Government and the Arab and 
Jewish communities in Palestine. Thus, by 1936 the Palestine 
question was already set to become a contentious issue within the 
British political arena. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PARTY AND DEPARTMENTAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS PALESTINE 
1917/1936 
Introduction 
In order to understand the dynamics of party behaviour in the post 
1937 period, an overview of party policy towards Palestine in the 
1920s and early 1930s is essential. This Chapter, therefore, will 
concern itself with the development of such policy in both the 
Labour and Conservative Parties; the extent to which policy made in 
Opposition was carried out in Office; and the influence of the 
Foreign and Colonial Offices on the government of the day. 
1. The Labour Party 
The Early Years 
The first reference to Palestine in early Labour Party literature 
appears in the proposals, drafted by Sidney Webb, for the document 
'Memorandum on War Aims' in August 1917; some three months before 
the text of the Balfour Declaration was released. The Memorandum 
contained a section entitled: 'The Jews and Palestine' which read: 
"The British Labour Movement demands for Jews of all countries the 
same elementary rights of tolerance, freedom of residence and trade, 
and equal citizenship that ought to be extended to all inhabitants of 
every nation. It further expresses the hope that it might be 
practicable by agreement among all the nations to set free Palestine 
from the harsh oppressive government of the Turk, in order that 
such of the Jewish people as desire to do so may return and may 
work out their own salvation free from interference by those of alien 
race or religion. 11(l) 
The final draft of the Memorandum, with the paragraph on Palestine 
intact, was approved by a Special Conference of the Labour Party 
and the TUC in the December of that year, and later accepted as 
the basis for a joint declaration at the Inter-Allied Socialist 
Conference in February 1918. However., when the Balfour Declaration 
was announced the response of Labour politicians was cautious, with 
MacDonald congratulating the Zionists on their success but hoping 
that "no untoward event will prevent the fulfilment of your 
desires. 11 (2) 
The Balfour Declaration, with its reference to the rights of 'existing 
non-Jewish communities in Palestine' was certainly ambiguous; (3) yet 
Webb's statement seemingly linked the future of Palestine solely with 
the needs of European Jewry and simply avoided any mention of the 
existing population. According to this statement Jewish settlement 
could take place 'free from interference by those of alien race or 
religion', and as such, a precedent had been set for future Labour 
Party doctrine on the question of Palestine; a doctrine which 
essentially managed to combine a sympathy for Zionism with a 
complete disregard for any potential dangers and injustices which 
might arise from it. 
It has been argued that the attitude of the Labour Party to Palestine 
can only be understood if viewed in the context of certain ideological 
traditions. (4) However, confusion arises if this line of argument is 
followed because of the contradictory ideas on colonisation prevalent 
in the Movement at that time. A dichotomy clearly existed between 
Fabian economic and social engineering within the Empire(5) and the 
Hobsonian critique of imperialism. (6) Of course, it must be 
remembered that in 1917 the Party was still in its infancy and often 
statements issued reflected this stage of development,, being at best 
vague, if well intentioned. 
As will be seen from the Party's later pronouncements on Palestine, 
there exists much evidence to support Richard Rose's view that 
"feelings within the Party were shaped as much accidental and 
personal as ideological. 11(7) Certainly, initial links between Zionists 
and Labour were furthered not by developments in Palestine,, but as 
a consequence of the wave of progroms in Poland and elsewhere 
which afflicted East European Jews at the close of World War I. 
These developments came as a confirmation of the need for Jews to 
acquire a National Home in Palestine, which, the Zionists stressed, 
would become a socialist state. The Labour Party, clearly 
sympathetic to the plight of European Jewry, and undoubtedly 
attracted by the idea of a socialist state which would "save Palestine 
from Capitalism, 11(8) accepted the affiliation of Poale Zion, the Jewish 
Socialist Labour Confederation. 
The Poale Zion (Workers of Zion) Movement had originated in Russia 
at the end of the 19th Century and was introduced in Britain by 
Russian-Jewish immigrants in 1905. At its inception the leading 
figure within the British Poale Zion was Kalman Marmor, a friend of 
Chaim Weizmann, although the latter was unconnected with the 
Movement. The Organisation held its first Conference in Liverpool 
in December 1906 where it committed itself to class struggle, the 
socialisation of the means of production and the "territorial solution 
of the Jewish question through the establishment of a Jewish 
Commonwealth in Palestine. "(9) 
In 1917, Poale Zion recruited new members and by its annual 
Conference in April 1918, one source spoke of a tenfold increase in 
membership from its pre-war level of 100.00) The following year 
witnessed an organisational change in Poale Zion whereby an 
Executive was set up and special committees were established to 
propagandise its views. Poale Zion now attempted to define its aims 
more clearly in that its programme for the prospective development 
of Jewish life in Palestine included: "The nationalisation of land, 
railways, trams, telephones and water; a minimum wage and the 
creation of a co-operative bank. "(11) Poale Zion's attraction to the 
British Labour Party stemmed directly from the Party's declaration on 
Palestine contained in its document, a 'Memorandum on War Aims', 
and its potential value as a channel through which Poale Zion could 
articulate its sentiments. 
It is certainly clear that as a consequence of its affiliation there 
existed from 1920 onwards a compact and influential Zionist pressure 
group within the Labour Party. Although small in membership, it 
did not exceed more than 1700 members, it was to play a vital role 
in providing a point of access into Labour Party politics and in 
inspiring and co-ordinating manifestations of support for Zionism 
within the Movement. 
The Palestinian Arab representatives made sporadic attempts to 
mobilise support within the Party but as foreign supplicants lacking 
any base in British political life, their position was in striking 
contrast to that of the Zionists' spokesmen, who could rely upon, not 
only a large body of sympathetic public opinion, but also, an 
influential domestic Zionist organisation. Socialist Zionists were able 
to develop intimate institutional and personal links with the Labour 
Party which their Palestinian rivals could not hope to match. 
Nevertheless., despite the existence of these strong ties between the 
Zionists and the Labour Party it would be erroneous to suggest that 
Poale Zion gained all it desired from the Movement. In fact, during 
the early months of its affiliation Poale Zion applied for direct 
representation on the International Advisory Committee; an attmept 
which was rejected by the Party. Sargent, in his doctoral thesis, 
interestingly points out that the meeting, at which the decision was 
taken, was unusually highly attended and included Ernest Bevin, 
Cole, Bennett, Stokes and Woolf. (12) It is difficult to assess how 
members voted but not unreasonable to deduce that Bennett and 
Stokes,, both later known as 'pro-Arab', opposed Zionist membership. 
Bevin's opinion on this matter remains unclear. 
Throughout the Mandatory period, non - representation on the 
Committee was to be a recurring irritation and conceivably one 
reason why the Advisory Committee was consistently to display less 
sympathy for Zionist aspirations than its parent body, the National 
Executive Committee. 
In 1920, Poale Zion participated for the first time in a Labour Party 
conference, and a resolution urging the Government to remove 
restrictions on Jewish immigration and to allow "immediate entry to 
the large number of suffering Jews in Eastern Europe anxiously 
waiting to settle in Palestine, 11 was proposed by Mr. Pomerantz of 
Poale Zion and seconded by Oscar Tobin of Stepney Central Labour 
Party. On the recommendation of the Standing Orders Committee, 
the resolution was passed unanimously, without discussion. 03) 
Despite the emphasis of the resolution on the question of 
immigration, the 1920s proved to be years of slow and unspectacular 
Jewish colonisation. However, Poale Zion had secured a niche within 
the Labour party and the many friendships and contacts between 
Zionists and Party members which developed throughout the decade 
tended to consolidate its position inside the British Labour 
Movement. Ramsay MacDonald, among numerous others, visited 
Palestine and returned enthusing about the country and the Jewish 
community - (14) 
In July 1922 the Labour Party was called upon for the first time to 
demonstrate its Zionist sympathies in Parliament. The debate in the 
Commons focused on the Mandate and Labour's spokesman, Morgan 
Jones seized the opportunity to outline the Party's views. He 
asserted that "on sentimental grounds, as well as on the grounds of 
good statesmanship, good policy and good politics" the Mandate in 
Palestine should be upheld. In the course of his speech Jones 
attacked the Conservatives for being rather slow to discover the 
"principle of self-determination. 11 (15) This was a potentially 
dangerous offensive for a number of critics had begun to question 
the compatibility of the commitment to Zionism with an overall policy 
of support for self-determination. Some official policy statments had 
blandly ignored the possible contradictions. Arthur Henderson had 
stated in an early document on the post-war aims of the Labour 
Party: "There will have to be certain restorations and 
reconstitutions. Such necessary changes will be covered by the 
application of the principle of the right of self-determination. The 
question of ..... Palestine (is) capable of being settled on this 
It basis. (16) J. M. Clynes had strongly supported 
Campbell- Bannerman's views that "Good government is no substitute 
for self-government. 1107) 
Ernest Bennett, a former Liberal MP, considered support for the 
Mandate to be ill-advised and T. Williams characterised the Mandate 
policy as "one designed to control Palestine in the interests of the 
Jews, as long as they are in a minority; when they reach a majority 
control is to be relaxed and Palestine will be run as an independent 
state. " Consequently, he argued, the Labour Party was acting in 
contradiction to its own fundamental principles by supporting a 
policy of running Palestine in the interests of a privileged minority. 
Williams protested strongly against the Party's argument that Britain 
was aiding the Arabs by raising their standard of living: "we think 
we know better for them than they do themselves. 11(18) 
However, this line of argument ran against the tide of official party 
policy, which failed to accept the notion that Zionism could in any 
way pose a threat to the Arab inhabitants of Palestine or that, 
indeed, any hostility existed between the two peoples. Public 
statements stressed that the conflict in Palestine lay solely between 
Socialism and Capitalism and this view was reflected in the resolution 
adopted by the 1921 Conference which stated that Palestine should be 
developed "not upon the foundations of capitalist exploitation , but in 
the interests of Labour. 11 According to the Conference decision the 
object of the Mandate was the establishment of a "Jewish Autonomous 
Commonwealth - 11 (19) 
1 (ii)Labour Enters Government 
During Labour's brief period in office in 1924 the question of 
Palestine was not raised and the Party's policy remained untested. 
However, by the time the Labour Party assumed power for the 
second time, Palestine had become an urgent problem requiring the 
immediate attention of the new government. Although Labour's term 
of Office has been briefly discussed in the previous chapter this 
section will confine itself to an analysis of the internal conflict within 
the Party as it faced, for the first time, the dichotomy between 
policy made in Opposition and that which is pursued in Government. 
This contradiction was to have an even greater impact upon the 
Party when it subsequently gained ofice in 1945. 
Amid the disturbances which occurred in Palestine in 1929, (20) the 
Government announced that a Royal Commission would be sent to 
Palestine, chaired by Sir Walter Shaw. In an attempt to avoid party 
controversy his three colleagues were drawn from each of the major 
parties; the Labour representative being Harry Snell, the MP for 
Woolwich East, whose only knowledge of Palestine stemmed from his 
readings of the Bible. (21) 
The Zionists were wary of the Commission and whilst investigations 
were still being undertaken.. Poale Zion sent an emergency resolution 
to the NEC for the forthcoming Annual Conference. The resolution, 
which was critical of the government and destined to be contentious, 
was not submitted to Conference. The Committee's behaviour would 
appear to give prima facie support to Lewis Minkin's view that the 
National Executive Committee, throughout Labour's period in office 
acted as a mobilising and supportive agency of the Government. (22) 
The point at which this argument fails to apply can be seen at 
Conference the following year when the NEC supported a pro-Zionist 
resolution in defiance of the Government. (23) 
Interestingly., at the time the Commission was instigated the New 
Statesman and Nation starkly re-oriented its previous position on 
Palestine: "We shall have to abandon both the appearance and the 
reality of that pro-Jewish bias which inspired our original acceptance 
of the Mandate. " It also commented that the Balfour Declaration had 
been "itself a dangerous leap in the dark. Moreover, it cut across 
other pledges which we have previously given to the Arabs. It was 
a blunder perhaps the worst blunder that Lord Balfour ever made in 
his political life... in short, the historical case of Jewish rights in 
Palestine, with all its religious, political., financial and sentimental 
backing, is in truth no case at all. "(24) 
Following this publication Labour MPs hastened to reassure Zionist 
opinion and at the Brighton Conference in 1929, Henderson, the 
Foreign Secretary, briefly referred to Palestine in order to reaffirm 
the Government's adherence to the Mandate. (25) 
When the Shaw Report was published in March, 1930, the Zionists 
were dismayed by its findings. It stated that certain factors 
contributed greatly to Arab unrest: firstly, the Arabs feared that 
continued Jewish immigration and land purchases would ultimately 
make them a minority in what they considered to be their own 
country; secondly, the Arabs were concerned about being 
economically as well as politically subjugated by the Jews. They 
complained that although Zionists were claiming to bring great 
material benefits to the Arabs, the Zionists not only excluded Arabs 
from their farm lands but also Zionist industries frowned on the 
hiring of Arab workers. Thirdly, the Arabs observed that the 
British Government appeared to pursue policies favourable to the 
Zionists and consequently, lacking confidence in the arbitration of 
the British Government and lacking what they considered to be 
adequate peaceful means for attaining their goals, many Palestinian 
Arabs were beginning to believe that the use of force was the only 
practical means left open to them. The Commission, therefore, 
recommended that Zionist land settlement and immigration levels 
should be reviewed by the British government. (26) 
The Report itself, however, was not unanimous. Snell had disagreed 
with the outcome and had written to Passfield a long note of 
reservation, expressing his misgivings. The Palestinian Arabs had 
criticised his views and considered them to be based on party 
considerations,, which he, of course, strenuously denied. (27) 
In an attempt to appease the Zionists MacDonald invited Dr. 
Weizmann to a meeting in order to discuss the Report. Weizmann 
was incensed with its conclusions and attacked MacDonald, the 
Government and the Palestine Administration for dismissing Zionist 
aims. (28) As a result of this conversation the Parliamentary Palestine 
Committee was reformed to be a watchdog for Zionist interests. This 
Committee had initially been instigated in 1926 by the Conservative 
MP 1, S. Finburgh, but Labour members, including MacDonald and 
Snowden, had joined the Committee at that time. In 1930 it was 
Josiah Wedgwood, an ardent pro-Zionist, who took a leading part in 
forming the new Committee which included not only a number of 
Labour MPs but also, Amery, Samuel and James de Rothschild. 
Conservative participation with Labour was not solely confined to the 
interests of the Zionist cause. A small number of Labour MPs led by 
Seymour Cocks and J. McShane, were able with the help of certain 
Conservative MPs to further the Arab case. This Group pursued 
the argument that the Government, by refusing to publish the 
McMahon-Hussein correspondence, was not being totally open about 
the Palestine affair, (29) and in a series of Parliamentary Questions, 
Cocks, and Howard Bury, a Conservative, urged publication. 
The Government steadily refused to do so and on 7 May 1930, Cocks 
raised the matter on the Adjournment. Cocks, Bury and McShane, 
joined by some Zionist sympathisers,, including Fenner Brockway, 
asserted that promises made to the Arabs should be acknowledged 
and taken into consideration. For the Government, Drummond 
Shiels, the Colonial Under- Secretary, claimed that publication was 
not in the public interest but did promise a departmental review of 
the situation. (30) 
However, after a series of debates throughout the summer,, a Private 
Notice Question in Cocks' name brought the final decision against 
publication. (31) This apparent blurring of party positions on 
the 
question of Palestine coupled with the agreement between 
the 
Conservative leader, Baldwin and the Liberal leader, Lloyd George, 
that the Shaw Report was unsatisfactory, placed the Government in 
an embarrassing position. Consequently, at a Cabinet meeting 
it was 
decided that a more authoritative examination of land settlement, 
immigration and development was required, with only Passfield 
dissenting - It was further agreed that a Cabinet Committee be set 
up comprising: Passfield, Henderson T-Shaw, Secretary of State for 
War and Lord Thompson, Secretary of State for Air., to overview 
policy towards Palestine. (32) However, these ad hoc Palestine 
Committees tended to act as bodies for deliberation rather than as 
groups for formulating policy. (33) 
It is difficult at this stage to assess MacDonald's attitude to the 
issue as conflicting statements emerge. On the one hand Weizmann 
spoke of the Prime Minister's 11100% Zionism"(34) and on the other, 
MacDonald is reported to have found the Zionists greatly trying his 
patience. (35) However,, neither of these reports are verbatim and it 
would be unwise to overlook their possible subjectivity. 
The outcome of the Hope-Simpson investigations and the subsequent 
White Paper, (36) curtailing Jewish immigration initiated what 
Passfield had predicted as the "Jewish Hurricane"(37) and further 
exacerbated the growing divide between Party and Government. The 
1930 Conference, in contrast to the previous year, passed without 
dissent and with the approval of Hugh Dalton, representing the 
NEC,, a long resolution from Poale Zion which included a demand for 
"the development of the economic possibilities of the whole of the 
Mandated territory and the encouragement of Jewish 
immigration. 11(38) In case anyone missed the evident contradictions 
between the resolution and the White Paper, Commander 
Kenworthy, (later Lord Strabolgi), elucidated them in a letter to The 
Times. (39) 
The Conference resolution, although satisfying the sectional interests 
of the Zionists and their supporters in the Party, had taken little, if 
any, account of the rapidly deteriorating economic climate in which 
the Government was operating. Massive investment in Palestine was 
totally dismissed at Cabinet level, by Snowden, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, when he stated that "there could be no question of large 
scale expenditure. 1100) 
Factions within the Conservative Party rejected the White Paper 
proposals and Amery, Baldwin and Sir Austen Chamberlain co-signed 
a letter to The Times asserting that "policy was so definitely 
negative, that it appears to conflict with the intention of the 
Mandate and the whole spirit of the Balfour Declaration. 11(41) The 
two legal experts., Lord Hailsham and Sir. J. Simon questioned the 
validity of the White Paper, in further correspondence to The Times 
and suggested obtaining "from the Hague Court an advisory opinion 
on the questions involved.... the British Government should not 
enforce those paragraphs which are challenged unless and until the 
Court had pronounced in their favour. "(42) 
The situation had developed into a political storm, with threats being 
made to MacDonald and Passfield, by Labour MPs, that many Labour 
members saw little alternative but to go into the opposition lobby 
when the House divided on the White Paper policy. MacDonald was 
becoming anxious, not only by the inter-party strife, but also, 
because a by-election was imminent in the predominantly Jewish 
constituency of Whitechapel St. George, in the heart of the East 
End. He confided to his diary: "even if the present clouds were to 
roll by... the position of the Government is steadily becoming 
worse. With blunders like Palestine... I can do nothing. "(43) The 
by-election was crucial to the Government which the Conservative 
Party fully realised. It would be naive to believe that the 
Opposition's militancy over the question of Palestine stemmed purely 
from altruistic motives. it was more likely to be generated by a 
desire to belabour a minority goverment and make capital out of the 
Government's handling of the crisis. 
The Zionists were, unquestionably, establishing a stronger position; 
the White paper had been roundly condemned; the opposition and a 
section of the Labour Party were up in arms; and American Jewish 
pressure was Powerful. 
Throughout the Whitechapel electoral campaign Poale Zion openly 
criticised both the Government and the White Paper,, thus making the 
by-election a prospective failure for the Labour Party. At this point 
Ernest Bevin appeared on the scene, and played a significant role 
in 
the Government's subsequent change of heart over the White Paper. 
Bevin had been invited to stand as the Labour candidate but refused 
in favour of a TGWU organiser, James Hall. Yet he was fully aware 
of the importance of the by-election to the 
Government and 
immediately embarked upon appeasing the Jewish community. In a 
conference with Poale Zion, Bevin stated that he would 
"instruct my 
boys to vote against the Government if the White Paper was not 
amended . 11 (44) Some days later, in a conversation with Henderson , Bevin again threatened to withdraw union support if assurances were 
not forthcoming. These threats came as one more devastating blow 
to an already battered Government, with the consequence that a 
public statement was swiftly released. It told of the representations 
made by the TGWU to the government and of the latters's assurances 
that Jewish protests had been founded on a complete misconception. 
Following from this statement came a definite pledge: the Government 
neither enacted nor intended any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish 
immigration and would expressly provide for the continuation of 
colonisation operations without a break. (45) 
Many years later it was clear that Bevin took great pride in his 
achievement and probably considered it expedient to do so at the 
time, when he reminisced to a Labour Party Conference how he had: 
"got MacDonald to make Arthur Henderson the Chairman of a 
Committee. This Committee amended the White Paper and the Jews 
were very pleased. "(46) 
As a result of the statement,, Poale Zion altered its position by 
supporting the Labour candidate and the Party ultimately gained the 
Whitechapel seat. The unwelcome by-election in a particularly 
sensitive area had seriously worried the Government and the Party, 
and Zionist pressure had acquired a potency it might otherwise not 
have achieved. Jewish influence had been channelled and amplified 
by the Labour Party and the Trade Union Movement and had clearly 
helped modify, if in a rather obvious manner, the Government's 
policy. It was the overt character of Zionist pressure which 
occasioned much criticism, especially from the Colonial Office. 
Although, Departmental policies and attitudes during this period will 
be discussed in detail in a subsequent section, for purely illustrative 
purposes it is interesting at this stage to relate Sir John Campbell's 
statement. The Economic Adviser stated: "The Government has 
treated the whole thing in a most deplorably rotten way .... and in 
my private opinion the Prime Minister was prepared to abandon the 
White Paper if it should seem necessary to gain Whitechapel. "(47) 
Further criticism stemmed from Labour Party members sympathetic to 
the Arab viewpoint. G. T. Garratt,, wrote of the Government 
appearing "to be like a reed blown hither and thither by every wind 
which may blow from New York, from Delhi, or even from 
Whitechapel. 11 (48) 
The Labour Party in Opposition had formulated its Policies far from 
the realities of Office and had,, in the absence of advice from the 
Civil Service or other interested parties, (49) come to rely upon the 
assistance of pressure groups. In the case of Palestine the most 
vocal pressure group was Poale Zion and its attendant supporters. 
As such, Labour., prior to 1929, had developed a one-dimensional 
view of the Palestine problem which, when Office was attained., 
appeared at once impractical and excessively partisan; particularly, 
as the violent disturbances occurring in Palestine coincided with the 
Party entering Government. The new Government clearly had to 
appear to be in command of the situation and it not unwisely 
appointed a Royal Commission to investigate the problem. Where the 
Government seemingly failed, and this was possibly created by the 
lack of a well-formulated policy in Opposition, was in its response to 
the findings of the Commission. It was not unnatural that the 
Government should fall foul of the Party when the White Paper so 
dramatically contradicted previous Labour commitments to Palestine. 
The Labour Party's previous lack of foresight coupled with the 
Opposition's stridency and by-election difficulties, placed the 
Government in the untenable position of appearing, quite accurately 
of course, to be unable to sustain a policy and being obliged to 
change direction under duress. 
I OR) Labour and Palestine 1931-1936 
For some time after the 1931 debacle Palestine was little discussed 
within the Labour Movement, partly because the issue was spent, for 
the moment anyway, but mainly because the Party, scarred by the 
splits in its ranks, was preoccupied with other matters. 
The process of formulating a party policy for Palestine throughout 
the 1930s took place within the Advisory Committee on Imperial 
Affairs. The Committee,, although less concerned with immediate 
political considerations, had the responsibility of advising the NEC 
on developments and problems in the field of colonial affairs. 
Membership of the Committee included Lord Snell and Leonard Woolf, 
both of whom were avowed pro-Zionists. (50) 
Renewed consideration of the Palestine problem occurred in 1933 when 
the National Government announced in the Commons its intention to 
institute a Legislative Council. (51) The matter was brought to the 
attention of the Advisory Committee for its consideration by William 
Gillies, and resulted in a resolution drafted by Leonard Woolf, being 
accepted by the NEC. The resolution was in stark contrast to 
Palestinian Arab demands and rejected the establishment of a 
Legislative Council "whether composed of nominated or elected 
members-" Once again the Party contradicted its commitment to 
representative self-government. Yet on this occasion it appeared to 
realise the inconsistency of its position and the resolution went on to 
stress that opposition to the Council "should be based solely on the 
contention that the moment is inopportune. 11(52) 
Amid the deteriorating situation in Palestine, the question of a 
Legislative Council was raised continually between 1933 and 1936. In 
fact, Creech-Jones had written to Arthur Lourie of the Jewish 
Agency, stating; "I think the question of a Legislative Council for 
Palestine is very much in the newspapers. Do you want any 
questions put in the House?.... if I can be of any help in this 
direction will you let me know? "(53) In reply, Creech-Jones was 
asked to table a question concerning the Immigration Amendment 
Act. (54) 
Creech-Jones, of course, on entering the House had offered his 
services to the Jewish Agency,, so sympathetic was he towards the 
Zionist cause. (55) He was not alone within the Party in his support 
for Zionism and throughout 1936 on a number of Parliamentary 
debates,, Labour Members led by Wedgwood, Silverman and Hopkin, 
rigorously defended the rights of Jews to develop Palestine and to 
maintain high immigration figures. (56) The Parliamentary Labour 
Party's attack on Government policy was supported by Churchill and 
Melchett who urged the Colonial Secretary to reconsider the matter. 
Some weeks later., Thomas indicated in the House that the question 
of a Legislative Council was to be quietly dropped. (57) 
Once again Arab sympathisers interpreted the Government's decision 
to be the result of the incorrigible influence of Zionism within the 
House of Commons. (58) To Zionist supporters the outcome was a 
triumph for Parliamentary democracy. 
In a sense, the situation reflected that which happened in 1931; an 
Opposition Party had flexed its muscles on a sensitive issue and 
through the support of dissident members of the National government 
had managed to coerce the Colonial Secretary to reject a contentious 
policy. The Palestine problem was clearly cutting across party 
political boundaries; a development which Tom Williams articulated in 
Parliament: "I think I represent the feelings of Members of all parts 
of the House when I say that we are neither pro-one nor anti-the 
other (Arab and Jew), but we are pro-Palestine and we desire to 
promote the interests of all the peoples resident in that country.... 
this is not a party question, and we have no desire to turn it into 
any form of party question; it is purely a Palestine question, and we 
want it to remain on that level. "(59) 
However, in the light of Attlee's activities on behalf of the Zionists 
some two months later, Williams' statement appears to be somewhat 
simplistic. The Government had decided to institute yet another 
Royal Commission and personal messages were sent to Labour leaders 
by Poale Zion who were anxious lest immigration be suspended 
during the investigations. As a result Attlee and Greenwood visited 
the Colonial Secretary, and pressed upon him the question of 
immigration and suggested the immediate recall of Parliament if the 
issue was not resolved. (60) The following month Ormsby-Gore 
recommended the continuation of Jewish immigration into Palestine. 
Of course, it would be unwise to suggest that this meeting was a 
crucial factor in the Colonial Secretary's change of policy, but it 
does indicate that the Labour Party acted in a less than objective 
manner in that it argued the case of one party to the dispute at the 
obvious expense of the other. 
The Labour Party in the 1930s had either not learnt the lessons of 
Government in relation to its Palestine policy or had simply excused 
its previous period in Office as being unrepresentative of a future 
Labour Government. Certainly, the Party's policies remained 
confused and muddled as can be clearly seen from the resolution 
passed at the 1936 Conference: the British Labour Movement 
"recognising that the interests of Jewish and Arab workers alike can 
be served only by their cordial co-operation, deeply deplores the 
outbreak of racial and religious strife which threatens ...... to 
deprive the Jewish people of the opportunity of developing their own 
political, social and cultural institutions. "(61) 
Failing to retreat from empty platitudes and to critically assess the 
increasing polarisation between the Arab and Jewish communities in 
Palestine, the Labour Party succeeded in "placing a millstone around 
its neck"(62) which was to become, in later years, a considerable 
burden. 
2. The Conservative Party 
2 Q) Arthur Balfour and Zionism 
There is little documentary evidence and few literary accounts of the 
influence of Zionism on the Conservative Party, yet links between 
the two were established as early as 1914. It was Dr. Chaim 
Weizmann, an academic and subsequent leader of the Jewish Agency, 
who initially forged a contact with the Party, principally through his 
negotiations with Arthur Balfour. (63) Weizmann, a Jewish-Russian 
emigre, possessed accomplished diplomatic skills and was highly 
adept and influential as a Zionist propagandist. Consequently, any 
study of Conservatism and Zionism must take account of the role 
Weizmann played in formulating and changing party opinion. 
Of course, the historic Conservative Party was not notably policy 
oriented and, as such, policy arose without any conscious 
involvement of the the Party as a whole. (64) The Conservative 
annual conferences did not assume the significance of those of the 
Labour Party and so, in the absence of a decision-making body 
greater importance was attached to the views of individual leaders 
and party members. It was within the context of personal contact 
that Weizmann's charm, charisma and commitment are alleged to have 
had such a potent effect. Lord Boothby, in his Memoirs, considers 
that Weizmann when dealing with the harsh realities of politics was 
both a pragmatist and a gradualist. Weizmann, he claims, persuaded 
the British Government to make the Balfour Declaration and that had 
he not done so: 11the Zionist Movement would almost certainly have 
been crushed. "(65) Richard Crossman shared Boothby's opinions of 
Weizmann, arguing that "without the personality of Weizmann there 
would have been no Balfour Declaration. "(66) 
After Weizmann's first meeting with Balfour in Manchester in 1914, 
Weizmann contrived to arrange further meetings and later reported 
that Balfour was clearly sympathetic to the aspirations of the Zionist 
movement. (67) Indeed, it is argued, albeit unconvincingly, that this 
seemingly detached and cynical person cared for little else but 
Zionism. (68) Weizmann interpreted Balfour's interest in Zionist aims 
and the subsequent Declaration as stemming from his desire: "to 
manifest a certain amount of restitution to the Jewish people for the 
contribution which the Jews had made ...... to the civilisation of 
mankind. 11 (69) 
However, this appraisal overlooks the decidedly pragmatic approach 
adopted by Balfour in his role as Foreign Secretary. At a Cabinet 
meeting in 1917, Balfour stated that from "a purely diplomatic and 
political point of view, it is desirable that some declaration 
favourable to the aspiration of the Jewish nationalists should be 
made. The vast majority of Jews in Russia and America now appear 
to be favourable to Zionism. If we could make a declaration 
favourable to such an ideal, we should be able to carry on extremely 
useful propaganda both in Russia and America. "(70) 
Although there is little doubt that the active canvassing by Chaim 
Weizmann of the Zionist concept in political circles before and during 
the war had engaged the sympathy of the Foreign Secretary, the 
predominant reason for issuing the Declaration lay in the hope of 
using it to influence American and Russian Jewry at a time when 
allied war prospects were bleak. In other words, the origins of the 
Balfour Declaration can be found in what was essentially wartime 
calculation. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to dismiss Balfour's 
sympathy with Zionism and he clearly outlined his preferences in a 
Memorandum issued some two years after the Declaration: 
"Zionism.... is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in 
future hopes of far profounder import than the desires and 
prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient 
land. 11 (71) 
The impact of the Balfour Declaration on the Conservative Party is 
difficult to discern. No mention of it is made in Conference reports 
and although there seemed to be an awareness among members that 
the Party needed to modernise its policy machinery, (72) (a 
development which did not, in fact, take place until after the Second 
World War), there is no indication that these innovative ideas related 
in any way to a dissatisfaction with the manner in which the 
Palestine question had been handled. One aspect which does 
emerge, however, is that both Leo Amery and Winston Churchill were 
committed Zionist supporters by the beginning of the 1920s. Amery's 
pro-Zionism stemmed from the Balfour Declaration which he had 
co-drafted(73) and he remained sympathetic to Zionism throughout 
the period under review. Churchill's contribution to Zionism in his 
role as Colonial Secretary was unquestionably far-reaching. 
2. (ii) Churchill's White Paper 
Churchill was Secretary of State for War when at a meeting of the 
Cabinet Finance Committee he first initiated a discussion on the 
setting up of a special Department for Middle Eastern Affairs, which 
would in effect co-ordinate Government policy in Palestine, 
Mesopotania and Arabia. (74) Churchill's enthusiasm for the idea 
stemmed less from his concern for the area than from his commitment 
to effect substantial cuts in military expenditure throughout the 
Middle East. He estimated that Britain was spending in excess of 
L37,000,000 and in the discussion which followed it was suggested 
that it would be cost effective if the Mandated territories were 
administered as a whole. (75) 
When the full Cabinet met on 31 December 1920, it was finally 
decided at Churchill's suggestion, that a special Middle East 
Department be set up within the general aegis of the Colonial Office. 
This plan would enable the existing divided spheres of the War 
Office, the India Office, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office 
"to be concentrated in a single Department, 11(76) under a single 
Minister. The Colonial Secretary of the day, Lord Milner, was less 
than pleased with the prospect of such onerous responsibilities and 
tendered his resignation. There was no more suitable candidate to 
fill the vacancy than Winston Churchill and after initial hesitation he 
accepted the Post. It was agreed that Churchill's responsibilities as 
Colonial Secretary should include both the civil and military 
administration of Palestine and Mesopotamia, and that the Middle East 
Department would be under his control. 
Shortly after Churchill's appointment, he engaged in discussion with 
the new French President, Alexandre Millerand. During the course 
of conversation Millerand criticised the Balfour Declaration arguing 
that Zionism in Palestine disturbed the Arab world, and emphasised 
his fear that "the Jews would be very high-handed when they got 
together there. "(77) Churchill defended British policy towards the 
Jews: "I expatiated on the virtues and experience of Sir Herbert 
Samuel (High Commissioner in Palestine) and pointed out how evenly 
he was holding the balance between Arabs and Jews and how 
effectively he was restraining his own people, as perhaps only a 
Jewish administrator could do. "(78) 
Churchill's statement reveals a superficial understanding of the 
situation in Palestine, yet the Colonial Secretary, seemingly unaware 
of the potential conflict between Arab and Jew continued to state 
that the area had to be considered as a whole: The more I study the 
Middle East problem, the more convinced I am that it is impossible to 
deal with it unless the conduct of British affairs in the whole of the 
Arabian peninsular is vested in the Middle East Department. The 
Arab problem is all one ..... 11(79) At this stage, Churchill did not 
envisage the animosity which was developing in Palestine between the 
two communities. In March 1921, Churchill arranged for a Conference 
to be held in Cairo, the object of which was to review the British 
position and lay plans for future policy in the Middle East in the 
light of the French occupation of Syria and the unsettled conditions 
of Trans-Jordan and Mesopotamia. 
Before the Conference the Political Committee of the Zionist 
Organisation met in London to discuss Churchill's forthcoming visit to 
the Middle East. Weizmann expressed concern about Churchill's 
intentions regarding the Mandate and maintained: "There are 
indications that Mr. Churchill might possibly desire certain changes 
in the Mandate. He is of a highly impressionable temperament and it 
is to be expected that the Arabs will organise an agitation to greet 
him on his arrival in the East. " But Weizmann added: "Mr. 
Churchill has a low opinion of the Arab generally. 11(80) 
In an attempt to influence Churchill Weizmann sent him an appeal, 
requesting that Transjordan be included in the Palestine Mandate. 
He also pressed Churchill to take the southern boundary of Palestine 
down into the Gulf of Akaba. Churchill, however, was not 
influenced by Weizmann's arguments. He had already decided to 
separate Transjordan from Palestine, but had also decided to allow 
the Negev to form part of the Mandate and, therefore, to be open to 
eventual Jewish settlement. Weizmann also wrote to Herbert Samuel 
urging him to show Churchill the constructive side of the work of 
the Jewish pioneers. (81) 
As Weizmann predicted the Arab community in Palestine outlined their 
grievances to Churchill immediately he arrived in Jerusalem. (82) The 
Palestinian Arab Congress clearly stated in a Memorandum to Winston 
Churchill their fears of Zionism and their disappointment with Britain 
for "creating, putting life into and carrying into execution" the 
notion of the Jewish National Home-(83) 
Churchill dismissed the Arab Memorandum cursorily with the 
exhortation that "instead of sharing miseries through quarrelling, 
the Palestinians should share blessings through co-operation, a 
bright future lies before your country, the earth, a generous 
mother, will produce in plentiful abundance for her children if they 
cultivate in justice and peace. "(84) The Palestinian leaders, 
however, failed to appreciate Churchill's interpretation of the 
situation in Palestine and remained embittered by what they 
perceived to be his "off-hand treatment". (85) An Arab rebellion 
followed Churchill's visit and the Colonial Secretary returned home to 
face a Parliamentary debate. 
On this occasion Churchill received a good deal of support from his 
fellow Party members in the House. He undoubtedly presented a 
more cogent analysis of the dilemma facing the British Government in 
regard to Palestine that he had done so hitherto: "The difficulty 
about the promise of a national home for the Jews in Palestine is that 
it conflicts with our regular policy of consulting the wishes of the 
people in the Mandated territories and in giving them representative 
institutions as soon as they are fit for them, which institution, in 
this case they would use to veto any further Jewish 
immigration. 11(86) Churchill had clearly taken account of Arab fears 
although seemingly dismissing them at the time: "The Arabs believe 
that in the next few years they are going to be swamped by scores 
of thousands of immigrants who will push them off the land. 
"(87) 
Churchill considered the fears to be illusory and maintained that 
if 
representative institutions were to be conceded to the Arabs, some 
definite arrangements would have to be made which safeguarded 
within reasonable limits the immigration of the Jews into the country. 
"Our task .... will be persuade one side to concede and the other 
to forbear, by keeping a margin of force available in order to ensure 
the acceptance of the position of both parties. "(88) The question as 
to which side should concede and which side should forbear was left 
open to interpretation. 
In the course of the discussion which followed Churchill received a 
good degree of praise for handling a complex situation with skill. 
The comments tended to be generalised with most speakers recalling 
their wartime experiences of the Arabs in either positive or negative 
terms. No-one particularly demonstrated a clear understanding of 
the nature of the conflict in Palestine. In fact, one member, Earl 
Winterton suggested that "In the House it is not desirable that 
attention be drawn to the differences between Jews and Arabs. "(89) 
On balance, therefore, it is more than likely that the Colonial 
Secretary's victorious emergence from the Debate was due not 
necessarily to the accuracy of his own arguments, powerful though 
they may be, but mainly because of the relative ignorance of his 
fellow members of Parliament. 
One year later, amid growing opposition to Zionism in Palestine 
Churchill sought to placate matters by publishing an authoritative 
statement of British policy. In his 1922 White Paper Churchill 
asserted that the Balfour Declaration, which the Government 
intended to uphold, did not aim at the subordination of the Arab 
population or culture. The Jews, however, were in Palestine, "as of 
right and not on sufferance", (90) and would be able to increase 
their number by immigration subject to the "economic absorptive 
capacity" of the country. The White Paper declared that it was the 
intention of His Majesty's Government to foster the gradual 
establishment of a full measure of self government. A legislative 
council with a majority of elected members would be set up 
immediately and a committee of elected members of the legislative 
council would confer with the Administration upon matters relating to 
the regulation of immigration. 
The White Paper came as a disappointment to many Zionists who 
thought the Statement "redeemed the Balfour promise in depreciated 
currency. "(91) Ultimately, however, it was accepted by the 
Zionists 
and rejected by the Arabs. (92) 
While the White Paper failed to reconcile the Arabs to Jewish 
immigration and to a slower development of the National Home, it was 
necessary for the purpose of defeating the opposition which had 
developed in Parliament to accepting the Mandate with the inclusion 
of the Balfour Declaration. In fact, Churchill faced a vote of 
No-confidence in the House, and much criticism was levelled against 
him by Parliamentary members of the Conservative Party. The 
ensuing debate was acrimonious and hinged on the financial 
commitments the British Government had assumed in its dealings with 
Palestine. Sir J. Butcher, rejected the Mandate as a whole purely 
on the grounds that Britain "could not afford it". Others supported 
the Mandate out of, what appears to be, a spirit of 'Jingoism', in 
that Palestine represented a further extension of the British Empire, 
yet condemned the Jewish National Home policy as being unfair to 
Arabs. (93) 
Sir W. Joynson-Hicks, in a long speech, outlined his sympathies for 
the Arabs, and attacked the British Administrations in Palestine for 
their bias against the Arab community. "The Zionists have been 
permitted by the Government practically to control the whole of the 
Government of Palestine. Herbert Samuel, before he went to 
Palestine.... was the go-between of the Zionists and the Cabinet 
and was able to press Zionist views on the Cabinet. When he went 
out to Palestine he went with the knowledge of all the people in 
Palestine that the Zionists claimed him as their representative. That 
is the real difficulty. It is necessary that the people of the 
country, 90% of whom are Arabs, should believe him to be above 
suspicion. 11 
Joynson-Hicks went on to recall a statement made by Chaim Weizmann 
at the time of Samuel's appointment: "Sir Herbert Samuel is our 
friend and has worked loyally with us from the first moment. At 
our request, fortified by our moral support he accepted the difficult 
position. We put him in that position. He is our Samuel; he is the 
product of our Jewry. "(94) 
Such emotive, words, considered Joynson-Hicks would do little to 
encourage the Arabs to trust the British Administration or believe 
it 
to be an impartial body. Implicit in this criticism was a 
condemnation of the Colonial Secretary, and a series of speakers 
continued the attack. At the end of the onslaught Churchill rose to 
present his reply; a reply which effectively silenced the opposition 
from his own ranks. He held in his hand a list of all those who had 
voiced a criticism of the Jewish National Home policy and proceeded 
to read aloud the statements which they had made, some five years 
previously, at the time of the Balfour Declaration. He stated acidly: 
"Sir J. Butcher, who has just addressed us in terms of such biting 
indignation was almost lyrical on the subject. He said 'I trust the 
day is not far distant when the Jewish people may be free to return 
to the sacred birthplace of their race and that they may attain their 
ideals and fulfil their destiny'. 11 Finally, Churchill related 
Joynson-Hicks' previous statement: "I will do all in my power to 
forward the views of the Zionists in order to enable the Jews once 
more to take possession of their own land. "(95) Churchill adeptly 
defeated the vote by 250 and some two weeks' later the Mandate 
inclusive of the Declaration was approved by the League of Nations. 
Churchill's skill in Parliamentary debate is not in doubt, yet the 
whole affair raises questions about Conservative Party policy. It is 
possible to see the Conservative Members' volte face in terms of 
wartime expediency as opposed to peace-time rationalism. Churchill, 
in a letter to Lord Sydenham, a critic of Zionism, (96) attempted to 
explain the shift in policy: "There is one reason for a change of 
view, namely that it was an easy and popular thing to advocate a 
Zionist policy in the days of the Balfour Declaration, and that it is a 
laborious ..... task to try to give honourable effect at the present 
time to the pledges which were given then. "(97) In the absence of 
an ideology to hold the Party together on the question of Palestine, 
it was perfectly possible and, indeed, not altogether unusual, for 
individual members to change their opinions. Churchill's personal 
commitment to the Jewish National Home had undoubtedly furthered 
the cause of Zionism. In his two major speeches in the House of 
Commons, he had spoken with admiration of all that the Jews had 
achieved in Palestine, and of its potential, and of Britain's 
determination to allow the National Home to grow and flourish under 
British protection. However, it must be remembered that there was 
no Party dictate on this issue and Churchill, essentially, pursued 
his own policy towards Palestine. This fact was clearly recognised 
by the Zionist organisation, who proffered their thanks not to the 
Conservative Party but to the Colonial Secretary personally: 
Weizmann wrote to Churchill: "To you personally, we tender our 
most grateful thanks. Zionists throughout the world deeply 
appreciate the unfailing sympathy you have consistently shown 
towards their legitimate aspirations and the great part you have 
played in securing for the Jewish people the opportunity of 
rebuilding its national home. "(98) 
It is interesting to note that within the short period of five years 
two leading Conservative politicians had deeply committed themselves 
to Zionist policies and yet, the issue was not once discussed at 
Conference level. In a sense,, the Party stood aloof from the whole 
question of Zionism. Given the absence of debate on the Palestine 
issue within the Party machine and as the Committee on Imperial 
Affairs existed only after 1945 one is forced to rely of fragmentary 
pieces of information which fail to supply a comprehensive picture of 
Conservative policy during the years under study. The links 
between Conservatism and Zionism were at best tenuous and then 
only formed with individual members of the Party. All that really 
can be observed of Conservative Party policy towards both the 
Arabs and the Jews up to 1937 is that it remained fluid and 
apparently uncommitted to either faction. In the circumstances, 
Party policy, if that is indeed what it should be called, could change 
as the mood, or the events in volatile Palestine, took it. 
3. The Colonial Office, The Foreign Office and the Palestine 
Question 
Departmental responsibility for the Palestine question oscillated 
between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office from the 
announcement of the Balfour Declaration until the proclamation of the 
State of Israel in 1948. The object of this introductory section is to 
place the varied policies pursued by successive governments towards 
Palestine during the preliminary years from 1917 to 1936 within the 
context of departmental attitudes and responsibilities. In so doing, 
it is hoped, a fuller understanding will be gained of the implications 
of the actions undertaken by Colonial and Foreign Secretaries in the 
period immediately preceding the Second World War, and in the later 
post-War years. 
3 (i) The 1920s 
As has been outlined in the previous section the Palestine issue came 
under the aegis of the Foreign Office until 1921 when Churchill 
became Colonial Secretary and set up the Middle East Department 
within the Colonial Office. The Department had special responsibility 
for the newly mandated territories: Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine; 
a development which, according to Sir Charles Jeffries, one time 
Deputy Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, changed the 
character of the Colonial Office by "diversifying and expanding its 
range of functions. 11(99) The Foreign Office, however., was not to 
forget the important role it had played in the formulation of the 
Balfour Declaration and all the implications the statement had for 
Palestine,, and it continued throughout the period to maintain an 
interest in the area even if the interest remained covert. Lord 
Curzon., the Foreign Secretary at the time of the change over, 
succinctly articulated the Foreign Office attitude towards Palestine in 
a letter to Winston Churchill: "I should not dream of making a 
speech about Palestine now that you have taken it over... although 
I may say that the connection between Palestine and the Foreign 
Office is very close. "(100) 
The Colonial Office, although in many ways strengthened as a 
department by its Mandatory responsibilities, became less enamoured 
of Palestine as time went by. Sir Charles Jeffries complains of the 
years "in which a wholly disproportionate amount of time and effort 
had to be devoted by Ministers and senior officials to the thankless 
task of administering Palestine. 11001) In later years much criticism 
was levelled at the Balfour Declaration by subsequent members of the 
Foreign Office; Sir Harold Beeley considered the Declaration to be "a 
very great mistake" although conceding that perhaps it was "not 
easy to see it at the time in 1917". He maintains that it was a 
commitment at variance with the post First World War trend against 
colonialism and argues that in essence, "it was the last fling of 
colonial settlement. 11002) 
The Colonial Office, however, professed to view its mandated 
territories quite differently and considered itself to be in the 
position of "trustees for the interest of the people in those areas, 
and committed to lead them to self-government. 11003) Article 2 of the 
Palestine Mandate made Britain responsible "for placing the country 
under such Political, administrative and economic conditions as will 
secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the 
development of self-governing institutions", (104) although it failed to 
state exactly what the nature and composition of these 
tself-governing institutions' were to be. With such a vague remit as 
regards to Palestine it is difficult to judge exactly what the Colonial 
office actually meant by the term 'self- govern mentt, and whether, in 
fact, on occasions it could be viewed as little more than pious 
sentiment. 
However, the Colonial Office endeavoured to distance itself from the 
Foreign Office by asserting that in contrast to the objectives of the 
Foreign Office, its primary consideration was for the "interests of its 
wards and not the interests of the British Government. 11005) This 
apparent polarity in the perspective of the two Departments towards 
the Middle East in general and Palestine in particular is evident 
throughout the period under study. The Foreign Office would often 
display an interest in the Palestine issue when British interests in 
the area were under threat, but it would be erroneous to view the 
Colonial Office as being above such considerations. In fact, Leo 
Amery, the Colonial Secretary in 1925 readily admitted that his 
interest in Palestine was, at first, "largely strategical. 11006) 
Contemporary studies of the roles played by the Colonial Office and 
Foreign Office in relation to the Palestine question have tended to be 
critical of the power and influence exerted by both 
Departments. (107) Gabriel Sheffer suggests that an elite consisting 
of a "small identifiable and little-changing group of Ministers and 
Officials", (108) essentially shaped policies towards Palestine. 
Although the main body of criticism concentrates on British 
Governmental policy formulation during the 1930s and 1940s attention 
will now be paid to the earlier period in order to assess whether or 
not such views of the Civil Service were justified in the 1920s. 
Churchill, on assuming the duties of Colonial Secretary in 1921, 
appointed Sir John Shuckburgh, his Assistant Under Secretary, as 
head of the newly formed Middle East Division. Shortly after the 
appointment had been made, Churchill attended a private meeting 
with Arthur Balfour, Dr. Weizmann and Lloyd George at the Prime 
Minister's residence. Weizmann emerged from the conference 
evidently reassured at the progress which had been made and 
reported that he was confident that the British government would 
undertake "definite action in Palestine" which would "ameliorate the 
situation. 11(109) Shuckburgh, upon learning of the meeting some 
months later.. registered his disapproval, not only of the fact that 
the Colonial Office had not been consulted, but also of the influence 
exercised by Dr. Weizmann. In a confidential letter to Sir James 
Masterton Smith,, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial 
Office, Shuckburgh complained of the Zionist Organisation, in the 
person of Dr. Weizmann, enjoying "direct access to high political 
personages outside the Colonial Office. 11(110) This is not to suggest, 
of course, that Shuckburgh had any persoanl animosity towards 
Weizmann, in fact, he was "convinced of the necessity of Dr. 
Weizmann's co-operation in such a difficult task" and maintained that 
"he is much the best and most reliable of Zionists. 11(111) However, 
Shuckburgh's correspondence does indicate that the influence he 
exercised over the Colonial Secretary was minimal, and his role was 
that of a subordinate. 
Sir Charles Jeffries of the Colonial Office recalls that "outside a 
limited circle, there was little public knowledge of or interest in the 
Colonies, their problems or the Colonial office, " and maintains that 
"the small attendance at Colonial debates in Parliament was 
notorious. 11012) Leo Amery, Colonial Secretary during the four years 
from 1925 to 1929, confirms Jeffries' views and maintains that the 
period passed uneventfully until 1929, when an outbreak of rioting in 
Palestine brought the issue forcibly to the attention of the newly 
elected Labour government. (113) However, Amery's recollection 
overlooks the Colonial Office's policies towards Palestine in the late 
1920s for which he was responsible. It is a serious omission for 
those policies were to have profound repercussions for the 
subsequent Colonial Secretary. 
Negotiations had continued between the Jewish Agency and the 
Colonial Office throughout Amery's terms of office and despite the 
relative calm in Palestine during those years, the Zionist 
Organisation was anxious to acquire more agricultural land for Jewish 
settlement. The Colonial Secretary regarded the Zionists as having 
first claims on land suitable for agricultural development and the 
Palestine Government was active in procuring land for the Jews. (114) 
These policies of the Colonial Office, although within the objectives 
of the Balfour Declaration., served to exacerbate the Palestinian 
Arabs' fears of economic disadvantage and political 
under-representation which were to provide the backcloth to the 
religious disturbances in 1929. The Peel Commission.. appointed in 
1937,, observed that until 1929: "The highly incendiary element of 
religion had had little to do with the growth of Arab antagonism to 
the National Home. In Palestine, nationalism had been more political 
than religious-" However, the Report concluded that in circumstances 
in which it was "widely and genuinely believed that the coming of 
the Jews to the country meant not merely their economic and political 
ascendance but also the full re-establishment of ancient Judaism and 
the invasion and desecration of the Holy places, then there could be 
little doubt that Arab hostility would be more unanimous, more 
fanatical and more desperate than it had ever been. "(115) 
3 (R) The Prelude to the 1931 White Paper 
The onerous responsibility for the renewed clashes between the Arab 
and Jewish communities in Palestine fell upon Lord Passfield, the 
Colonial Secretary in the new Labour administration. The situation 
in Palestine quickly became critical in the wake of the anti-British 
sentiments espoused by the Arabs. Sir John Chancellor, who had 
replaced Lord Plumer as High Commissioner, received a Memorandum 
from the Arab community complaining that the crisis was a natural 
result of the British Government's policies: "The inhabitants of 
Palestine can no longer tolerate any unjustices in addition to the 
injustices done to them up till now as an outcome of the present 
system of Administration. In fact, this Administration has placed 
the country in great economic crisis which compelled a not 
inappreciable number of the inhabitants to sell their lands to 
foreigners (Jews) who only buy land for political purposes .... 11016) 
Within a few months of Passfield's appointment a Royal Commission 
chaired by Sir Walter Shaw, was sent to Palestine to investigate the 
disturbances. However, the Commission's final terms of reference 
excluded any mention as to whether the 1929 outbreak of violence 
could be "regarded as having been pre-concerted or due to 
organised action. 11017) This decision was taken by the Colonial 
Secretary and was a direct consequence of the overtures which had 
been made to him by Sir John Chancellor. The High Commissioner 
had previously engaged in a series of private interviews with TJajj 
Amin, the Mufti, and had been reassured that the mass of the Arab 
population were amicably disposed towards Great Britain. The Mufti 
sought to impress Chancellor with his loyalty and asserted that he 
believed it Possible to confine Palestinian Opposition to Britain's 
Zionist policies and to the Zionists themselves in an attempt to avoid 
a direct clash between Britain and the Arabs. (118) Chancellor, of 
course, relayed the Mufti's views to Passfield, who immediately 
recognised the importance of maintaining Hajj Amin's conciliatory 
attitude towards the British Government as a means of avoiding an 
Arab-British confrontation in Palestine. The restricted terms of 
reference of the Shaw Commission could, therfore, be interpreted as 
a sign of deference to the Mufti. 
Chancellor, in his role as High Commissioner in Palestine, has been 
criticised for "psychologically identifying with the Arab 
community" (119) and for his inability to view the situation 
objectively. That he had qualms about the moral position of his rule 
in Palestine is not in doubt but a more feasible analysis of his 
attitude would reveal that he was merely trying to rectify what he 
saw as an anti-Arab bias in London. In a Colonial Office minute, 
Chancellor outlined his position and emphasised that it was essential 
he should do or say nothing that would embarrass HMG and in that 
sense he "could not support the Arab cause". 020) However, it was 
his unease which gave rise to the Foreign Office instigating a 
reappraisal of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, (121) in an 
attempt to gain a further understanding of Britain's promises to the 
Palestinian Arabs. 
The Shaw Commission reported that essentially it was Jewish land 
acquisition which had incensed the Arab community; and stressed 
that throughout its investigations "the fears of the Arabs that the 
success of the Zionist land policy meant their expropriation from the 
land were repeatedly emphasised. "(122) In the Cabinet meeting which 
followed the publication of the Report it was decided that a more 
authoritative examination of land settlement, immigration and 
development was required and one which "to such an extent as might 
be deemed desirable, considered the political questions in the 
background. 11 (123) 
According to Weizmann., General Smuts, a committed Zionist., had 
been earmarked to conduct the investigation and should he not be 
availablej, then a real statesman "with Palestine in his bones"(124) 
would replace him. However,, the Colonial Secretary had other ideas 
and informed Weizmann that Smuts had been discounted on the 
grounds that he was believed to be too pro- Zionist. (125) The Colonial 
office was seeking to re-establish a more balanced view between the 
conflicting sides and as such Sir J. Hope-Simpson's appointment was 
presented to the Zionists as a fait accompli. Weizmann, recognising 
the need to gain Hope-Simpson's acquaintance requested of Passfield 
that he be given the opportunity of meeting him before he left 
London for Palestine, to which the Colonial Secretary agreed. 
However., Passfield failed to arrange any meeting and Weizmann, 
unused to such responses from Ministers, complained of being badly 
treated. It is unclear why Passfield broke his word but not 
altogether unlikely that he felt it imperative to scotch rumours which 
had emanated from the Palestinian Arabs that the British government 
was in the pocket of the Zionists. (126) In essence, he was attempting 
to emphasise Britain's role as an independent umpire in the dispute. 
In the wake of this incident tension grew between the Jewish Agency 
and the Colonial Office and Weizmann was advised by his associates 
that "the Colonial Office officials, acting in collusion with the 
Palestine administration, were unravelling the work of the 
politicians. " Weizmann evidently agreed and described the effect as 
"devastating... (we are) literally hitting our heads against a blank 
wall. The officials seem to be utterly impervious to reason and 
certainly haven't a spark of sympathy. 11027) Of course, this 
response is not totally surprising,, the Jewish Agency was notably 
sensitive to any development which they perceived to be, often 
without reason, an anti-Zionist bias within the British Government. 
Passfield in particular came in for a good deal of criticism from the 
the Labour Party and the Zionists and was thought to be not in 
sufficient control of his officials. Beatrice Webb recalled that she 
was told that the "Parliamentary Labour Party thought Sidney too 
much in the hands of his officials. But this is inevitable. By 
temperament and training Sidney belongs to the civil service. 11028) 
Ramsay MacDonald is reported to have said of Passfield: "He is old, 
in some ways efficient,, but he has the mind of a German professor 
and an indestructable belief in the experts who sit in the Colonial 
office. 11 (12 9) 
At this juncture it is necessary to return to the criticism by 
contemporary historians of the influence exerted by the civil service. 
Sheffer points out that by virtue of the secure tenure of office 
various Colonial Secretaries were assisted by the same "small cluster 
of senior officials, Shuckburgh, Cosmo Parkinson and Gratton 
Bushell all of whom operated within the Middle East Department, and 
suggests that this resulted in a consistent approach to Palestine's 
problems-030) This line of argument is dubious given the distinct 
change of policy adopted by the British government in 1929. In 
fact, it was this shift in policy which occasioned so much criticism 
from the Zionist camp and which led to accusations of partiality 
against the Colonial Office. 
Implicit in Sheffer's argument is the opinion that the Colonial Office 
was in some way anti-Zionist and pro-Arab yet documentary evidence 
suggests otherwise. The Office was fully cognizant of the 
difficulties of administering Palestine and Cosmo Parkinson drew 
particular attention to the "activities of Arab agitators, their devices 
for keeping Arab public opinion in a state of ferment, their attempts 
to enlist the sympathy and co-operation of the Muslim world .... and 
their disturbances which resulted in attacks upon Jews ... 11 (131) If 
the Colonial Office did display an irritation with the Zionists it was 
invariably caused by what it considered to be Weizmann's behind the 
scene activities. In his dealings with many influential people 
Weizmann was aware that he would certainly, "foster antagonism at 
the Colonial Office which is always sensitive at being 
by-passed. 11 (132) 
Whilst the Hope-Simpson investigations were continuing, Shuckburgh 
in a memorandum to Chancellor succinctly defined the dilemma facing 
the Colonial Office in its policy towards Palestine: "We have to 
consider not merely the existing population (in Palestine) but the 14 
odd millions of Jews all over the world who regard themselves as 
potential Palestinians. The embarrassing results of this position are 
obvious. But they are inherent in the Zionist policy and must be 
faced. 11 (133) 
The findings of the Hope-Simpson study did little to ease the 
contradictions in British policy for it bore out Arab contentions as 
thoroughly in detail as the Shaw Report had favoured them in 
general trend. It drew attention to the increasing polarity between 
the two communities which it felt had been aggravated by high levels 
of Jewish immigration which exceeded the economic capacity of the 
country; rising Arab unemployment which was a direct consequence 
of their displacement from the land; and the lack of any measure of 
self-government. Therefore, the Report suggested the British 
government should reduce, or even suspend Jewish immigration into 
Palestine and should stop Zionist acquisition of land without special 
authority of the British administration. (134) Following the publication 
of the Report the government decided to issue a White Paper which 
would enounce the course of its future policy in Palestine. it 
essentially incorporated the recommendations of the Hope-Simpson 
investigation albeit within the theory of 'dual obligation' under the 
Mandate. 
Weizmann's response to the White Paper was predictable and he 
roundly condemned the government for completely misunderstanding 
the whole purpose and meaning of the National Home. However, the 
Jewish Agency was anxious to avoid all possible contact with the 
Colonial Office whom they considered to be totally responsible for the 
policy. As a means of circumventing the Colonial Office the Zionists 
wanted the responsibility of Palestine removed from the Colonial 
Office to the Foreign Office; "If that is done we shall deal with 
infinitely more intelligent officials ..... with men of a wider view 
than the rather parochial Colonial Office officials and more accessible 
to influence from America.... the pros are decidedly in favour of 
the Foreign Office. 11035) Weizmann also considered the possibility 
and stated as much in a revealing note: "I might demand from the 
Prime Minister that Palestine be transferred from the Colonial Office 
to the Foreign Office so as to get rid of Passfield and his clique... 
(it) needs careful handling. 11036) 
Whether or not Weizmann's assumed influence over Ramsay MacDonald 
was simply a flight of fancy is open to debate, but clearly his 
assertive attitude did little to endear him or his cause to the Colonial 
Office. Although, of course, the Colonial Office was quite aware of 
the difficulties inherent in the Palestine issue they justly interpreted 
any prospective move as a slight upon their political objectivity and 
departmental efficiency. The fact that Weizmann and other members 
of the Jewish Agency had conducted private meetings with the 
Prime 
Minister only served to exacerbate the feelings of resentment 
nurtured by the Office. This was evidenced in a Memorandum from 
Drummond Shiels, the Colonial Under Secretary, who stated that the 
Department was "positively indignant at the way in which the 
Colonial Office was being by-passed. "(137) 
However, it was Passfield who suffered the brunt of personal 
condemnation from embittered Zionists and who considered himself to 
be a failure. Nathan Laski referred to him as an "aged minister... 
who has long been anxious to seek repose. " While another member of 
the Jewish Agency announced that the White Paper was "less a 
statement of the policy of HMG than a revelation of the prejudice of 
one man,, Lord Pass field. " (138) There existed widespread feeling 
among Zionists and Zionist sympathisers that the White Paper had 
somehow dishonoured Great Britain and that the Government's 
performance in general and Passfield's performance in particular had 
been less than competent. 
It was in the midst of this outcry against the White Paper that 
Arthur Henderson, the Foreign Secretary, came to take an active 
role in the Palestine problem. Henderson was fully alive to the 
international aspects of the Government's predicament over Palestine 
and the ramifications it might have on the domestic standing of the 
Labour Administration. The Foreign Office, therefore, began to take 
an interest in the problem and in the process assumed a rather 
superior view of the crisis. It condemned the Colonial Office for not 
keeping the Foreign Secretary properly informed of the situation in 
Palestine which, it claimed, had denied the Foreign Office the 
opportunity to "anticipate and possibly forestall some of the 
difficulties. 11 (139) 
Nevertheless, despite its momentary interest in the affairs of 
Palestine , the Foreign Office was disinclined to accept 
the 
responsibility on a permanent basis and at a Cabinet meeting both 
Passfield and Henderson submitted memoranda arguing against the 
transfer of Palestine from the Colonial Office. (140) The Cabinet 
accepted their recommendations and the whole idea was publicly 
quashed when Shiels . in answer to a question 
in the House, stated: 
"There is no intention of transferring the supervision of the affairs 
of Palestine from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office. "(141) 
Although the question of transference had been dropped the Cabinet 
discussed the possibility of establishing an inter- de partm ental 
committee which would be designed to supervise the development 
schemes in Palestine. (142) The membership of the Committee was to 
comprise: the Lord Advocate; Malcolm MacDonald, the Prime 
Minister's son and an avowed Zionist sympathiser; and one 
representative from the Foreign Office, the Colonial office and the 
Treasury. The Jewish Agency readily approved of the idea and 
considered it a means of evading the supervision of the Colonial 
Office. However, the scheme failed to leave the ground principally 
because the Colonial Office, perturbed at the prospect of its 
diminishing role in the affairs of Palestine, "blocked the way to 
agreement. 11 (143) 
Zionist sympathisers interpreted this action on the part of the 
Colonial Office to be yet another indication of the Departmentys 
pro-Arab leanings and have pointed to evidence, however, slight, in 
support of their claims. One Arab notable, Jamal Husseini, on his 
return to Palestine from London spoke of "the courtesy and 
consideration with which he was treated by Officials of the Colonial 
Office, " who he maintained "were sympathetic to the Arab case. 11044) 
Yet it could be seen that if the Colonial Office was to appear as an 
'honest broker' between the two parties it was not unnatural that the 
Department would lend a sympathetic ear to the grievances of both 
Arabs and Jews. That,, as a result of the investigations and 
recommendations of two independent enquiries, the office issued a 
White Paper which reflected their findings, is no indictment of the 
Department's objectivity. Of course, there is little doubt that the 
Zionists' direct access to the Prime Minister had been a cause of 
some irritation in the Colonial Office but it would be fallacious to 
draw the conclusion that this had created an anti-Zionist backlash 
within the Office. The fact that the Department disapproved of the 
methods used by the Jewish Agency did not necessarily imply its 
opposition to the merits of the Zionist case. 
The retreat from the White Paper ultimately took the form of a letter 
written by MacDonald to Weizmann which essentially reversed the 
recommendations made in Passfield's Paper. During this period the 
Colonial Secretary stayed in the background although he still 
remained the butt for Weizmann's attacks and was constantly 
criticised for "causing trouble all the time. "(145) Weizmann, in fact, 
wrote a note to the Prime Minister personally thanking him for his 
work in altering the Colonial Office's policy towards Palestine. (146) 
This was perceived by the Colonial Office to be the final blow in a 
debilitating affair, and the issue eventually came to a close with Sir 
John Chancellor leaving his post as High Commissioner; Lord 
Passfield contemplating resignation and a feeling of bitterness 
pervading the Colonial Office. 
3 (Uil) Post 'Passfieldism' 
The Zionist Movement greeted the election of the National Government 
in 1931 with unconditional approval: "It is impossible to exaggerate 
the importance to Zionism of the National government's assumption of 
Office. " However, still nursing its grievance towards Passfield it 
went on to state: "A continuance of 'Passfieldism' would have been 
fatal for the Zionist Movement. The National government can 
re-examine Britain's Palestine policy and this delicate task can be 
most conveniently undertaken by the government which has the 
advantage of not being hindered by Party commitments. Mr. J. 
Thomas, the Colonial Secretary, is fully aware of the present 
opportunity for immpressive action. "(147) 
Unfortunately for the Zionists neither the Colonial Secretary nor the 
National Government had any intention of engaging in 'impressive 
action' towards Palestine,, in fact, the reverse was the case. Only 
five weeks after the National Government had been elected it was 
decided at a Colonial Office meeting that: "As regards Palestine in 
particular it is considered important to avoid taking any action .... at 
the present time. "(148) 
J. H. Thomas remained Colonial Secretary for only three months and 
was succeeded in November 1931 by Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister. On 
learning of Cunliffe-Lis ter's appointment., Professor Brodetsky of the 
Jewish Agency wrote a letter to the Colonial Secretary congratulating 
him, if in a rather sycophantic manner, on his appointment: "We 
hold ourselves fortunate in that the new Colonial Secretary with 
whom we shall be privileged to co-operate is one whose wide 
experience alike in the administrative and economic field will be of 
the greatest value to Palestine. 11049) 
Cunliffe- Lister. unsure of how to reply looked to his officials in the 
Colonial Office for guidance. 0. G. R. Williams of the Middle East 
Section advised that a personal letter should be sent in reply but 
emphasised that "its wording required a little consideration. 11 Williams 
went on to suggest that "Professor Brodetsky may be trying to make 
good the claim, which we are always trying to resist, that the 
Jewish Agency have a right under the Mandate of co-operating and 
advising - not with the Palestine Administration as Article 4 of the 
Mandate explicitly states - but with HMG direct. 11 He continued. 
indicating clearly that the bitter lessons of Passfield's term of office 
had not been forgotten: "It is the tendency of the Jewish Agency to 
overdo direct recourse to the Prime Minister that has often created 
difficulties for us. 11 (150) 
Williams also drew the Colonial Secretary's attention to a comment in 
Brodetsky's letter which referred to the Jewish Agency assisting the 
representatives of HMG in the execution of the Mandate, which, he 
maintained implied: "as we know from previous events a sort of 
partnership with HMG. This is, of course, all wrong. The 
execution of the Mandate is the responsibility of HMG alone and HMG 
is responsible to the Council of the League for what they do in 
Palestine and not to the Jewish Agency or the Arab executive. 11051) 
Cosmo Parkinson, who had recently replaced Sir John Shuckburgh,, 
also commented on the letter and stated that if "would be desirable, 
indeed it is probably inevitable, that the Secretary of State should 
receive Professor Brodetsky soon, as a matter of courtesy. 11(152) The 
proposed meeting took place a few days later between the Colonial 
Secretary,, Cosmo Parkinson,, Brodetsky, and Nahum Sokolow, 
another representative of the Jewish Agency. 
Although the meeting was brief Cunliffe-Lister informed the visitors 
that the newly appointed High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope 
was very highly thought of and was considered to be a first-rate 
man who would carry on the tradition in Palestine of such a High 
Commissioner as Lord Plumer. It is interesting that no mention was 
made of Sir John Chancellor, which perhaps could be seen as an 
indication of the conciliatory way in which the Colonial Office was 
approaching the Zionist movement. The Secretary of State reassured 
Brodetsky and Sokolow that the Mandate would be followed and that 
they could rely upon law and order being maintained. However, the 
Colonial Secretary emphasised the fact that it was essential to take 
account of the 'absorptive capacity' of the country in considering the 
question of further immigration. Before the meeting came to a close, 
Cunliffe-Lister urged the Jewish Agency to establish good relations 
with the High Commissioner who, he argued, could weigh up the 
various local factors and upon whom a Secretary of Sate relied; with 
such a man as Wauchope he felt sure that the Agency would be able 
to co-operate. (153) 
The Zionists seemingly took Cunliffe-Lister at his word and 
established such good relations with Wauchope that it ultimately led 
to an Arab revolt. Wauchope essentially followed the guidelines Set 
by Cunliffe-Lister. The Colonial Secretary, alarmed at the 
Depression in Britain, had defined the question of Jewish immigration 
into Palestine in a wide sense and had relaxed the regulations 
concerning it and the related land sales to the Jews. By approving 
larger Labour Schedules, he hoped to transform Palestine into a 
self-sufficient economic unit which would become, as a result of 
larger Jewish capital imports, less dependent on the British 
tax-payer. (154) Wauchope carried through these policies, under the 
guise of attempting to assimilate the communities in more or less 
equal numbers. 
During the early 1930s, Jewish immigration into Palestine was an 
incendiary issue, particularly as the rise of Fascism in Europe had 
encouraged more Jews to seek refuge in Palestine. The situation, as 
a result,, became increasingly tense as Palestinian Arabs staged a 
number of demonstrations. However, when Wauchope received an 
Arab deputation who complained of the high immigration rates., he 
replied that he could see they had a legitimate grievance against 
only one aspect of Jewish immigration, namely those persons 
remaining in Palestine without authority, in other words, illegal 
immigrants. (155) 
As the High Commissioner ignored the hostilities aroused by the 
Palestine Administration's immigration policy, the Colonial Secretary 
outlined the obligations contained in the Mandate: "The Mandate 
carries with it a clear duty to Arabs and to Jews. There is under 
it the obligation to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a 
National Home for Jewish people. But at the same time there is an 
equally definite obligation to safeguard the rights of all inhabitants 
of Palestine-" Cunliffe-Lister went on to assure a meeting of Arabs 
in Haifa that the constant aim of British policy was to "foster and 
promote the well-being of all Palestine. 11056) 
It was a fine sentiment but it had little impact on the Arab 
community who were not only disillusioned with the British 
Government in the wake of the reversal of the 1931 White Paper but 
were also hardening in their opposition to the Jews. Their views 
were expressed in an article: "Zionism is nothing but a criminal 
enterprise encouraged by Britain and ...... aimed at oppressing the 
Arabs and bringing them under its control. "(157) 
Riots, demonstrations and violent incidents characterised Palestine in 
the years leading up to 1936. In the light of the outcry against 
Passfield and the White Paper it is not surprising that the Colonial 
Office should endeavour to appease the Jewish community in 
Palestine. However, it was this attitude which served to arouse 
Arab hostility and culminated in the disorders of 1936. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE 1937 ROYAL COMMISSION 
Introduction 
The preliminary chapters have provided an historical perspective to 
the events leading up to the Arab rebellion of 1936 but this chapter 
will mark the beginning of the main body of the thesis. The 
decision to commence at this point is not an arbitrary one for the 
Royal Commission, instituted in 1936 as a direct consequence of the 
Arab revolt - the worst outbreak of violence in Palestine to confront 
the British Government - had a profound implication for subsequent 
British policy. The Commission's importance not only lies in the fact 
that it was unquestionably the most authoritative enquiry undertaken 
during the inter-war period, but also, its recommendations were to 
have such a crucial impact on party attitudes in the years which 
followed. 
The Prelude 
During the months preceding the Arab rebellion Sir Arthur 
Wauchope, the High Commissioner, consolidated his influence on 
Britain's policy decisions towards Palestine, This arose chiefly as a 
result of a re-shuffle within the Colonial Office and the appointment 
of two Colonial Secretaries in quick succession. Malcolm MacDonald 
had assumed office in June 1935 immediately after the General 
Election but his appointment was of a temporary nature and lasted a 
mere five months. J. H. Thomas remained in office for a similar 
period of time and finally resigned following his involvement 
in a 
financial scandal. (1) Consequently, for the better part of a year 
Wauchope commanded an authority previously unknown throughout 
Cunliffe-Lister's term of office. Wauchope had enjoyed a certain 
success since his appointment in 1931., in securing the rapid 
development of the country and his immigration schemes 
had 
undoubtedly endeared him to the Zionists. In a discussion between 
David Ben-Gurion and Wauchope in Jerusalem in 1933, the 
former 
reported that he had been given a "sympathetic hearing, 
"(2) which 
was a significant comment given Ben-Gurion's radical leanings. (3) 
However, the beginnings of a rift between the High Commissioner 
and the Zionists appeared when he advocated the establishment of a 
Legislative Council(4) on which both communties in Palestine would 
sit. The Arabs had been pressing for the institution of such a 
Council since November 1935, yet Wauchope's support of the scheme 
came as a disappointment to the Jews. Weizmann recalled in his 
biography: "From the time of his arrival in 1931 Sir Arthur had 
entered into the problems of the country with great enthusiasm and 
had realised from the outset that the mainspring of our progress was 
immigration. By 1935 the annual immigration figure passed the sixty 
thousand mark and we thought that if this would only continue for 
another few years we would be past the difficulties which had given 
us most trouble. " He concluded that the setting up of a Legislative 
Council would inevitably lead to "the complete arrest both of Jewish 
immigration and of Jewish progress generally. "(5) 
One fact which the Zionists and the British Government could not 
overlook, however, was the Arab community's growing militancy as a 
result of the high rates of Jewish immigration. The Arabs had 
warned Wauchope of the probability of a "rapid deterioration" in the 
political situation in Palestine if their demands for a Legislative 
Council were not met. (6) In view of these provocative statements the 
question of a Legislative Council was discussed in the Commons on 
25th March 1936. During the debate there emerged serious doubt in 
all parts of the House as to the desirability of proceeding with the 
proposals. In fact, the Secretary of State's speech was constantly 
interrupted as other members pointed out that the introduction of a 
Council would contravene the aims of the Mandate. (7) This assertion 
was not strictly correct as the Mandate's articles had allowed for the 
possibility of some form of self-government being established. The 
stumbling block to this development which worried a number of MP s 
was that it would directly contravene Britain's other commitment i. e. 
it would retard the development of a Jewish National Home. 
Thomas regarded himself as the unfortunate caretaker of his 
predecessor's policies, essentially, as he put, "left to carry the 
baby", but others saw in his poor defence of the Legislative Council 
yet another indication of his "low political calibre. "(8) 
Wauchope's own position was naturally shaken by the rejection of a 
policy to which he had been committed, and it was he who had to 
face the Arabs' response. They likened the Government's reversal of 
policy to that of MacDonald's 'Black Letter' in 1931 and their feelings 
of resentment were exacerbated by the attitude of the Jews. 
Wauchope reported to Thomas: "I am told on good authority that 
they (the Jews) have boasted to the Arabs in private that they can 
square matters in London. "(9) The Arabs reasserted their demand 
that all Jewish immigration should cease. The Government, however, 
announced a new Jewish Labour Schedule of 4,500 immigrants to be 
admitted over the following six months. It was this development 
combined with the failure of the Legislative Council which 
precipitated the Arab revolt against the British authorities and 
resulted in military reinforcements being sent into Palestine from 
Egypt and Malta. 00) 
The Peel Commission judged that the Parliamentary defeat of the 
scheme had been instrumental in provoking the Arab rebellion in the 
sense that it demonstrated to the Arabs that any policy favourable to 
them could be neutralised by Jewish pressure in London. 01) The 
rebellion in Palestine, which initially took the form of riots in the 
streets progressed to random killings and finally culminated in a 
strike by all Arabs, generated a nervousness within the Foreign 
Office who, mindful of Italy's aggrandisement policies in Abyssinia, 
were anxious lest repressive measures against the Palestinian Arabs 
would bring repercussions in the surrounding Arab states. In the 
event there was no need for anxiety for Saudi Arabia, Iraq and 
Egypt had no desire to enter into a conflict with the British 
Government and offered their good services to quell the 
rebellion. 02) However, the Foreign Office had views on the situation 
in Palestine and were outlined by L. Oliphant, the Deputy 
Under-Secretary of State at the Department: "The Jews have been 
forcing the pace of immigration and it is unfortunate that German 
persecution precipitated a flood of immigrants but the Jews must see 
that Palestine has to be related to the global picture. If British 
resources are overstrained, the Jews may find themselves under a 
different mandatory power, one which is not so amenable. "(13) 
It is difficult to pinpoint the country to which Oliphant alluded. 
There was certainly some talk much later as to whether the United 
States would be a possible candidate to assume the Mandatory 
responsib . ities of Palestine, but there is no evidence to suggest that 
these ideas had surfaced in June 1936. In any case, America with 
its sizeable politically powerful Jewish population was hardly a 
country Zionists would find less 'amenable. ' 
Amid the increase in Arab attacks and murders and the 
corresponding Jewish reprisals, Wauchope found himself in the 
unenviable position of having annoyed both Arab and Jewish 
communities. In a bid to resolve the situation Wauchope suggested 
to Thomas that a Royal Commission be dispatched to Palestine to 
investigate the disturbances. Thomas brought Wauchope's proposal 
before the Cabinet, not for specific decisions on the Commission's 
terms of reference or its composition, but for the Cabinet's 
agreement to a new Commission in principle. 04) The Cabinet delayed 
its decision until 13th May. During the interval the Zionists learnt 
of the proposed initiative. The last thing the Zionists wanted was 
another Commission of Enquiry; they were still haunted by the 
findings of the Shaw Commission and its resultant White Paper and 
were less than eager to participate in a new Commission. The 
Zionists mobilised Leo Amery in an attempt to 'head off' the 
Commission at Prime Ministerial level. However, Amery reported that 
the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, "had very great faith in 
Wauchope", and that it would "take a lot to move him to oppose. 1105) 
Weizmann was out of the country and pressure was exerted on 
Thomas to defer a decision until he returned to London. The 
Colonial Secretary argued this point in Cabinet: "while taking the 
view, as a matter of general principle, that it is better to follow the 
advice of the man on the spot, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies felt some doubt whether in view of his own announcements 
about not capitulating to a threat of force it would be wise to 
announce a Royal Commission at the present time, at any rate before 
seeing Dr. Weizmann. "(16) Nevertheless, the Cabinet supported 
Wauchope's proposal, concluding that if it became known that 
Weizmann, but not the Arabs, had been consulted prior to the 
Cabinet's decision, the good effects contemplated might be 
discounted. It was agreed, however,, that the decision must not 
seem like a concession to Arab violence and the Cabinet decided to 
announce that the Government's first task would be to restore law 
and order, after which some form of enquiry would be 
undertaken. (17) 
Weizmann arrived in London on the day before the Cabinet was due 
to ratify the draft announcement that had been drawn up by the 
Ministers concerned. Weizmann rushed to see Thomas but without 
effect. The Colonial Secretary's own deteriorating position rendered 
him unable, even had he been willing, to controvert a draft 
document which he himself had participated in composing. The 
Cabinet gave its approval and Thomas duly made the announcement 
in the Commons on 18th May 1943.08) 
The announcement in Parliament to the eff ect that the Royal 
Commission would only get under way when the Arab disturbances 
and strike had been called off did not receive the desired result in 
Palestine. The Arabs declined to concur. Wauchope insisted that 
their action did not indicate a rejection of the Royal Commission in 
principle, but merely a refusal to accept the appointment of the 
Commission as a concession sufficient to warrant calling off the 
strike. What the Arabs wanted, he claimed, as a first step was the 
suspension of Jewish immigration. (19) The prospects of an early 
peace in Palestine were clearly not improving, particularly as a 
controversy was developing between the civil and military authorities 
as to how Palestine should be administered. 
Wauchope debated with the GOC in Palestine, Air vice-Marshall 
Peirse, the advisability of instituting martial law in the country. In 
such an event, executive authority would pass from the High 
Commissioner to the military, which had increasingly become 
frustrated by the administrative restrictions imposed on its military 
operations. It was Wauchope's view that the harsh consequences of 
martial law might doom all prospect of future peaceful development in 
the country. The dispute was referred to London where Wauchope 
recommended piecemeal political appeasement in the form of the Royal 
Commission together with a show of strength in the shape of troop 
reinforcements. In contrast,, the military proposed an all-out 
repression of the rebellion under the powers of martial law. 
(20) 
Wauchope's unwillingness to, as he saw it, further divide the two 
communities and to lose the Arabs' goodwill by resorting to stern 
measures against the rebels earnt him contempt and castigation 
by 
the military officials. The War Office, not notably sensitive 
to 
political considerations, commented: 11 .... the conclusion cannot 
be 
avoided that the method adopted by the High Commissioner was 
entirely ineffective. Martial law and unfettered military control 
should have been exercised from the first. The behaviour and 
general conduct of the defence forces in very trying circumstances 
were admirable. 11 (21) 
The fact that Wauchope's interpretation of events was accepted in 
London essentially meant that the Colonial Office had to improvise 
new ideas which might possibly break the impasse in Palestine. 
O. G. R. Williams, an official at the Colonial Office commented: "The 
situation has now developed in such a way that a continuance of the 
present measures of suppression, even if they are not as intensive 
as the Jews would like them to be, is likely to convert Arab goodwill 
into hatred for Great Britain. I am not in a position to express 
opinion as to the probability of this enmity spreading, nor whether 
this probability would justify HMGIs effort to alter Arab feeling by 
timely concession, for example by temporary suspension of 
immigration... 11(22) 
On 13th June Wauchope himself proposed that the Government 
intimate to the Royal Commission that it might suggest the 
suspension of immigration. The Colonial Office had rejected the 
idea, for "the natural reaction of the Royal Commission to any such 
suggestion would be to hand in their resignations at once. "(23) At 
this time, W. Ormsby-Gore replaced Thomas as Colonial Secretary and 
the Foreign Office, sensed the time was right to press the Colonial 
office to take immediate steps to suspend Jewish immigration pending 
the Royal Commission's investigation. At a Cabinet meeting Anthony 
Eden, the Foreign Secretary, make a recommendation that immigration 
into Palestine be stopped. (24) As a result of this pressure, 
Ormsby-Gore invited Weizmann and Ben-Gurion to attend a meeting 
at the Colonial Office. 
The Colonial Secretary informed the two Zionist leaders that he was 
contemplating announcing in the Commons that as soon as the Royal 
Commission began its work immigration would be stopped, though the 
actual word 'suspension' would be used. Ben-Gurion was totally 
opposed on principle to any suspension of immigration, even if only 
for a short period. Weizmann, however, adopted a more conciliatory 
approach and proposed that, if it would help matters,, "we might be 
prepared to postpone applying for the Labour Schedules while the 
Commission was in Palestine. 11(25) 
Weizmann's suggestion seems curiously at odds with the ideas 
prevalent in the Zionist movement over the question of a Royal 
Commission,, which they considered would be antipathetic to their 
interests, and in stark contradiction to his previous opposition to 
the scheme. It is possible, of course, that he considered the 
Government to be so deeply committed to the Commission and unlikely 
to change its policy that he had no option but to alter his position. 
In any case, Weizmann, always ready to seize a diplomatic initiative, 
probably perceived that in the face of Arab intransigence, Jewish 
co-operation would encourage the Government to look upon the 
Zionist case more favourably. 
Heartened by Weizmann's response Ormsby-Gore proposed to the 
Cabinet that the Government announce a suspension of immigration 
for the duration of the Commission's work, to be announced once law 
and order were restored and the Commission able to leave for 
Palestine. The Cabinet approved his recommendation. (26) However, 
although the Government had seemingly defined its policy towards 
Palestine the question remained as to when law and order -would be 
restored. The Arabs continued to refuse to call off the strike and 
the apparent instability within Palestine attracted the attention of the 
other Arab states. Both Ibn Saud, the ruler of Saudi Arabia, and 
Nuri Said, the Foreign Secretary of Iraq offered to mediate between 
the Palestinian Arabs and the British Government. (27) However, the 
involvement of the Arab Nations carried with it implications that they 
would in future meddle in what were essentially the affairs of the 
Mandatory Power and this probability was fully recognised by the 
Foreign Office: "It is obvious to us that Nuri (Said) is making the 
utmost use of the present situation to create maximum amount of 
elbow room for future Iraqi intervention in Palestinian affairs and to 
further his own Pan-Arab ideas... 11(28) Nevertheless, the 
intervention did mark a precedent and without doubt served to 
further involve the Foreign Office in the Palestine issue. 
Negotiations continued between the Palestinian Arabs and the British 
Government via representatives of the Arab States.. yet Britain 
refused to make any concessions. Within one month the Palestinian 
Arabs, sensing that they had conceivably overplayed their case and 
in the face of the threat of martial law, decided to call off their 
strike and order was once again restored in Palestine. 
The immigration issue, shelved during the negotiations with the 
Palestinian Arabs., had still to be finally settled. Wauchope, having 
regained his confidence, now advised against any concessions to the 
Arabs on the question of Jewish immigration as "it would merely 
invite a recurrence of armed rebellion as a method of gaining 
political ends, "(29) and the Colonial Office recommended that 
Wauchope make "a conservative estimate" of the economic absorptive 
capacity of the country. (30) The Cabinet accepted the Colonial Office 
contention that any concessions made now the disorders had ceased 
would smack of a deal between London and the Arab rulers and as a 
consequence Jewish immigration was maintained. (31) It was later 
agreed at a Cabinet meeting that an announcement be made that any 
change in the status quo with regard to immigration might prejudice 
the findings of the Royal Commission-02) 
The fact that the Palestinian Arab rebellion had come to an end 
under the threat but not the weight of martial. law, led Military 
Intelligence to arrive at the conclusion that the militancy of the Arab 
leaders in Palestine had only been curtailed in the short-term: "The 
last rebellion was mainly raised and controlled by the Higher Arab 
Committee led by a gentleman called the Grand Mufti. The fact that 
the rebellion was not suppressed by military action and the 
institution of martial law, and that no direct measures were taken 
against the Grand Mufti and his Arab Committee had left them with 
their power and prestige largely unimpaired. 11(33) With this rather 
salutory reminder of the incendiary nature of Palestinian affairs in 
mind, the Royal Commission prepared to leave London for Palestine 
on 5th November 1936. 
GO The Investigation Begins 
The terms of reference of the Royal Commission were firstly, to 
investigate the origin and underlying causes of the disturbances; 
secondly, to examine the grievances of the Jews and the Arabs in 
the light of the dual obligation contained in the Mandate towards the 
Jewish people and towards the Arabs and other non-Jewish sections 
of the population of Palestine; and thirdly, to make recommendations 
for effectually implementing the Mandate while preventing the 
recurrence of disturbances and promoting more harmonious relations 
between Jews and Arabs. (34) The Commission, headed by Lord Peel 
had a ist nguished membership; it comprised: Sir Maurice Carterv 
an eminent barrister; Sir Lauri Hammond; Sir H. Rumbold., the 
former British Ambassador to Berlin; and Professor R. Coupland, 
Fellow of All Souls, Oxford. Sir John Martin, an official within the 
Colonial Office, was the Secretary to the Commission. 
On 12th November 1936, Wauchope welcomed the Commissioners 
officially at Government House in Jerusalem. The following days 
were spent on an extended tour of Palestine, the Commissioners 
visiting the main Arab centres and several Jewish settlements, as 
well as Tel Aviv. The Commission's first public session took place 
on 18th November and it began by interviewing local officials in 
Palestine. November 25th was given over to the evidence and 
cross-examination of Weizmann. Weizmann recalls that, although he 
had complete confidence in the Commissioners' fairness and 
intellectual honesty it was with "considerable trepidation that I went 
up to Jerusalem on November 25th to deliver my evidence. I 
remember that, as I walked between two rows of spectators to the 
door of the building where the sessions were being held there were 
audible whispers on either side of me 'Ha-shem yatzliach darkechol 
(God prosper you on your mission) and I felt that I carried the 
burden of these well-wishers... I knew that a misstep of mine, any 
error, however involuntary, would be not mine alone, but would 
rebound to the discredit of my people. I was aware of a crushing 
sense of responsibility. 1105) 
During this first meeting, Weizmann outlined the history and aims of 
Zionism and pointed to the achievements which the Jews had already 
accomplished in Palestine: "After only 16 years we stand before an 
achievement on which I think we can look with a certain amount of 
respect and on which, I will not hide from you, we look with a 
certain amount of pride. "(36) The interview at the next public 
session was with Moshe Shertok, head of the Political Department of 
the Jewish Agency. Rumbold questioned Shertok on the Jewish 
Agency policy of granting Labour certificates to European Jews and 
whether it took account of the 'economic absorptive capacity' of the 
country. Shertok claimed that it did,, but when Rumbold queried the 
reply Shertok retorted: "We are never oblivious of the conditions 
under which our people live in the Diaspora. "(37) Jewish 
immigration, not surprisingly, was an issue which arose throughout 
all the interviews with members of the Jewish Agency and it 
ultimately led Rumbold to state that immigration seemed like an 
unending process. Zionist leaders began to fear that Britain might 
give up the idea of an eventual Jewish majority in Palestine and 
Weizmann outlined his anxieties to the High Commissioner. Wauchope 
informed Ormsby-Gore of his conversation with Weizmann: "He 
(Weizmann) had heard that it was generally held that there was a 
solid block of Arab people who could make the position for the 
British in Palestine so difficult and so constantly threatened that the 
English were tempted to say that they had done their duty, a 
National Home is now established, formed and existing and it is 
neither their duty nor their interest to go on allowing immigration 
when that course will only mean war or constant strife against the 
Arabs in Palestine-" Were England to "throw over the Jews" it would 
be faced "with 400,000 Jews all in revolt in Palestine backed by 
millions of Jews in America and elsewhere determined to gain their 
just rights and the fulfilment of the promises made to them. "(38) 
In threatening this response, Weizmann implied that it had been the 
intention of the British Government to install a Jewish majority in 
Palestine. This may, and probably was, the intention of those 
within the Government who supported the Zionist cause,, but to 
argue that this was Britain's interpretation of her Mandatory 
responsibilities is certainly inaccurate. Britain essentially followed a 
piecemeal policy towards Palestine taking short-term measures in 
order to circumvent the obvious contradictions evident in the Balfour 
Declaration which had been enshrined within the Mandate. Over the 
fourteen year period of Mandatory rule, Britain had followed no 
clear, definite, long-term policy towards Palestine. HMG's responses 
had changed to meet the internal and external exigencies of the day. 
The Jewish leaders appeared to be labouring under a 
misapprehension yet given Weizmann's astute mind this seems 
curious. It is far more probable that Weizmann deliberately 
overstated British policy by opting for an extreme, but permissible, 
interpretation of it, in order to put pressure on the Government. 
Upon reading the text of Weizmann's interview with Wauchope, 
George Rendel the head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign 
Office, resented the implication that Palestine must provide a 
solution, by way of Jewish immigration, for a problem which was 
not, in his view, a Palestinian problem at all. He stated in a 
departmental minute: "The position of the Jews is indeed a tragic 
one, and commands the utmost sympathy. They are suffering an 
intense persecution in Germany and the problem of the disposal of 
the surplus Jewish population of Poland is clearly becoming one of 
the major difficulties of central European politics. " He then went on 
the draw a rather curious analogy by stating that this problem was 
of the same type as "the redistribution of raw materials and the 
opening up of markets .... It is submitted that, even if Palestine 
were,, as the Jews would like to represent it, a practically empty 
place capable of absorbing a very much larger number even than at 
present of Jewish refugees, it is neither practical nor just to regard 
the Palestine problem simply as an escape from a major world 
problem. 11 (3 9) 
Rendel.. of course, was a committed Arabophil, on his own 
admission(40) and had developed close and cordial relations with Ibn 
Saud. In fact, after a visit to the Middle East, Rendel circulated 
his impression to the Colonial Office, stressing "the need to solve 
the Palestine problem in a way which would placate the Arabs. "(41) 
Rendel wanted to submit a memorandum to the Peel Commission to 
this effect, but Ormsby-Gore quashed such a proposal: "I realise 
that Mr. Rendel is sincerely pro-Arab and anti-Jew and a critic of 
His Majesty's policy of carrying out the Mandate of the League of 
Nations, but that he had the right to submit to a Royal Commission 
his own erroneous opinion of that policy is a right I cannot 
admit.... 1102) 
The Colonial Secretary, of course, was on shaky ground when he 
tried to assume the role of impartial adjudicator, for he had to live 
down a 'Zionist past' dating from 1918 when he went to Palestine as a 
member of the Zionist Commission. Weizmann never let Ormsby-Gore 
forget his former sympathies and urged him "not to become impartial" 
in the light of the whole-hearted help he had given the Zionists in 
earlier days. (43) 
The Commission continued its interviews, this time with the Arabs, 
who had belatedly agreed to attend. When the Muti, as leader of 
the Palestinian Arabs, (44) stated that "we object to the existence of 
400,000 Jews in this country"(45) it soon became apparent to the 
Commissioners that co-operation between the Arabs and the Jews was 
a remote possibility. Coupland had already come to that conclusion 
and in a secret session with Weizmann suggested the question of 
partition. Coupland told Sir John Martin that Weizmann would "think 
it over. "(46) Weizmann recalled that on being presented with the 
notion he was placed in an impossible position, and maintained that 
as the head of a democratic organisation, he could not give the 
Commission his views on such an important subject without 
consultation with his colleagues. (47) 
S. Brodetsky of the Jewish Agency, when hearing of the partition 
proposal itemised the points which needed to be considered before 
such an idea became acceptable to the Jewish people. He argued 
that it was possible to favour the idea only if four aspects were 
included: firstly, freedom of entry and settlement for Jewish 
individuals; secondly, sovereign status; thirdly, a sound economic 
basis and fourthly, cultural independence. Within these areas 
Brodetsky outlined the need for 'population transfer' which in effect 
meant that Arabs would be transferred or expropriated from Jewish 
territory, although no mention was made of Jews being moved from 
Arab areas. He explained that any Arabs in the proposed Jewish 
state would be "definitely the 'bottom dog"', and considered that 
partition would involve further fighting and bloodshed in Palestine. 
Speaking, as he was, on behalf of the Jewish Agency, he decided 
that it would be inopportune for the Agency to arrive at any 
conclusion, which he thought should be left to the Zionist Congress, 
but by way of a concluding note he stressed an interesting and 
revealing point: "It must be remembered that if general opinion 
accepts the view that we favour partition, by implication it will be 
assumed that we have given up our present claims to the whole of 
Palestine. 11(48) This statement clearly highlights the aims of the 
Zionists, that is, to control Palestine, ultimately, if taking 
Brodetsky's argument to its logical conclusion, to the exclusion of 
Arabs. Weizmann, of course, had skilfully managed to blur these 
objectives throughout his discussions with the British Government. 
Shortly after writing the memorandum, Brodetsky and Weizmann had 
a meeting with Ormsby-Gore during which a discussion ensued on 
the procedural arrangements of the Royal Commission's report, 
i. e. 
how long it would take to be completed and channelled through to 
Parliament. Brodetsky asked the Colonial Secretary if the Report 
could be made available to the House of Commons before 
the 
Government took its decision about policy, in order that there might 
be an opportunity of wider discussion. Ormsby-Gore replied that 
this was out of the question stating that "there would be no point in 
such a procedure because the only thing the House could discuss 
would be a definite Government proposal. "(49) Significantly, 
Ormsby-Gore was to reverse his decision only two months' later. 
Meanwhile, the Commissioners in Palestine were preparing to return 
to London although their work had not finished. It was now the 
turn of the politicians in Britain to give evidence to the Commission 
and the first to be interviewed was the former Colonial Secretary, 
Winston Churchill. The interview was an uneasy one. Rumbold, on 
referring to the Arabs spoke of the "indigenous population" being 
subjected in 1918 "to the invasion of a foreign race. " Churchill 
strongly objected to the term "foreign race" and replied that it was 
the Arabs who had come in after the Jews. In any case, he argued, 
it was "the great hordes of Islam who had smashed Palestine 
up. 11(50) By this time, the Commissioners had become aware that 
both the Arabs and the Jews held irreconcilable positions, and they 
began to prepare their report on the basis of the establishment of 
two separate states in Palestine, one Jewish, the other Arab. 
The Report was radical and unprecedented. Palestine would be 
partitioned into Arab and Jewish States. The latter would be a strip 
of coastline running from south of Tel Aviv and widenening south of 
Haifa to include Nazareth and the western shore of Lake Tiberias. 
Britain would retain under permanent Mandate the Holy places, 
Jerusalem, Bethlehem and a corridor to the sea at Jaffa. The 
remainder would constitute the Arab State. As such, the 1922 
Palestine Mandate would be abrograted. (51) 
OR) The Partition Debate 
The Peel Report was introduced to Cabinet on 25th June 1937. 
However, prior to this date a series of meetings had taken place 
between Weizmann and Ormsby-Gore. On 13th June, Weizmann met 
the Colonial Secretary to discuss the proposed Jewish State. 
Weizmann asserted that he did not stand committed to the acceptance 
of the Report and that if it was unacceptable to the Jews they would 
do everything possible to oppose it. Ormsby-Gore suggested to 
Welzmann that, without committing himself, he outlined the points 
which would make the Report favourable in Jewish eyes. He replied 
that the partition proposal was not his and he,, in fact, did not want 
it at all, but if it was going to be put through, there were certain 
minimum requirements which would be essential in order to satisfy 
the Jewish community. Firstly, he maintained it was necessary that 
the Negev be included in the Jewish area (the Report had included 
this in the Arab State); secondly, the eastern boundaries of the 
state should be sufficiently advanced into the hills to afford 
adequate protection to Jewish territory; thirdly, the Jews in 
Jerusalem should form part of the Jewish state, and finally, there 
must be a real possibility of large scale development and immigration. 
Ormsby-Gore stated that some of these points really required 
discussion with the Government's strategic experts,, that is to say, 
the Chiefs of Staff and concluded the meeting by saying that the 
Government had before it the alternatives of coming to Parliament 
with its policy ready made and allowing discussion only after the 
announcement of that policy, or of coming to Parliament and giving 
the House the opportunity of discussing the Report first and only 
then arriving at a final decision. The Colonial Secretary then asked 
Weizmann which alternative he favoured. Weizmann replied that he 
had always preferred the latter option, indeed had argued this point 
with Ormsby-Gore only two months' previously. The Secretary of 
State responded that he now inclined to the view that Parliament be 
given the opportunity of speaking first. (52) 
At the Colonial Secretary's suggestion, Weizmann wrote a letter to 
Ormsby-Gore, two days' later outlining the points which had been 
raised at their meeting. (53) Also as a result of the meeting on 13th 
June, Sir Herbert Creedy of the War Office contacted the Jewish 
Agency in an attempt to discern which boundaries, from a defence 
point of view, would be acceptable to the Jews. The Agency replied 
that over and above the agricultural, industrial and commercial 
aspects which could be developed in an enlarged Jewish State, the 
State could be "strategically utilised by Great Britain. "(54) 
In presenting the Peel Commission Report to the Cabinet, 
Ormsby-Gore strongly advised his colleagues to accept the partition 
of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, calling the report a 
"lucid and penetrating analysis" which had led him to accept 
"without hesitation the Commission's diagnosis of the root of trouble 
as a conflict of irreconcilable national aspirations. 11 He also accepted 
that partition,, although a "drastic and difficult operation" had, "the 
best hope of permanent solution, just to both parties and consonant 
with our obligations to both Jews and Arabs. "(55) The Foreign 
Office objected to the scheme on two grounds: firstly,, to the details 
of the partition proposal, and secondly., to the fact that partition 
would have to be strictly imposed, possibly by martial law. Eden 
claimed that the Peel plan created a small Jewish state with unviable 
frontiers alongside an Arab state without access to the sea, and 
argued that the Government should make the frank admission that 
fulfilment of the Mandatory's obligations had proved impossible. (56) 
The Secretary of State for India, thought the Arabs had been given 
a "raw deal" and amid the uncertainty surrounding the Report's 
radical suggestions, it was decided that the Government would not 
commit itself to details but would confine itself to the approval only 
of the principle of partition. 
Rendel, of course, opposed the establishment of a Jewish state in 
any form and particularly resented what he considered to be the 
"indecent haste" with which the Colonial office sought to divest itself 
of all responsibility for Palestine. (57) It is possible to discern the 
Colonial Secretary's exasperation with the whole affair in a minute he 
wrote to Lord Dufferin. Despairing of the attacks on Britain by 
both the Arabs and Jews, Ormsby-Gore stated that he was inclined 
to tell both communities that partition "was the Government's 
proposal and they could either take it or leave it. "(58) 
The Zionists ostensibly condemned the whole idea of partition and 
Ben-Gurion outlined as much in a interview with Ormsby-Gore. He 
made it clear that the Zionist Movement was strongly against any 
partition scheme at all and pressed for the fulfilment of the Mandate, 
which he interpreted as being Jewish control of the whole of 
Palestine. Ben-Gurion pointed to the fact that Palestine had been 
partitioned twice; once when the frontier was drawn between the 
British and French Mandated territories and a considerable part of 
Northern Palestine had been included in Syria and later when the 
whole of Transjordan had been excluded from the scope of the 
Mandate. The Zionists were, he argued, justly concerned over the 
results of a third partition. (59) 
Weizmann, who was also present, ignored Ben-Gurion's line of attack 
and asked the Colonial Secretary if the Jewish Agency could have an 
advance copy of the Report before publication on 7th July,, pointing 
out that this would enable them "to prepare their people 
beforehand-" He suggested that if any issues arose from their 
perusal of the Report they could discuss the points with Cosmo 
Parkinson or Shuckburgh and the issues could be "ironed out in 
advance of publication. " Ormsby-Gore replied that he was unwilling 
to show the Report to any private person, to which Weizmann replied 
that the head of the Jewish Agency could hardly be regarded as a 
private individual. Ibn Saud was not seeing a copy of the Report, 
remarked the Colonial Secretary and Weizmann enquired as to what 
Ibn Saud had to do with the matter anyway: "He has no standing 
whatever as regards Palestine, but the Jewish Agency are the people 
who will have to carry out what might be decided-" Ormsby-Gore 
agreed to raise the matter at the next Cabinet meeting but 
cautioned: "We should certainly have to keep it confidential. 11(60) 
In the event,, the Cabinet rejected the suggestion and Weizmann, in 
a fit of pique, wrote a long condemnatory letter to the Secretary of 
State, accusing him of being responsible for the disorders in 
Palestine which had occasioned the appointment of the Royal 
Commission: 11 ... the paralysis of Government, the surrender to 
crime; the demoralisation of the Civil Service; the denial of justice; 
the failure to protect the lives and property of law-abiding Jewish 
citizens. These things fall to a great extent into your own term of 
office. " He stresssed the long connection between the Zionists and 
the Colonial Secretary: "You have been working with us for the last 
20 years. This is the more tragic for me when I see you at the 
head of the Colonial Office, you who have helped us whole-heartedly 
in earlier days, I remember - and I shall never forget - our old 
friendship and the work we did in common. But however I feel 
towards you personally,, how can I trust the system with which you 
have now become identified. " 
Weizmann went on to complain that the Zionists would receive a copy 
of the Report "at about the same time as it will be given to the 
Lobby correspondents of the newspapers, that is, two days before 
publication. 11(61) Nevertheless, although Ormsby-Gore appeared to 
the Zionists as unsympathetic to their cause, a number of Zionist 
supporters, including members of the Opposition were gathering to 
discuss tactics in order to oppose partition when it came up for 
discussion in Parliament. A certain irony appears at this stage as 
the Zionists, by vocally emphasising their opposition to the question 
of partition and thereby carrying their supporters with them, 
overstated their criticism of the plan. Blanche Dugdale warned the 
Zionists not to make partition the "cat's paw of English politics. "(62) 
A Jewish Agency report, written two weeks before the issue was 
debated in Parliament, indicated that some Zionists were not 
completely opposed to the scheme: "To attempt to upset the Report 
is to run our heads against a brick wall. The alternatives to 
partition are disastrous. Therefore, partition must be made 
workable. 11 (63) 
However., on the same day, Wauchope reported to Cosmo Parkinson 
that Ben-Gurion and other members of the Jewish Agency in 
Palestine "have openly declared they are against partition. 11(64) The 
equivocation of the Zionists encouraged their supporters to argue 
against partition. Dalton maintained that "many of my colleagues 
who are very friendly to the Jews would be inclined to oppose 
partition in the interests of the Jews themselves. 11(65) Churchill, 
Creech-Jones and Attlee all roundly condemned the proposal. Attlee 
was shocked at the idea of partition and felt it was a concession to 
violence and a confession of failure. (66) 
Creech-Jones clarified the reasoning behind the Zionist sympathisers, 
opposition to partition: 11 ... I do not know whether at this stage it 
would be wise for those who have supported the establishment of a 
Jewish National Home in Palestine to support such a proposal which 
is a considerable limitation and might prove to be a big modification 
in the conception of the Balfour Declaration. "(67) 
With the current of opinion running against partition among Zionist 
supporters, Ormsby-Gore decided to keep his statement in the House 
of Commons vague in the anticipation that he would have "rather a 
bad time. "(68) The Colonial Secretary was accurate in his prediction: 
with an overwhelming majority of Zionist sympathisers: Morgan 
Jones, Sinclair, Wedgwood, Tom Williams, Churchill and Lloyd George 
arguing against the proposal. Only Amery gave "preliminary 
approval of the broad principle" and maintained that the final 
partition scheme should take into account future Jewish needs in 
conjunction with the European situation. (69) The Commons did not 
want to be rushed into endorsing a scheme which a Royal Commission 
had taken six months to compile, and a delaying amendment, first 
proposed by Churchill, was adopted without division. The partition 
scheme would be submitted to the League of Nations and it was 
resolved that during the interim period the Government would be 
able to make adequate inquiries so as to return to Parliament with a 
definite scheme which took into account the recommendations of the 
Commission. (70) 
It appeared that Zionist logic in emphasising the negative aspects of 
the proposal distorted their acceptance of the general principles 
involved. The Peel Report had clearly presented a quandary for the 
Zionists; they could neither accept it nor ignore it. The issue 
required a carefully balanced evaluation but this was not always 
forthcoming. Weizmann claimed, somewhat disingenuously, that the 
Zionists' failure to display adequately their conversion to partition 
had been due to their having been denied an advance copy of the 
Report. (71) 
On llth August 1937, the Zionist Congress met in Zurich to discuss 
the question of partition, and a majority of delegates authorised the 
Zionist Executive to negotiate with HMG the precise details of the 
scheme. (72) One month later the Foreign Secretary, presented the 
Government's proposals to the League of Nations Council. He argued 
the case for partition in the light of the unworkability of the 
Mandate, and stressed the fact that the Mandatory Power could take 
no steps without the authority of the League. The Council adopted 
a resolution which in effect allowed Britain to conduct further 
investigations but did not commit itself to the concept of partition: 
"the Council agrees to the UK carrying out the study and ... defers 
consideration of the substance of the question until the Council is in 
a position to deal with it as a whole and in the meantime entirely 
reserves its opinion and its decision. "(73) 
A few days later the Palestine issue was discussed at the League 
Assembly Meeting and Arab opposition to the partition plan was 
considerable. Tewfik-el-Swaidy, Iraq's Foreign Secretary warned the 
British Government that their policy in Palestine was doomed to 
failure and that the disorders in the country were bound to have 
repercussions in the neighbouring countries and consequently 
disturb the peace in the Middle East. The Egyptian Foreign 
Minister, Butros Ghali Pascha, strongly condemned partition which 
he considered to be "irreconcilable with Arab national rights. The 
creation of two small states, " he maintained., "was untenable". Lord 
Cranborne, speaking on behalf of the British Government, argued 
that these opinions only "served to underline the complexity of the 
problem, " and reassured the delegates that all views would receive 
the fullest consideration of the British Government. He went on to 
say that although the British Government viewed partition as the 
best and most hopeful solution of the problem, it was not committed 
to the details of any definite scheme. (74) 
However, the opinions espoused by the Arab states did not go 
unnoticed by the Foreign Office and in many ways reinforced the 
Department's antipathy towards the scheme. The Office considered 
the implementation of partition would undoubtedly bring with it the 
risk of a general conflagration in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the 
Foreign Office did not advocate a return to the pre-Royal Commission 
policies but rather that Britain openly admitted that the task of 
implementing the Balfour Declaration had proved beyond its 
capabilities. Britain, the Department argued, could offer the Jews 
"a free gift of British territory elsewhere. 11(75) Vansittart, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, ruled out this 
approach sensing, quite accurately, that it would prove unacceptable 
to the majority of Jews, and would arouse the opposition of the 
Colonial Office. As it was, the Colonial Office could not understand 
the Foreign Office's objections to partition, which appeared to them 
to be the only honourable departure from a debilitating affair: 
"... the falseness of our position hampered us at every turn; now at 
length we have a means of escape... by which we can do 
substantial justice to both parties and clean our conscience of the 
odious imputation of breach of faith. We are.. in sight of shore after 
prolonged buffeting in heavy seas. Are we to scuttle the lifeboat 
merely because the coast looks rocky and dangerous? " (76) 
The Foreign Office , of course, could take 
the view that as the 
Government's recommendation to implement partition had not been 
endorsed by Parliament, largely on account of Zionist opposition, and 
as there had been negative reactions to the policy from the Arab 
nations,, there was little reason to support a scheme which clearly 
antagonised the two communities it sought to appease. The fact that 
the Zionists belatedly began to favour the idea of a separate Jewish 
state was a case of misjudged timing. Had the Jewish Movement and 
its supporters appeared enthusiastic towards the notion of partition 
it is possible that the British Government, with the support of the 
League of Nations, could have effectively progressed with the 
Commission's recommendations before the deteriorating European 
scene obliged Britain to view the Middle Eastern situation, in general 
and Palestine in particular, in a rather different perspective. As it 
was,, the six month interval between the publication of the Peel 
Report and the appointment of the Woodhead Commission, which was 
to examine the technical feasibility of partition, allowed time for the 
Foreign Office to interest itself in the Commission's terms of 
ref erence. The Foreign Office stated that the "British were faced 
with solid and growing opposition from the native inhabitants of 
Palestine and more seriously, from the whole Arab world. "(77) The 
Government, by this time, had decided that it would not agree to 
the compulsory transfer of populations and land and this clearly 
limited the feasibility of partition. (78) As such, the terms of 
reference were widened to enable the Commission not only to examine 
alternative schemes but also to reject the idea of partition totally. 
In Gabriel Sheffer's view the Peel Commission's Plan was not: "a 
genuine attempt at solving the problem for good ... in its final form 
the plan was primarily aimed at safeguarding Britain's national 
interests and only secondarily at solving the inter-communal 
strife. "(79) However, Sheffer's view is overdrawn for it assumes 
there was one identifiable perception of how to maintain British 
interests. Certainly, the British Government was aware of the 
strategic importance of Palestine, but opinions differed, particularly 
between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, as to the best 
means of preserving those interests. 
The Report contradicted Foreign Office's conception, at that time., of 
the desirable political shape of the Middle East. The Foreign Office 
favoured a Muslim federation rather than secular national states as 
the optimum arrangement for securing British interests in the area. 
This view ran counter to the ideas held by Ormsby-Gore and his 
Department. It was their opinion that the British Government should 
encourage the creation and existence of national states, including a 
Jewish state, as it was felt a disunited Arab world would best suit 
Britain's concerns. (80) 
The notion of partition raised for the first time by the Peel 
commission was an idea to which Zionists and their sympathisers 
would return in future years, yet paradoxically in 1937 their less 
than enthusiastic response to the policy inclined the British 
Government to reconsider the proposal. In essence, the whole 
question of partition was on the verge of being rejected just as the 
Zionists were beginning to recognise the benefits of such a scheme. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RETREAT FROM PARTITION 
(i)The Woodhead Commission 
During the summer of 1937 Chaim Weizmann began to sense a change 
in the climate of opinion towards partition and remarked that., while 
he exerted himself in breaking resistance to the plan within the 
ranks of the Jewish Agency, "the government seemed to grow 
increasingly cool towards it. 11(l) Weizmann's interpretation was 
correct. The British government was beginning to doubt the 
viability of partition particularly in view of the renewal of 
disturbances by the Arab community in Palestine. 
The outbreak of violence in Palestine which erupted in August 1937 
could be seen as the second phase of the rebellion which had 
preceded the Peel Commission's investigation. It was still, of 
course, anti-Zionist in character, although this recourse to violence 
related to the partition proposals and, as such, hostilities went one 
step further in that they were manifestly anti-British. During the 
campaign of personal terror the District Commissioner responsible for 
arranging the Peel Commission's travels through Palestine, was 
murdered. As a response to this outrage Ormsby-Gore sought and 
obtained Cabinet authorisation to arrest all members of the Higher 
Arab Committee, the organisation in Palestine which represented 
Palestinian Arab interests. It was believed in British circles that 
the Mufti, who was an executive member of the Arab committee, 
orchestrated the rebellion and orders were given that he too should 
be arrested. (2) In the course of the Cabinet meeting the Colonial 
Secretary maintained that the murder had been accompanied "by 
many other murders of moderate Arabs" and that a reign of terror 
had seemingly been inaugurated. (3) 
Following Ormsby-Gore's representations in Cabinet, British troops 
began an intensive military campaign against Arab terrorists and on 
6th October, the Colonial Secretary reported to the Cabinet that five 
of the ten members of the Arab Higher Committee had been arrested 
and deported to the Seychelles. (4) The Mufti, however, managed to 
elude arrest and escaped to the Lebanon in the guise of an old 
woman., Nevertheless, it was not Beirut in the Lebanon which was 
the source of the terrorism in Palestine, but Damascus in Syria. 
The apparent participation of the neighbouring Arab states in the 
disorders within Palestine aroused the interest of the Foreign Office 
and a number of communiques were received from the Department's 
representatives in those areas. However, it was a report from the 
British Consul in Damascus,, Gilbert Mackereth, which threw an 
interesting light on the nature of the disturbances. In his 
memorandum to Rendel., Mackereth maintained that although it was 
posible to sympathise with the pan-Arab and anti-Zionist activities of 
the Arab world, there was,, in his view, another aspect to the 
present anti-British and anti-Jewish campaign. "It should not be 
thought., " Mackereth wrote, "that the Arab nationalists, either in 
Palestine or Syria offer themselves as heroes in a noble cause. " and 
went on to explain: "During the past two months they (the Arab 
Nationalists) have been scouring the slums of Syrian towns for 
known criminals. I have myself compiled in the course of my efforts 
to prevent them from going to Palestine a list of about one hundred 
and fifty Syrians and Palestinians resident in Syria who have in this 
way been canvassed; many have been hired and have gone to 
Palestine with a sordid and purely mercenary mission to create what 
havoc they can. " To his knowledge., Mackereth asserted, "not a 
single honourably known Syrian or Palestinian from Syria has 
crossed the frontier to join any of the groups of bandits who in 
Palestine pass their time menacing and murdering officials, 
defenceless soldiers, policemen and civilians, Arab., Jew and 
Christian alike. " He concluded by emphasising that he would not 
normally refer to Arabs as bandits but on this occasion he could 
"fully justify the use of these epithets. I chose the terms 
deliberately in the hope of thus distinguishing their activities from a 
legitimate manifestation of proper Arab feeling. "(5) 
Exactly what a 'legitimate manifestation' of Arab feeling implied is 
unclear; presumably it could be taken to mean Arab deputations to 
the Foreign Office not dissimilar to those taken by the 
representatives of Egypt who continued to reiterate their hostility to 
any future Jewish State and the inadvisability of the British 
Government adopting a policy "which would be hateful to the 
Arabs. "(6) 
Rendel took exception to Mackereth's description of the Arab 
terrorists and, completely overlooking the fact that moderate 
Arabs(7) were continuing to be killed by Arab extremists, stated 
"The trouble in Palestine is political and not criminal.. though 
naturally our political opponents are using criminal measures, since 
no others are at present open to them. " Rendel was clearly alluding 
to the widespread Palestinian Arab contention that because the 
British Government allegedly ignored the Arab case a recourse to 
violence was the only alternative and, as such, he went on to assert 
that many of those whom Mackereth had described as 'thugs' were, in 
fact, "sincere Arab patriots. "(8) 
Rendel's views on the question of partition and his apparent 
condonation of Arab violence begin to seem less than impartial. 
Opposition to the proposed Jewish State undoubtedly existed within 
the Arab nations as evidenced at the League of Nations debate on 
the issue, and it was believed at the Foreign Office that Ibn Saud of 
Saudi Arabia was "genuinely in something approaching despair about 
our Palestine policy. "(9) Yet it is difficult not to gain the impression 
that Rendel's personal bias against the institution of an independent 
Jewish state, a development which he had opposed even before the 
Royal Commission published its recommendations, coloured his 
perspective to such an extent that he seemed ready and almost 
willing to dismiss the fact that Arabs were, in fact, being killed by 
Arabs. This would seem to suggest, as Mackereth implied, that a 
polarity of views existed both within the Arab community in Palestine 
itself and in the wider context of the Arab states. A report from an 
official at the British Embassy in Cairo noted that the sense of 
outrage at the partition proposal expressed in Egypt was not 
necessarily spontaneous and that internal Egyptian political rivalry, 
Itmay provoke an artificial and inconvenient interest in the Arab 
cause in Palestine. 11(10) 
Throughout these months the Colonial office still adhered strongly to 
the opinion that partition was the best policy and Ormsby-Gore 
argued this point in Cabinet: "Either we must carry out our pledges 
to the Jewish people, as now interpreted by an impartial Royal 
Commission, or we shall have to tell the Jews that we cannot fulfil 
our frequently reiterated pledges, for fear of jeopardising our 
relations with the Arab rulers outside Palestine... 11(11) However, 
it 
was Foreign Office opinion that the new Commission's terms of 
reference would have to be enlarged to ensure that they did not 
exclude all evidence other than that having a direct bearing on the 
partition scheme and Eden proposed that the Commission be allowed 
complete freedom to consider whatever proposals it thought best 
suited the new situation. The Cabinet., cognisant of the controversy 
between the two departments decided to defer a decision. (12) 
Ormsby-Gore disliked the delay and considered that uncertainty 
about the government's direction would inevitably lead to an increase 
in Arab intransigence. 
Before the next decisive Cabinet meeting a Foreign Office 
memorandum was prepared and signed by Eden. The document 
argued the case for the Arabs pointing out their subjection to "an 
alien and dangerous invader" and outlining the serious opposition to 
partition within the Arab states. The Memorandum went on to state, 
in the first person: "It has been suggested to me that there is only 
one way in which we can now make peace with the Arabs and avoid 
any danger,, that is, by giving the Arabs some assurance that the 
Jews will neither become a majority in Palestine nor be given any 
Palestinian territory in full sovereignty. We would go a long way 
towards recovering the confidence and friendship of the Middle 
Eastern States and greatly strengthen our moral and political position 
in that vital area by re-establishing peace with the Arab world and 
fulfiling our obligation to the Jews by the establishment of a fixed 
numerical proportion between the two races. " A failure to do so 
would not only involve the British government "in continuing military 
commitments of a far-reaching character in Palestine itself, but also 
would bring on Britain the permanent hostility of all the Arab and 
Moslem Powers in the Middle East. "(13) 
In the Cabinet meeting on 8th December, the Prime Minister, Neville 
Chamberlain, accepted the thrust of Eden's Memorandum and it was 
agreed that whilst the Woodhead Commission would consider the 
viability of partition it would be mindful of the limitations of such a 
proposal and would be enabled, after sufficient investigation, to 
suggest any other scheme it felt to be preferable. 04) 
The appointment of the new Commission in January 1938, headed by 
Sir John Woodheadj, a former Indian Civil Servant,, was regarded by 
the Colonial office as an instrument with which the Foreign Office 
intended to slowly eliminate partition. Although a Cabinet 
appointment, the Commission was regarded by the Colonial Office as 
a Foreign Office creation; Shuckburgh, Deputy Under-Secretary at 
the Colonial Office commented: " .... I am extremely anxious about the 
whole position - It is unique in my experience. Here we have a 
policy (good or bad is not the purpose) which was formally adopted 
by the Cabinet as a whole., but which the Foreign Office are doing 
their best ..... to render nugatory. "(15) 
It was widely believed in the Colonial Office that the Peel Commission 
was betrayed by the Woodhead Commission. In fact, it came to be 
known at the time as the 'Repeal Commission'. (16) Sir John Martin, of 
the Colonial Office, quite accurately considered the Woodhead 
Commission to be of an entirely different calibre to that of the Peel 
Commission, and in no sense as authoritative. It was his opinion 
that, in a sense, the Peel Commission had been mistaken in not 
requesting more time for their investigations, which would have 
permitted them to produce a detailed scheme of partition based on 
greater information about population figures; "the scheme might then 
have been imposed swiftly on the strength of their authority and 
would have saved a lot of subsequent trouble. "(17) Of course, issues 
always seem much clearer when viewed with the benefit of hindsight 
and although it would not be unreasonable to suggest that HMG 
acted with inordinate delay in appointing the second commission at a 
stage when time was of the essence, a doubt must still exist as to 
the acceptability of any partition plan to the Zionist Movement, be it 
definitive or not, at a time when such a scheme was considered to be 
a vital departure from the commitments of the Mandate. The fact 
that Zionists only began to favour the scheme when British 
government policy focussed on the fixing of a permanent minority 
status on Palestinian Jewry in the January of 1938 compounds the 
view that Zionists viewed partition to be the lesser of two evils and 
only supported the proposal when all hope was apparently lost of 
fulfilling their claims to control the whole of Palestine. 
Weizmann, aware that partition was under threat and the Jewish 
immigration into Palestine was being curtailed, warned Shuckburgh 
that "Jews are not going to Palestine to exchange their German or 
Polish ghetto for an Arab one. 1108) He also complained of what he 
thought to be the deference shown to Ibn Saud by the British 
Government, and asserted., somewhat ironically, that the Arab leader 
was "an astute politican, he chooses his time for the exercise of 
gentle pressure on the Foreign Office and unfortunately he finds a 
sympathetic ear..... "(19) 
Paradoxically, Weizmann's easy access to high places which 
characterised the earlier part of his career began to diminish at a 
time when certain Arab leaders began to assert their influence. On 
his return to Palestine in order to prepare his evidence before the 
Woodhead Commissiong Weizmann endeavoured to reassure himself as 
to the role the Commission would adopt. The Chief Secretary to the 
Commission reported to the Foreign Office that Weizmann accepted 
that the Commission would favour partition. Evidently, the High 
Commissioner had told Weizmann that the Commission's note-paper was 
headed 'Partition Commission' and Weizmann deduced that that "must 
mean something! "(20) 
Ormsby-Gore continued to favour the establishment of a Jewish State 
as proposed by the Peel Commission and in a letter to Lord Halifax, 
the successor to Anthony Eden, he stressed that he was "absolutely 
committed to partition. I am convinced that the Peel Commission 
were right and that the only solution of the Palestine problem 
compatible with the Balfour Declaration is self-government for Jews 
and Arabs in separate states within Palestine. 11(21) Time, however, 
was running out for Ormsby-Gore and in less than two months he 
was replaced at the Colonial Office by Malcolm MacDonald. Zionist 
sources claim that he resigned from office a broken man(22) but 
governmental records reveal him to be, if not quite a broken man 
then unquestionably an embittered one: ... the Arabs are 
treacherous and untrustworthy, the Jews greedy and, when freed 
from persecution, aggressive .... I am convinced that the Arabs 
cannot be trusted to govern the Jews any more than the Jews can be 
trusted to govern the Arabs. "(23) 
Malcolm MacDonald's appointment initially pleased the Zionists for he 
had long established links with the Jewish Agency. Weizmann 
speaking at the time of the 1931 White Paper expressed his 
appreciation of the efforts Malcolm MacDonald had exerted in his role 
as go-between for the Jewish Agency and the government., and the 
'extreme sympathy' he had shown for the Zionist cause. (24) The 
Jewish Chronicle reported favourably on his appointment: 
"Mr. MacDonald had declared his sympathy with the Zionist Movement. 
He was a member of the Palestine Mandate Committee which worked 
unofficially to mould public opinion in favour of the Balfour pledge 
and the upbuilding of the Jewish National Homeland. He did helpful 
work during the negotiations which succeeded the publication of the 
Passfield White Paper. "(25) 
MacDonald restated his commitment to partition in his opening 
address to Parliament: ... the change of personnel in the Colonial 
office does not mean any change of policy of the Government... " 
who were still of the opinion that "a scheme of partition on the 
general lines recommended by the Royal Commission represents the 
best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock. "(26) 
Between June and September 1938, MacDonald took soundings of 
opinion on the Palestine question, and even paid a short visit to the 
country to gauge the views of both the Administration and the 
military authorities. These sources indicated it was unlikely that 
Arab and Jew could arrive at any agreement on the basis of 
partition. (27) MacDonald also learnt of sporadic Arab attacks on 
Jewish civilian settlements which continued unabated despite Britain's 
military presence. MacMichael, the new High Commissioner, reported 
a catalogue of atrocities including an account of the attack on one 
settlement: ". -a family of three was burnt in one hut and a woman 
and child shot in another. "(28) Yet, HMG was disinclined to send 
reinforcements to Palestine for fear of tying up large bodies of 
troops in the area which, in the increasing likelihood of a European 
war, might be required elsewhere. 
With the background of Munich in Europe the British Government 
could no longer view the problems of Palestine in isolation, and 
policies had to be seen from a wider perspective than that of purely 
Arab/Jewish animosities. MacDonald outlined the difficult situation to 
Weizmann on 13th September. He maintained that although he still 
personally favoured partition, a number of factors had impressed 
him: firstly., the inherent danger of including a substantial Arab 
minority in a Jewish state, particularly, when that state would be 
surrounded by powerful neighbours in sympathy with the minority's 
national aspirations, and he pointed to the case of the Sudeten 
Germans in Czechoslovakia; secondly, the dangerous position created 
in the Near East by the support which Arabs received from their 
sympathisers, and from Italy and Germany; and lastly, he was 
beginning to believe that there might., in fact, be a conflict of 
policies with regard to the promises made in the MacMahon 
correspondence, (29) i. e. the dual Policies of establishing a Jewish 
National Home and promoting the welfare of the indigenous Arabs. 
MacDonald mentioned the possibility of reviving the Mandate along 
with the principle of economic absorptive capacity, to which 
Weizmann evidently reluctantly agreed. (30) 
it was clearly the beginning of the end for the policy of partition, 
its ultimate decline being facilitated by the report of the Woodhead 
Commission. The Report, published on 19th October, was unlike the 
Peel Report in that it was not unanimous, and three alternative 
partition plans were presented although with the caveat that as a 
whole the Commisssioners were unable to recommend definitive 
boundaries for "self-supporting Arab and Jewish states. " As a 
consequence, the three plans proposed variations of an extremely 
reduced Jewish state, one of which diminished the state to a mere 
four hundred square miles of coastal plain. (31) 
Mindful of the fact that the Jewish Agency had rejected the partition 
proposals of the Peel Commission on the grounds that they were too 
limited, Malcolm MacDonald maintained that it would not be difficult 
to predict Jewish reaction to the new plans. MacDonald had, by this 
time, decided against partition and on 24th October he informed his 
colleagues in Cabinet that "if Britain were to insist upon the 
partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state, we should 
forfeit the friendship of the Arab world. " During the course of the 
discussion Neville Chamberlain stated quite bluntly that Palestine had 
become "a pan-Arab question", in that the issue had to be viewed 
within the wider context of the Middle East, and it was agreed that 
the Woodhead Report would be published together with a Government 
White Paper rejecting partition. (32) 
The House of Commons debated the Woodhead Commission Report on 
24th November 1938. The Colonial Secretary opened the discussion 
by defining the government's attitude towards Palestine and asserted 
that "when Britain promised to facilitate the establishment of a 
national home for the Jews in Palestine, we never anticipated this 
fierce persecution in Europe... The problem of the refugees in 
Central Europe cannot be settled in Palestine. " He went on to argue 
that partition "is impracticable. " This was the rationale behind the 
government's decision to reject partition. "A part of Palestine is not 
to be handed over to control by the Jews, another part is not to be 
handed over to control by the Arabs. The government, " he argued, 
"have declared that they will continue their responsibility for the 
government of the whole country.. " and it proposed to hold 
discussions between the Arabs and Jews in London in order that 
Britain could formulate and declare future policy. 
Herbert Morrison, the Labour spokesman, in a long and rambling 
speech expressed sympathy with the Colonial Secretary's views and 
remarked somewhat naively that if the Palestine problem "is amicably 
settled and everybody is satisfied, we shall all be happy. " He also 
pointed to the fact that the House had never been committed to the 
partition proposal and asserted that in the light of the Woodhead 
Report "how wise the House has proved to have been... " Churchill 
also extolled the virtues of Parliament in that it had previously been 
disinclined to endorse a policy which was admitted to be 
'impracticable', and emphasised that it was not partition that was 
required but "perseverance". (33) The question of partition was 
dead. 
The Government, in essence, had little or no opposition to their 
decision to hold a conference in London, a proposal which surely 
must have been seen to be doomed to fail. In many ways, the 
Government had come full circle, via two Commissions, to the point 
at which it had begun in 1936. The Arab rebellion still raged, the 
Government still seemingly vacillated, in fact, the whole cycle of 
events prompted Sir John Martin to commment: "Within the 
Government, during the years 1937/8/9 there was a terrible feeling 
of muddle and desperation and searching for a solution. "(34) If the 
Government had not yet reached the point of desparation it was more 
than aware that a solution to the problem had to be found, and 
quickly. 
Qi) The Search for a Solution 
As 1939 opened, Jewish and Arab leaders were invited to London for 
a Round Table Conference. In preparation for their arrival 
MacDonald set out for his Cabinet colleagues the crux of the new 
policy in a secret Cabinet Memorandum which explained: "We cannot 
accept the contention that all Jews as such have a right to enter 
Palestine. We cannot avoid an eventual clash . if we continue to 
carry out the Balfour Declaration, between the forces of persecuted j 
desperate, brilliant, constructive Jewry in Palestine and the 
widespread pan-Arab movement which is rallying to the defence of 
its weakest brethren,, the Arabs of Palestine. Arab detestation of 
the Jewish invasion into Palestine being what it is, it would be 
wholly wrong to suggest that this large Arab population should one 
day in their own native land and against their will come under the 
rule of the newly arrived Jews. "(35) These paragraphs became the 
basis of the government's policy. Meanwhile, pressures were 
growing against the flood of illegal immigrants seeking to escape from 
Eastern Europe into Palestine. A member of the Foreign Office, 
C. W. Baxter, explained to the Colonial Secretary "It is equally 
arguable that it is morally wrong for us to insist on sending more 
and more Jews into Palestine against the wishes of the Arab 
inhabitants of that country and the Middle East. After all, the 
moral satisfaction we may derive from sending more Jews to Palestine 
without Arab consent must be weighed against the moral right of the 
Arabs to have some say in the question of admission of aliens into 
their country. "(36) 
On the same day as MacDonald received this memorandum from the 
Foreign Office, Weizmann was holding discussions with the Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Halifax. Halifax noted in his report of their 
conversation that Weizmann was anxious that "while he was not 
particularly concerned with the numerical limit at which immigration 
might be fixed -a thousand more or less, was, he said, a matter of 
no great importance on a long view - the thing that was fundamental 
was that HMG should not undermine the whole basis of right by 
which Jews were in Palestine at all. " Weizmann had apparently gone 
on to explain to the Foreign Secretary that "it would be to place 
Jewry in an unbearable position were we to say that immigration was 
to be permitted only by agreement with the Arabs. This would have 
the effect of reducing the position of the Jews in Palestine to one of 
sufference instead of one, as they claim, of right. "(37) 
The Zionists, it was obvious,, still adhered to the terms of the 
Mandate and in particular to the aims of Churchill's White Paper 
in 
1922 whereby Jews were to reside in Palestine as of right. 
Yet it 
was this principle which was re-interpreted by MacDonald at a 
Cabinet meeting on 27th January 1939. "As of right, " the 
Colonial 
Secretary maintained 9 "referred only to those Jews who were already 
living in Palestine in 1922 and not to those Jews who reached 
Palestine later, or might do so in the future. "(38) 
The burning question at the beginning of 1939, with the prospect 
of a European war on the horizon, was how to avoid forfeiting the 
confidence and friendship of a large part of the Moslem world, and 
this view was clearly outlined to Weizmann during a session of the 
London Round Table Conference on Palestine. MacDonald informed 
the Zionist leader that "If it came to a choice between Jewish or 
Arab support, he did not believe that, valuable as Jewish assistance 
would be, it would make up for what would have been lost by the 
lack of vital support of the Arab and Moslem world-1109) 
The Colonial Secretary, in an interview many years later, summed up 
Government policy at the time as being: "Perhaps a little bit cynical. 
We knew that if it came to war, the Jews would be on our side 
whatever happened; they had no choice. The question was: Would 
the Arabs be on our side? They had been our allies before... but 
if we supported a situation in Palestine for the building of a Jewish 
National Home, then the Arabs would be pushed into the war against 
us. 11 (40) 
Throughout the Round Table negotiations, British policy was 
presented to the Zionists in rather vague terms,, with Halifax 
explaining that there existed 11 ... a contest between the 
profoundest philosophies of human life, " and urging that the Jews 
"should of their own free will dispose of their rights by offering 
terms of conciliation, " in order to reach a solution. (41) 
The Zionists, predictably, were not impressed with this line of 
argument., and MacDonald returned to Cabinet reporting: "We must 
not enable the Jews to hold up the constitutional process by refusal 
to co-operate with the Arabs. " Chamberlain agreed and emphasised 
the importance of having the Moslim world "with us",, in the event of 
a war. "If we must offend one side, " the Prime Minister added, "let 
us offend the Jews rather than the Arabs. "(42) 
For the Arabs' part, their demands were as they had always been. 
Jamal Husseini, acting as spokesman for the Palestinian Arabs (the 
Mufti continued to live in exile and had not been invited to the 
Conference) demanded an independent Palestinian Arab state, the 
abrogation of the Mandate., the end of the 'Jewish National Home' 
experiment,, and the creation of a sovereign state in treaty relations 
with Britain. (43) It became clear to MacDonald that no solution could 
be reached by agreement and that in the final analysis the British 
Government would have to impose a solution which may or may not 
be just within the Palestine context, but would suit the external 
exigencies of the day. 
At a private meeting with Ben-Gurion, the Colonial Secretary 
stressed the impossibility of the situation: "... the Palestine Arabs 
are insisting on the immediate establishment of an Arab state and 
they are not going to budge from that position. I do not see any 
chance of an agreement with the Arabs. "(44) The Conference came to 
a close and by the end of April 1939, the Palestine White Paper was 
finalised, imposing upon Palestine restrictions which would fix an 
upper limit of 100,000 on the number of Jewish immigrants to be 
admitted over the following five years, after which the Arabs would 
have an effective veto on any further Jewish immigration. (45) The 
Paper outlined the government's intentions as to the future of 
Palestine. It was Britain's objective to establish "within ten years 
an independent Palestine state in such treaty relations with the UK 
as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic 
requirements of both countries in the future. " Ultimately, it stated 
"the proposal for the establishment of the independent state would 
involve consultation with the Council of the League of Nations with a 
view to the termination of the Mandate. "(46) 
MacDonald was fully aware of a level of injustice in the Paper and 
admitted to Cabinet colleagues that as regards the policy itself: 
"certain points have been inserted to meet Arab pressure and which, 
perhaps, would have been omitted if the matter were looked at on 
strict merits. "(47) In Zionist eyes, MacDonald was a traitor and it 
was reported that he "had earned nothing but their (the Jews) 
contempt, disgust and hatred. "(48) Although, Weizmann somewhat 
phlegmatically remarked: "why was it an invariable rule that 
politicians who previously were enthusiastic for the Jewish Homeland, 
forgot about it completely if they returned to office. "(49) 
This 
statement was a peculiarly ingenuous one, coming from a man of 
Weizmann's calibre and diplomatic skills. He, of all people, should 
have been the first to recognise a pragmatic policy when he saw it, 
yet, when writing a report on the Government's policy he noted: "it 
is difficult to find a rational explanation for the change in the 
attitude adopted by the government. Fear of the Arabs cannot 
explain it all. "(50) 
The White Paper was debated in the House of Commons on 22nd May 
1939 and MacDonald in his opening speech explained that he had 
foreseen the criticism he would receive from Zionist quarters: "When 
the Prime Minister appointed me to the Colonial Office, a misguided 
friend of mine offered me warm congratulations. I replied that his 
sentiments seemed hardly appropriate, since whatever policy the 
government pursued in Palestine, within twelve months I should be 
the most bitterly criticised Colonial Secretary of modern time. My 
calculation was wrong by two days. It was one year and two days 
after my assumption of my present office before the White Paper, 
which the House is to discuss today was published. 11(51) 
The government's policy was castigated by members on all sides of 
the House. Herbert Morrison spoke of the Jews being sacrified to 
the government's incompetence; the Liberal leader, Sir Archibald 
Sinclair., declared that the good name of Britain would be tainted if 
Parliament accepted the White Paper; Leo Amery protested that all 
"pledges and promises" made to the Jews had been broken and 
Winston Churchill in an impassioned speech spoke of the White Paper 
as a "violation of a pledge; an abandonment of the Balfour 
Declaration; an end of the vision, the hope and the dream. "(52) The 
final vote was cast in favour of the Government but with a severely 
reduced majority of 268 to 179; 110 Members abstained. 
The debate on the White Paper appears as a sharp contrast to the 
discussion in the House on the Woodhead Commission's Report six 
months' previously. Clearly, the direction of British policy had not 
been foreseen and the White Paper certainly marked a change 
in 
tenor from former policy statements. The abrogation of the Mandate 
aroused Zionist sympathisers, yet perversely, the 
findings of the 
Peel Commission, which also recommended an end to the Mandate, 
but 
which in many ways were advantageous to the Jewish community, 
had 
been summarily dismissed by Members of the 
House. It almos t 
seemed that the maintenance of the Mandate, with all 
its inbuilt 
ambiguities, was all that mattered to Jewish sympathisers, and 
they 
manifestly refused to contemplate any diversion 
from that 
commitment, for any reason. Their refusal to countenance any move 
from the Mandate suggests that at this point in time, its continuation 
was the only possible route to the achievement of a Jewish National 
Home - 
The White Paper, of course, represented a shift in a pro-Arab 
direction at a time when many Jewish exiles from Europe were 
seeking refuge in Palestine and it is not altogether unlikely that this 
seemingly inhumane policy incensed Zionist supporters. 
Nevertheless, the debate in Parliament revealed a great deal of 
rhetoric, with little substance, reminiscent, in fact, of previous 
debates on the Palestine issue. However, it served as propaganda 
for the Zionist cause and crystallised the belief that MacDonald's 
paper was not to be the definitive policy of the British government. 
As a response to the debate the Jewish Agency reported that its 
objective would be "to put the White Paper into refrigeration and 
create conditions in which it would appear to be a grotesque and 
unseemly anachronism. 11(53) These aims were to characterise Zionist 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE WAR YEARS 
(i) Labour's Role in Government 
Events which occurred both within Britain and Palestine during the 
Second World War were to have significant implications on the 
direction of British policy in the Middle East. The fall of the 
Chamberlain Government on 8th May 1940 and the emergence of a 
Coalition government immediately suggested that policies more 
favourable to the Zionists would be pursued. In fact, Lewis Namier 
of the Jewish Agency, at once contacted Labour leaders with regard 
to their possible participation in Office. Following discussions at 
NEC level Namier was informed of their willingness to enter 
Government under a new leader if invited to do so. Q) 
Winston Churchill assumed the role of Prime Minister and , 
predictably, Attlee and Greenwood entered the War Cabinet. 
Ben-Gurion remarked at the time that "three of the five members of 
the War Cabinet are friendly to us. 11(2) The Labour leaders were 
eager to confirm this development and on 22 May 1940 Greenwood and 
Morrison, during a meeting with representatives of the Jewish 
Agency, asserted 11 ... things are quite different in the War Cabinet 
now, they are three to two and the Prime Minister (is) on our side 
in Jewish matters. "(3) However., Labour was not alone in reassuring 
the Agency of its commitment to the Jews. Brendan Bracken in 
conversation with Chaim Weizmann reported that Churchill had 
insisted only ten days after gaining office that "no obstacles are to 
be put in the way of the Jewish War Effort. "(4) Even if one disputes 
Bracken's role as Churchill's confidante., the Prime Minister himself 
lost little time in reiterating his rejection of the White Paper policy 
and asserting that "the Jews must have territory. "(5) 
Some six months before becoming Premier, Winston churchill 
forwarded a paper to his Cabinet colleagues stressing the need for a 
"softer and smoother" policy towards Palestine. (6) The White paper 
Policy, he suggested, could lose Britain the powerful support of 
American Jewry. If the war sharpened and a Coalition government 
had to be formed, he prophesised, the White Paper would have to be 
shelved. Churchill had never approved of the White Paper and with 
this line of argument he successfully managed to combine principle 
with expedience. However, at that time Churchill was First Lord of 
the Admiralty and although without doubt a force with which to be 
reckoned and a possible challenger for the Premiership, he had not 
yet acquired the role of decision maker. 
Churchill's fears of alienating influential sections of American public 
opinion were not,, at that time, shared by the Colonial Office. Sir 
John Shuckburgh, the Deputy Under-Secretary minuted: "The 
importance in present circumstances of retaining the goodwill of the 
United States needs no demonstration; but it is very doubtful 
whether the influence of the American Jews over the United States 
Government or over general opinion in America is really as potent as 
the Zionists and their supporters would have us believe... There is 
evidence to show that Jewish stock in the US is on the decline. 
Generally speaking, I doubt whether we need be unduly alarmed 
over the American bugbear. In any case we ought not to allow it to 
deflect us from the policy which we have deliberately adopted on the 
Palestine question. "(7) Shuckburgh, as a consequence of his 
argument, had the dubious privilege of being regarded as a 
"miserable insect" by members of the Jewish Agency, (8) and was 
considered to be an influential anti-Zionist force within the Colonial 
Office. Yet only three years' previously he had been considered to 
have "a good record" with the Zionists. They had hoped he would 
be appointed head of the Commission which was later led by Sir John 
Woodhead. (9) It is unlikely, however, that Shuckburgh did, as 
suspected by Zionists, dictate policy but merely followed the 
direction of policy as set by the Colonial Secretary of the day. it 
would clearly have been immensely embarrassing for Malcolm 
MacDonald had his Deputy Under-Secretarv overtly disagreed with 
the stated policy of the Colonial Office. 
When Churchill became Prime Minister he quickly banished MacDonald 
to Canada as High Commissioner and appointed Lord Lloyd to take 
his place. Lord Lloyd died some eight months' later and was 
succeeded for a short period by Lord Moyne and later 
Lord 
Cranborne. These Colonial Secretaries, moving in and out of office 
in quick succession adhered faithfully to the principles of the 
White 
Paper policy. 
The primary ambition of the Jewish Agency during the early years of 
the war was to secure the establishment of a 'Jewish Fighting Force', 
which would, in effect, be an exclusive1v Jewish army unit, fighting 
under a Jewish flag. Throughout 1939 the British Government 
expressed doubt as to the efficacy of instituting such a unit whicho 
it suspected, might in certain circumstances be used against the 
British. There already existed the embryo of a Force in the form of 
the Jewish Supernumerary Police unit, which had been created at the 
time of the pre-war Arab rebellion and which had assisted the 
Palestine Administration in quelling the riots. This organisation still 
existed in a para-military style in the October of 1939 and it was not 
long before it became the foundation of the illegal Haganah, the 
armed force of the Palestinian Jews. The formation of the Haganah 
alarmed the British Government to such an extent that the Colonial 
Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald informed the civil and military 
authorities in Palestine "to take the firmest possible measures to 
suppress this illegal Jewish organisation. "(10. ) 
The Jewish Agency defended the organisation and explained to 
MacDonald that "They had no doubt that they (the Raganah) might 
be called upon to perform certain duties by way of assistance to 
British troops and were anxious to get ready for the job. 11(ll) 
However, neither the High Commissioner, Sir Harold AfacMichael, nor 
his army commander, Lieutenant -General Michael Barker considered 
the Haganah to be Britain's faithfull ally. Its aims, they thought, 
were to establish a Jewish army and to secure "eventual Jewish 
military supremacy in Palestine. 1102) 
Weizmann disputed these views and complained to MacDonald that 
"the idea is fantastic. No doubt there are a few extremists who toy 
with the idea of turning against Britain, but it is repulsive to the 
Jewish community as a whole. "(13) MacDonald dismissed Weizmann's 
argument and asserted perspicaciously that although Jewish 
advocates of violence might be few in number they, nevertheless, 
posed a real danger and a not insignificant potential threat to 
Britain. Consequently, throughout the flrst three years of the war 
Zionist demands to raise an independent Jewish army were 
consistently resisted by the British Government. 
The Jewish Agency, during this period, were clearly dismayed at the 
intransigence of HMG and sought to enlist the assistance of the new 
Minister of Labour and National Service,, Ernest Bevin. The minutes 
of a Jewish Agency Executive Meeting in the December of 1940, 
reveal the unanimous belief that Bevin "is the only man who 
understands our problems and is willing to listen to them and take 
action. "(14) Weizmann considered Bevin to be "open-minded and 
energetic, 1105) and there is little doubt that at this stage Bevin was 
held in high esteem by the Zionist Movement. His association with 
the Zionist cause in a by-election some ten years' previously had 
enhanced his reputation. (16) 
A meeting had taken place between members of the Executive of the 
Jewish Agency and Bevin in the August of 1940. This was an 
important occasion, for Churchill had decided to raise six Palestinian 
companies, three Jewish and three Arab; and to recruit in roughly 
equal numbers from each community. The Zionists were extremely 
disappointed with what they saw as a parity restriction and, 
consequently, were eager to conduct a meeting with Bevin. The 
outcome of the discussion pleased the Zionists. Bevin had agreed 
that separate military units were desirable, and had also suggested a 
possible solution to the imposed restrictions on Jewish recruitment. 
Jewish volunteers in excess of the Arab number could., he proposed, 
be sent to Egypt as part of the general defence forces in the Middle 
East. As a result of this meeting Bevin contacted the Colonial 
Secretary, Lord Lloyd, and the subject was brought to the attention 
of the Prime Minister. The Zionists, clearly appreciative of Bevin's 
intervention, quickly expressed gratitude for "the interest you have 
so kindly shown in the matter and for bringing it to the notice of 
the Prime Minister. " Weizmann reported after an interview with the 
Prime Minister that Churchill had apparently given the suggestion a 
"favourable reception" and "seemed to approve of the idea. "(17) It 
remains unclear as to why Bevin, at this particular time, should 
concern himself with an issue that was so far removed from his 
ministerial brief. 
Bevin, however, always remained the realist and at a meeting over 
lunch at the Dorchester Hotel with Arthur Creech-Jones and 
representatives of the Jewish Agency he outlined his thoughts on the 
Palestine problem. (18) The conversation, of course, centred on 
Zionist ambitions, during which Bevin remarked that he "personally 
would greatly like to see the Jewish people firmly established 
in 
Palestine. " However, adding a caveat, he stated there was "another 
important factor in the situation - the Arab factor. Even with all 
our recent victories in the Mediterranean they (the Arabs) were still 
not too friendly. " Bevin assured the gathering that he hoped he was 
being too pessimistic, but he nevertheless felt that Zionists had to 
envisage: "the Possibility of an onslaught (from the Germans) on 
three fronts, including the Eastern Mediterranean.. " and, therefore, 
he was obliged to emphasise that HMG could "not afford to do 
anything which might make our relations with the Arab countries 
more difficult. " Weizmann and Locker accused the Government of 
appeasing the Arabs and after a few vexed words the discussion 
turned to the topic of Jewish immigration into Palestine after the 
war, not, it must be added, without a certain irony. Locker pointed 
out that the Palestine Government had asserted that even after the 
war refugees would not be allowed to enter Palestine. Bevin seemed 
appalled at such an idea and stressed tha he "knew nothing of this; 
there has been no such Cabinet decision, " and that he would 
immediately look into the matter. He did not realise at the time, of 
course, that within four years he would again be concerned with this 
problem but from a rather different perspective, that of Foreign 
Secretary. 
The meeting ended cordially with arrangements being made for 
another luncheon party and Bevin informed Creech-Jones that he had 
been much impressed. (19) However, not all Bevin's interventions on 
behalf of the Zionist Movement came to fruition. In a letter from 
Locker to Creech-Jones the question of a Jewish Fighting Force was, 
again mentioned. Locker drew attention to Bevin's suggestion as to 
the recruitment and training of Jewish volunteers and referred to 
the fact that the Prime Minister was favourably disposed to the idea. 
The letter went on: "Since then negotiations have been taking place 
with the Colonial Office, the War Office and the Foreign Office and 
we had reached agreement on practically everything except a couple 
of minor details. " Nevertheless, a decision had now been taken to 
Postpone the establishment of such a unit allegedly because of "lack 
of equipment". Locker continued: "I. thought I had better tell you 
immediately about this latest development, before you speak to Bevin 
so that he may be in a position to decide upon the line of action 
which he may now be prepared to take. "(20) 
There is no evidence, however, to suggest that Bevin again involved 
himself on this topic although he apparently continued to exhibit 
concern about Palestine, if in a somewhat desultory manner. In 
June 1942 Lewis Namier conducted an interview 
. with 
Professor 
Coupland, a member of the Peel Commission of 1937. During the 
discussion Professor Coupland recalled a meeting he had conducted 
with Lord Moyne, then Colonial Secretary; Bevin; George Hall the 
Colonial Under- Secretary, and Cosmo Parkinson., in the Summer of 
1941. Coupland related what he terms as Bevin's "two extraordinary 
ideas. " Firstly, Bevin considered that the High Commissioner for 
India's proposal that "an Indian Moslem should be appointed High 
Commissioner in Palestine" would be a "pleasing compliment to the 
Arabs. " Bevin's second proposal was "to nationalise the land in 
Palestine. " Coupland evidently explained the inadvisability of the 
first suggestion and the difficulties of the second., and quickly left 
the meeting. (21) The impression one gains from this meeting is of 
Ernest Bevin's complete lack of understanding as to the complexities 
of the issue and his surprisingly naive comprehension of the 
animosities existent between the Arabs and the Jews. 
It is not unreasonable to deduce that although Bevin clearly had 
established creditable contacts with the Zionist Movement and was 
unquestionably concerned as to the future of Palestine and the role 
of the British Government, his knowledge of the problem essentially 
remained superficial and this, in turn, was largely reflected in his 
attitude towards the issue when he assumed the role of Foreign 
Secretary in the 1945 Labour Administration. 
Meanwhile in May 1941, the question of the Jewish Fighting Force was 
brought up in Parliament. The Under Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Labour minister, George Hall, was asked whether the 
government had authorised the formation and arming of a Palestine 
Volunteer Force. He replied that it had but that the Force would be 
limited. Emmanuel Shinwell and Eleanor Rathbone complained of the 
limitation, "If Jews wish to join and are willing to serve in the war 
effort why should they be precluded from doing so. "(22) However, 
despite the evident sympathy for Zionist aims within the Labour 
Party, support for such a unit was not sufficiently widely 
held to 
make a significant impression on government policy. The 
issue also 
suggested that the Party's new position had drawbacks as well as 
advantages for the Zionists. The positions of power now 
held by 
Sympathetic Labour politicians undoubtedly gave the Zionists support 
within the Government, but wartime exigencies made the party 
less 
willing officially to voice criticism and led to a greater acceptance of 
the demands of 'high policy' as perceived by a Government which 
now included the Party's own representativs. In other words, the 
Labour Party's ftrst taste of office since 1929, albeit under immensely 
difficult conditions, revived its pragmatic leanings. 
Herbert Morrison . although a Zionist sympathiser, acted quite 
differently in his position as Home Secretary. At a meeting of the 
newly established Cabinet Committee on the Reception and 
Accommodation of Jewish Refugees, Morrison stated that "the Home 
Office would not refuse to take a limited number of refugees say, 
from 1000 to 2000, but certainly not more .... on the condition that 
they were sent to the Isle of Man. " The Home Secretary stipulated 
that such immigration was contingent upon "the firm understanding 
that the United States and the Dominions would accept proportionate 
numbers, " and added a warning that "there was considerable 
anti-Semitism under the surface in this country. If there were any 
substantial increase in the number of Jewish refugees or if these 
refugees did not leave this country after the war, we should be in 
for serious trouble. "(23) Morrison produced no evidence in support 
of his contention and one can only assume that his judgement of 
public opinion stemmed from a personal assessment. He may have 
gleaned from the Jewish Chronicle that anti-semitic feeling within the 
country was "noticeably increasing" (24), yet it is doubtful whether 
Morrison, as Opposition Spokesman on Home Affairs, would have 
accepted the logic of this argument had it been espoused by a 
Conservative Home Secretary. 
Although many Labour Ministers were concerned about the continuing 
operation of the White Paper there was little sign of any bold or 
compassionate intervention of behalf of Jewish refugees. Clement 
Attlee was criticised by Weizmann as behaving "very much in the 
manner of Lord Passfield. "(25) Attlee, of course, on his own 
admission endeavoured to view the problem objectively and although 
Sympathetic to the sufferings of the Jews under Nazism argued that 
"the Arabs, as the inhabitants of Palestine for centuries, had a case 
which was sometimes ignored. 11(26) However, Attlee's position 
vis-a-vis Palestine was ambiguous and at times unclear. In the 
October of 1943 Attlee purportedly favoured partition. 
During a 
discussion between Weizmann, Churchill, and Attlee, the Prime 
Minister assured the Zionist leader that Attlee and the 
Labour Party 
were committed to partition . to which Attlee nodded his 
avreement. (27) Notwithstanding Kenneth Harris' unconvincing 
biography, (28) Attlee may have been undulv influenced by Churchill 
at the time, yet the episode points to a certain indeterminacy in the 
character of the Labour leader. 
The Labour Party continued to develop prospective policies for 
enactment after the war and it was within this context that Hugh 
Dalton was called upon to prepare a draft on Labour's post-war 
foreign policy. Included in the proposals would be a section on 
Palestine. Dalton, unlike many of his colleagues, had not visited 
Palestine. Nor, as he later recounted, was he then in close touch 
with the Zionists, "though over a long period I used to see Weizmann 
from time to time and Lewis Namier occasionally, and some of my 
pupils in the LSE had been, and still were, keen Zionists. "(29) 
Dalton was determined to tackle the Palestine problem from scratch 
and, clearly, had little alternative to do otherwise given his cursory 
knowledge of the area. The Jewish massacres had had a profound 
effect upon Dalton, as indeed upon many others, and the onslaught 
strengthened his resolve to find a solution: "I had been trying to 
think out this whole problem afresh, in the light of its urgency and 
the horror of the Hitlerite atrocities. 11 (3 0) However, Dalton's 
pronouncements, particularly over the contentious issue of Palestine, 
were to prove an ultimate embarrassment to the Party. 
(ii) Labour's Poldcy Making Machinery 
Upon Dalton's appointment by the National Executive Committee a 
number of Arab sympathisers within the Partv sought to impress 
upon him Britain's commitment to the Palestinian Arabs. Richard 
Stokes asserted "whether we like it or not the persistent tendency 
in 
Britain to ignore macMahonls promises lends colour to the contention 
that we are more influenced by the rich Jews in London and 
New 
York than by our pledges to the Arabs. "(31) Another Labour 
MP 
argued that the government should affirm that "we do not threaten 
(the Arabs) existence in Palestine and that we stand 
by the 
Principle of the White Paper. 11(32) However, there 
is no sign that 
Dalton took notice of any of these suggestions, not necessarily 
because they were unfashionable within the Party but rather 
because 
he believed that "we were at a point of sharp discontinuity in world 
history. "(33) It was his view that many old arguments were 
irrelevant and that most importantly the massacres of the Jews had 
"destroyed the case for any limitations, by the Mandatory power, on 
Jewish immigration into Palestine". Consequently, the concept of 
leconomic absorptive capacity' had little meaning. 
Dalton had great faith in the potential of Palestine and saw his goal 
clearly: "given sufficient capital expenditure on developments, given 
intelligent planning on the spot, and given the diverse and 
distinguished talents, driving energy and fanatical faith of the Jews, 
I am sure Palestine could become a most successful, popular and 
predominantly Jewish state. "(34) His optimism was formidable: 
"This". as he later wrote, "would be a unique moment, I judged, 
when.... a determined and imaginative leadership could telescope 
into a few years changes which otherwise would drag along, slowly 
and painfully, through centuries. " But what of the Arabs in this 
Messianic vision of a predominantly Jewish State? "An Arab minority 
might wish to remain in Palestine.... 11(35) 
Dalton quickly formulated his first draft, or as he called it: his 
11sketch, a rough outline and in simple terms for the preliminary 
consideration of mv colleagues. " He intended it to "help provoke 
discussion and to test how far we really disagree among 
ourselves, 11(36) and, as such, stated his views frankly. The 
paragraph on Palestine read: "Here we have halted half way. I see 
neither hope nor meaning in a 'Jewish National Home' unless we are 
prepared to let Jews, if they wish, enter this tiny land in such 
numbers as to become a majoritV. Here too surely is a case for the 
transfer of population. Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out, 
as the Jews move in. Let them be compensated handsomely and let 
their settlement elsewhere be carefully attended to. The Arabs have 
not done very well in the war, either for themselves or for us. We 
should not give in to their policy of Dog in the Holy Manger. They 
have many wide territories of their own, compared with poor little 
Palestine. Indeed, f would like to extend the Palestinian boundaries 
either into Egypt or Transjordan. There is also something to be 
said for throwing open Libya or Eritrea to Jewish settlement, as 
satellites or colonies of Palestine. In any case, we must seek to 
remove Russian dislike of the Palestine experiment and encourage 
American interest and support for it. "(37) 
Although Dalton claimed that this remarkable paragraph was his own 
and owed nothing to the views of the Advisory Committee members or 
to the direct representations of Zionists, the re is reason to suspect 
that Dalton's interpretation of the situation in Palestine related 
closely to Winston Churchill's appraisal of the issue. Dalton., of 
course, was a member of the War Cabinet and was a recipient not 
only of party documents on Palestine but also, of Government 
papers. On 28th April 1943, Churchill, seeking to re-open 
consideration of Palestine, circulated a memorandum of his thoughts. 
A comparison with those of Dalton is interesting. "Churchill 
expected full American support for a new policv in Palestine ... he 
advocated an investigation into the possibility of making Eritrea and 
Tripolitania into Jewish colonies that might be affiliated to the Jewish 
National Home. "(38) As for Arab claims, Churchill considered that, 
apart from Ibn Saud and Emir Abdullah, the Arabs had been 
virtually no use to the allies in the present war. The onlv fighting 
they had done was against the British. Unlike the First World War, 
the Arabs could make no demands on the victorious allies. 
The similarity of the two perspectives is stark. Both hinged upon 
the clearly unsatisfactory pro-German leanings of the Arabs 
throughout the war as the basis for their proposed exodus from 
Palestine. The Foreign Office, of course, reacted sharply against 
Churchill's views, claiming that he had entirely missed the point and 
asserting: "The question is... not whether we owe the Arabs a debt 
of gratitude, but whether we have important interests centring in 
the Arab world. The answer must be emphatically that we have; 
and in particular our oil interests. 11(39) Dalton's statement received 
no such stricture from the Labour PartV hierarchy. Yet he was a 
member of the Cabinet and unquestionably shouldered Governmental 
responsibility; however, whilst devising policies for enactment by a 
future administration he paid scant regard to the possible difficulties 
which might arise in the pursuit of such a programme. No one could 
consider Dalton to be an ideologue, yet his views on Palestine seem 
strangely devoid of his characteristic pragmatism. 
Dalton's call for free immigration was clear enough, but much else 
was vague. Partition was seemingly rejected since Palestine, with a 
Jewish majority, was to be given the opportunity to extend its 
boundaries. Paradoxically, as a member of the post-war Labour 
government Dalton was to criticise Bevin's attempt "to make a 
sVnthetic glue of all the Arab States, "(40) yet in 1943 he apparently 
regarded the 'Arabs' as an homogeneous people 'with wide territories 
of their own', clearly enabling them to absorb their kin who 
happened to live in Palestine. 
Dalton introduced his document to the Sub-Committee of the NEC, on 
16th November 1943 and was evidently pleased with the response: ffIt 
is extremely well received, much better in some quarters than I had 
expect. " Harold Laski was, reportedly, "deeply touched by my 
Palestine Paragraph. 1101) However, the one piece of adverse criticism 
of the complete draft centred on Dalton's statement on Palestine. It 
was William Gillies, who, as Secretary of the International 
Department, expressed alarm at the paragraph and assessed the 
enormity of Dalton's suggestions. Dalton dismissed Gillies' doubts 
with cursory contempt: "Poor little Gillies is terrified of my Palestine 
paragraph and thinks this should be referred to a separate 
committee. I say this is all nonsense. "(42) 
The episode was significant. The programme was not being 
considered by a special International Relations Sub-Committee and 
Gillies' defeat finally ruled out the possibility of any party 'experts', 
whether from Poale Zion or the somewhat less pro-Jewish Imperial 
Advisory Committee, participating in the policy making process at an 
early stage. Dalton, of course, was quite satisfied with the 
situation: "It is all going along quite nicely and I have got things 
pretty comfortably in my own hands. "(43) However, Dalton redrafted 
his paragraph on Palestine and presented the revised edition to his 
colleagues in the February of 1944. Section 18 now read: "Here we 
have halted, half way, irresolute between conflicting policies. But 
there is surely neither hope nor meaning in a 'Jewish National Home' 
unless we are prepared to let Jews, if they wish, enter this tiny 
land in such numbers as to become a majority. There was a strong 
case for this before the war. There is an irresistable case now, 
after the unspeakable atrocities of the cold and calculated German 
plan to kill all the Jews in Europe. Here too surely in Palestine 
is a 
case, on human grounds and to promote a stable settlement, 
for 
transfer of population. Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out as 
the Jews move in. Let them be compensated handsomely 
for their 
land and let their settlement elsewhere be carefully orqanised and 
generously financed. The Arabs have many wide territories of their 
own; they must not claim to exclude the Jews from this small area of 
Palestine,, less than the size of Wales. Indeed, we should re-examine 
also the possibility of extending the present Palestine boundaries, by 
agreement with Egypt or Transjordan. Nor should we close our 
minds to another possibility, namely of throwing open Libya or 
Eritrea to Jewish settlement. But we should seek to win the full 
sympathy and support of the American and "Russian governments for 
execution of the Palestine policy. "(44) 
Essentially, the Paragraph remains fundamentally unchanged. Arab 
wickedness is replaced by Jewish need; the resettlement of displaced 
Arabs is to be 'carefully organised' and 'generously financed' and 
Arabs are reminded not to seek to exclude Jews from Palestine; but 
in essence, the sentiments contained in the statement are unaltered. 
Yet there was no indication that Zionists would have any interest in 
a settlement in Libya or Eritrea. 
Dalton's grip on policy formulation was not shaken: "it all goes 
wonderfully well, " he recorded, "there is hardly any opposition. I 
am amazed at the facility with which it has practically all gone 
through. "(45) In March 1944 he framed his final redraft for 
submission to the NEC and, with Noel Baker, dined with Weizmann 
and another member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency. He 
could hardly disguise the fact that he had written a decidedly 
pro-Zionist section on Palestine and almost revealed as much to his 
companions: "I all but tell them that I have drafted a very hot 
paragraph for the Labour Party on post-war Palestine. I hint as 
much on leaving. "(46) 
passed by On 14th March Dalton's draft was fl na Ily the 
Sub-Committee. Once again the discussion appears to have been 
cursory: "Phil and Harold Clay, the two likeliest critics, came in late 
when we had finished this item. "(47) However, when the printers 
preparing the proofs of the document were bombed, thus 
necessitating a delay of two weeks before the NEC could meet, I 
Dalton commented revealingly "this is rather a pity for it is likely to 
be more closely examined than it might have been today, run 
through with other items. "(48) Dalton was accurate in his prediction. 
When a special meeting of the NEC finally took place the following 
month, a lengthy discussion occurred and each paragraph of 
his 
document was considered in turn. As a consequence, two alterations 
were made to the Palestine section neither of which dramatically 
changed the text. The sentence suggesting colonisation of Eritrea 
and Libya was deleted, and Syria was included as a country which 
could be approached with regard to boundary revisions. The 
finalised paragraph as it appeared in the Labour Party's publication., 
'The International Post-War Settlement' read: "Here we have halted 
half way, irresolute between conflicting policies. But there is surely 
neither hope nor meaning in a 'Jewish National Home' unless we are 
prepared to let Jews, if they wish, enter this tiny land in such 
numbers as to become a majority. There was a strong case for this 
before the war. There is an irresistable case now, after the 
unspeakable atrocities of the cold and calculated German Nazi plan to 
kill all the Jews in Europe. Here too in Palestine surely is a case, 
on human grounds and to promote stable settlement, for transfer of 
population. Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out as the Jews 
move in. Let them be compensated handsomely for their land and let 
their settlement elsewhere be carefully organised and generously 
financed. The Arabs have very wide territories of their own; they 
must not claim to exclude the Jews from this small part of Palestine, 
less than the size of Wales. Indeed, we should examine also the 
possibility of extending the boundaries by agreement with Egypt, 
Syria and Transjordan. Moreover, we should seek to win the full 
sympathy and support both of the American and Russian 
governments for the execution of this Palestine policy. "(49) Dalton 
still remained satisfied with his endeavours and noted in his diary: 
"It has been a long struggle of successive reviews, compromises and 
consultations, but it is not such a bad document in the end. "(50) 
Not everyone, however, was to share Dalton's verdict. 
Chaim Weizmann expressed alarm at the document's suggestion that 
Arabs should be encouraged to move out: "I was greatly concerned 
about this proposal. We had never contemplated the removal of the 
Arabs, and the British labourites in their pro-Zionist enthusiasm 
went far beyond our intentions. 11(51) The Colonial Secretary, Oliver 
Stanley, was particularly disturbed by the section on Palestine and 
visited Dalton to inform him of his doubts. Stanley considered the 
sentiments contained in the paragraph to be "Zionism plus plus". 
His criticism, of course, was quite legitimate: "He is afraid that it 
may do harm in Palestine, both by encouraging the Jews to believe 
that the next British Government, which they think may well be a 
Labour government, will do everything for them and equally be 
unsettling to the Arabs. "(52) Dalton may have condemned these 
views as unfounded and unnecessary yet the Colonial Secretar is 
perception was to be vindicated in the Post war years. 
The Colonial Office echoed Oliver Stanley's forebodings but viewed 
the situation phlegmatically: "We do not s ee how we can prevent the 
discussion from taking place, ill advised though it be. "(53) However, 
the High Commissioner in Palestine was clearly alarmed at the 
possible repercussions of Dalton's statement and reported that: 
"Feeling among the Arabs has been sharply stimulated during the 
past months by various manifestations of Jewish political activity and 
in particular the reported resolution of the British Labour Party.... 
They are genuinely shocked at the disregard that the chosen 
representatfves of a large section of the British public could show in 
contemplating the removal of Arabs from their homes in Palestine in 
favour of the Jews. "(54) 
The Labour Party's Imperial Advisory Committee, was far from 
delighted with Dalton's proposals. The Committee called a meeting 
during which it was resolved to draw the attention of the NEC to the 
unfortunate implications of the policy. (55) The suggestion causing 
most concern was that of i3opulation transfers which Leonard Woolfe 
described as an example "of the folly of believing that spectacular 
settlements are desirable and feasible. "(56) However, before the NEC 
met to consider the issue, Berl Locker, a member of Poale Zion and 
a representative of the Jewish Agency, wrote to William Gillies, 
arguing that "it would be wrong to take out the transfer clause now 
that it has appeared; its removal might be interpreted as an 
admission that the Labour Party's proposals involved an injustice to 
the Arabs. "(57) He explained that in the opinion of the Jewish 
Agency such transfers might take place but were not a pre-requisite 
for large scale Jewish immigration, although he conceded that under 
certain circumstances a transfer of population might be a means of 
solving the conflict. 
Gillies took note of Locker's comments and issued a memorandum 
to 
Dalton outlining the points Locker had made: "I think that 
the 
Paragraph cannot be redrafted at this stage. This is also 
the 
oPinion of Berl Locker, who as far as we are concerned, expressed 
the views of the Trade Union and Socialist movement 
in Palestine. 
Locker thinks the phrase: "let the Arabs be encouraged to move out 
as the Jews move in' is unfortunate. He calls for an emphatic, clear 
statement that no measures of compulsion will be used under anv 
circumstances. 11(58) It is not altogether surprising, therefore., that 
when the NEC met on 20th June 1944, it decided against changing 
the paragraph. For Dalton and his colleagues., "the terms of the 
paragraph as drafted makes it clear.... that no compulsion was 
contemplated. 11(59) Conference began in London on Ilth December 1944 
and the 'International Post-War Settlement' was adopted b-v an 
overwhelming majoritv. The document was six pages long and the 
paragraph on Palestine was not mentioned once during the whole 
debate. (60) 
In later years, Arthur Creech-Jones, the Colonial Secretary in the 
post-war Labour Administration attempted to distance himself from 
the 1944 Conference decision on Palestine. He claimed to be opposed 
to the resolution on the grounds that it was "too extravagant, unjust 
and impracticable. 11(61) In a draft of a book on Palestine - left 
incomplete at his death - he endeavoured to explain the nature of 
Labour Conference decisions concerning Palestine "whose significance 
cannot be overrated. 11 In his view: "Delegates too often cast their 
votes in ignorance of many of the facts concerning the matter on 
which they are making policy. Conference is not constituted for 
careful study, deliberation and consideration. Delegates are often 
sub. iect to pressure groups and propaganda, often they are not 
'delegates' in the proper sense of the word. In the case of 
Palestine, Zionist activity among constituency parties, affiliated 
organisations and delegates did not contribute to calm reflection. 
The Arab case was never understood or discussed or 
publicised. 11(62) 
No-one could reasonably dispute Creech-Jones' account of the 
inadequacy of Conference decisions yet the nagging aspect of his 
condemnation lies in his exclusion of the role he played at the time. 
There is little indication that he made an effort to ensure that the 
Palestinian Arab case was fairly stated. In fact, he had strong 
pro-Zionist leanings and campaigned actively for the British 
Association for a Jewish National Home. (63) A speech he gave in 1941 
to the Anglo Palestine Club and reported in the Zionist Review 
clearly reveals his feelings and prejudices to be closely aligned 
to 
those of Dalton: "The Arabs had a vast territory over which 
thev 
could roam and it occurred to him (Creech-Jones) that they 
had not 
made particularly good use of the areas in which they had roamed. 
After all, with such a vast territory, it seemed to him no small 
advantage to the Arabs that a portion of that territory should be 
given to an energetic people in order that they might bring about 
the economic changes on which the general well-being of the Arab 
people would depend. He was a firm believer in the Zionist cause 
and was convinced by what he had seen and by talks he had had 
with Jews and Arabs alike that a national home founded by the Jews 
was not only a blessing to the Jewish people themselves but a 
colossal blessinq to the Arab people and a contribution to the 
stability and peace of the world. "(64) 
If one makes allowances for the fact that he was unlikely to deliver a 
less than pro-Zionist speech to the Anglo Palestine Club there is no 
evidence to suggest that he personally contributed, or even desired, 
a wider, objective discussion of the Palestine issue within the Party 
itself. His later flirtation with impartiality resulted from the trials 
of his period in offtce during which we was confronted with the 
essential incompatibility of relating ill-thought out Conference 
decisions to the evident constraints of Government. 
In stark contrast to Dalton's breezy optimism about future 
developments in Palestine was a comment made by Ernest Bevin 
during a meeting with Dr. Israel Goldstein, a leader of the Zionist 
Organisation in the United States: "Now is not the time to make 
declarations which will cause trouble. "(65) Devastating declarations 
had already been made and trouble was undoubtedly develoy)ing for a 
Labour Party that had apparently lost its grip on realistic 
Judgement. 
(iii) Governmental Policy 
The question of Palestine was discussed at Cabinet level in 
July 
1943., whereupon it was agreed that in the short term 
Jewish 
immigration should be permitted beyond the White Paper termination 
Point of 31st March 1944. (66) As regards the long term, 
Churchill 
reiterated his view that the Government was not tied to the 
White 
Paper and that when the time arrived the Government would continue 
to carry out its solemn undertaking towards the 
Jewish National 
Home. As such, it was decided to set up a sub-committee which 
would consider and report to the War Cabinet on the 
long term 
Policy for Palestine. The Committee was guided to take the 
Peel 
Commission's plan of partition as its starting Point, and membership 
of the Committee was to be left to Churchill's discretion. The Prime 
Minister appointed Herbert Morrison as Chairman, Leo Amery, Oliver 
Stanley, A. Sinclair and R. K. Law as the spokesman for the 
Foreign Office. The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden was 
dissatisfied with the Committee's apparent pro-Zionist leanings and, 
endeavoured to have Amery removed, which in the event was quickly 
rebuffed by Churchill. Eden., in an attempt to placate his officials 
at the Foreign Offtce remarked acidly: 11 ... there is going to be much 
trouble on this subject, internal as well as external before we are 
through. It is a comfort to reflect that Mr. Amery has never been 
right on any subject that I can recollect from Palestine to the League 
of Nations. .. . 11(67) 
The Committee, it must be said, had a pro-partition bias and Leo 
Amery was its chief advocate. Views, however, differed between 
members of the Committee as to the size of a proposed Jewish state. 
At the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee, the Colonial Secretary 
opened the discussion by stating that they would have to accept the 
fact that Arabs and Jews would not be able to live together 
peaceably in Palestine. This left two alternatives, firstly, continued 
British administration over the whole country under some form of 
colonial system, or secondly.. partition. Oliver Stanley agreed with 
Amery that partition would have to be considered now on principles 
other than those which had guided the Peel Commission. As distinct 
from the recommendations of the Peel enquiry, areas which were 
predominantly Jewish or Arab would not necessarily remain so, and 
the Jews would have to have unfettered control over immigration into 
their area. Morrison, however, seemed less enthusiastic: "the 
Chairman... said that Palestine was already a small country and to 
partition it as it stood would create two States even smaller. "(68) He 
suggested 'readjustments' over a larger area, including TransJordan - 
a view which was currently being espoused by Hugh Dalton. 
Nevertheless, there is little indication that from this point onwards 
%rrison argued the Labour Party line during the Committee meetings 
and much to suggest that he confined his role to that of a neutral 
Chairman. Of course., although as Chairman and representative of 
Labour he assumed his full share of responsibility for the decisions 
Of the Committee, it is interesting to note that in the months which 
followed the views of the Cabinet committee and the Labour Party 
began to sharply diverge. Whilst the Labour Party Sub-Committee 
considered and accepted a plan for territorial expansion and possible 
transfer of population, a Cabinet Committee with a Labour Chairman 
passed a scheme recommending partition. 
The Committeep throughout its subsequent meeting focused attention 
on Amery's plan of partition. It was Amery's belief that the area 
assigned to the Jews by the Peel Commission was less suitable than a 
mainly coastal area extending down to the Egv Ptian border, which 
would include the greatly disputed area, the Negev, with access to 
the Dead Sea and to the Gulf of Akaba. The Arabs would then have 
all of northern Galilee, previously allocated to the Jews under the 
Peel Enquiry, and most of the inland, hilly Samaria and Jerusalem 
districts. (69) 
The Foreign Office, upon learning of the proposed scheme, 
immediately prepared its attack. Criticism centred especially on the 
assignment of the Negev to the Jews for three reasons: a) a 
Jewish-held Negev, combined with the Gulf of Akaba, would 
interpose a barrier between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world; 
b) reports indicated that the Negev was hopeless from an 
agricultural point of view; and c) to give the Jews so large an area 
would bound to cause repercussions among the Arabs. (70) 
In reply, Amery argued that there was no reason to suppose that 
Egypt and Syria were worried about physical contiguity. On the 
contrary, asserted Amery the nearer the Jews were brought to the 
Canal the better - so as to secure in that area a developed State 
bound to Britain by ties of gratitude. The reason for giving the 
Negev to the Jews was not so much for its agricultural value, 
although he did not rule this out, but for the access it gave to the 
Dead Sea minerals and their exporl via Akaba. Amery concluded his 
memorandum with a barbed comment directed at the Foreign Offlce: 
"... if we are precluded from doing anything which could in any way 
offend Arab susceptibilities.... then surely our enquiry is 
superfluous. 11(71) 
The Foreign Office, despite its antipathy towards the question of 
Partition, would seem now to be obliged to take into account the 
weight of opinion inside the Cabinet Committee in favour of the 
notion, and of the influence of the Prime Minister himself. It should 
not, therefore, have been an unexpected development that the 
Committee, when it finally prepared its report, should recommend 
partition. Yet this is exactly what Eden deemed it to be when 
counselling his Ambassadors to the Arab States: "You may be 
surprised that the Committee, in the light of their past knowledge of 
the history of Palestine, should have recommended what is essentially 
a return to the Peel Plan, which was responsible for so much 
opposition and bloodshed in the years before the war... 11(72) Eden 
went on to explain to his Middle East envoys that the change in 
Government policy was due to two factors: firstly, the change in the 
political balance of the Cabinet effected by Churchill; and secondly, 
the difficulty in carrying out the later stages of the White Paper 
provisions in a world radically changed from that of 1939. 
The Cabinet had given its general endorsement to the Palestine 
Committee's report considering it to be: "as good as any that could 
be devised. "(73) Nevertheless, a decision as to its implementation 
was reserved. Churchill advocated delaying tactics until the 
successful conclusion of the European war but more importantly until 
after the American Presidential elections due to be held in the 
November of 1944. (74) However, the issue was to remain unresolved. 
On 6th November 1944, three days before the question of Palestine 
was to have been discussed again at Cabinet level, Lord Moyne, the 
Minister Resident in the Middle East, was assassinated by a Jewish 
terrorist organisation, the Stern Gang. Churchill, deeply touched 
by the murder of a close personal friend issued a stiff warning in 
the House of Commons: "If our dreams for Zionism are to end in the 
smoke of an assassin's pistol and our labours for its future to 
produce only a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany many 
like myself will have to reconsider the position we have maintained so 
consistently in the past... "(75) On Churchill's orders Cabinet 
discussion of partition was to be postponed, it being impossible, he 
maintained, to discuss plans for the future of Palestine while such 
outrages continued. (76) 
Upon hearing of the assassination Weizmann immediately wrote to the 
Prime Minister: "I can hardIV find words adequate to express the 
deep moral indignation and horror which I feel at the murder of Lord 
Aloyne. I know that these feelings are shared by Jewry throughout 
the world. Political crimes of this kind are an especial abomination 
in that they make it possible to implicate whole communities in the 
guil t of a few. I can assure you that Palestine Jewry will go to the 
utmost limit of its power to cut out, root and branch, this evil from 
its midst. "(77) However, Weizmann was later to completely miss the 
significance of the Moyne assassination: "I wish to observe that the 
harm done our cause by the assassination of Lord Movne was not in 
changing the intentions of the British Government, but rather in 
providing our enemies with a convenient excuse and in helping to 
justify their course. "(78) 
There can be no doubt that the murder of Lord Moyne created an 
hiatus in British policy towards Palestine and was, without doubt, 
the reason why the White Paper of 1939 remained HDAG's policy when 
the General Election was called in July 1945. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ZIONIST AND ARAB ORGANISATIONS 
The Zionist Camp 
The division within the Zionist hierarchy, which manifested itself 
during the later years of the Second World War, first became 
apparent in 1936. It was in the July of that year when Chaim 
Weizmann, in conversation with a colleague, prophetically claimed 
that: "In due course I shall be called a traitor. 11(l) The schism lay 
in what was essentially the strained relationship between the Jewish 
Diaspora and those who lived and worked in Palestine. Of course, 
Weizmann's own position in the Zionist movement rested upon his 
diplomatic campaign, political reputation and international prestige. 
During the early period of Mandatory rule Weizmann, as President of 
the World Zionist Organisation, was indisputably the leader of world 
Jewry. So long as the Palestinian Jews retained their faith in HMG 
Weizmann remained their chief negotiator in London. However, when 
David Ben-Gurion became the Chairman of the Jewish Agency in 1935 
a shift in power occurred and a greater importance was attached to 
the Palestinian based wing of the Zionist Movement. David 
Ben-Gurion was head of the Mapai Party in Palestine, an organisation 
which was closely identified with the Histadruth,, the Jewish Trade 
Union Federation and hitherto had been little known outside the 
context of the Palestinian Labour Movement. Nevertheless, his 
ascent to the Chairmanship of the Agency Executive enabled him to 
challenge Weizmann's authority and as a consequence the relationship 
between the two men, on a personal level, deteriorated significantly. 
In fact, Baffy Dugdale, a close friend of Weizmann's for many years, 
concluded that there "might be a touch of jealousy of the old leader 
for his successor. "(2) Jealousy was certainly considered to be a 
feature of Weizmann's character and he had at times been criticised 
for "trying to thwart anyone who might come up in competition 
against him. "(3) 
However, personal animosities apart, the unease in their comradeship 
was symptomatic of the militant/ moderate dichotomy in their 
respective aims, ambitions and means of achieving a Jewish National 
Home. Weizmann was, of course,, the diplomat; a naturalised British 
citizen whose approach to the Mandatory Power was in many ways 
conciliatory. He outlined the sensitivity of his identification with 
Britain in a letter to an American colleague: 11 ... as a British subject 
I have to be extremely careful not to contribute to a strain in 
relations ... Perhaps Ben-Gurion does not feel it, but I do. We 
have one great friend in England, the Prime Minister (Winston 
Churchill) .... I find myself in an extremely delicate position... "(4) 
Ben-Gurion, on the other hand., held quite different views. 
Although born in what was then Polish-Russia he had lived in 
Palestine for the greater part of his life. (5) Involving himself in the 
Trade Union Movement and the Socialist Mapai Party he had 
developed a perspective which emphasised the urgency of 
establishing a home for the Jews. In a speech given in February 
1937 he maintained that this aim could only be facilitated by mass 
immigration: "The most vital issue before us now is immigration. 
The scope of immigration will determine everything else - including 
the achievement of the 'final goal'... We want a Jewish majority and 
a State because they are prerequisites for the fulfilment of 
Zionism. 11 (6) 
Consequently, his response to the partition plan recommended by the 
Peel Commission in 1937 was equivocal. He had not envisaged a 
Jewish State in a truncated Palestine in which "people would have to 
live and suffer its claustrophobic restrictions - 11 (7) Instead, 
Ben-Gurion saw beyond the implications of partition and in doing so 
revealed the essence of his aspirations: "A partial Jewish State is 
not the end, but only the beginning.... We shall bring into the 
State all the Jews it is possible to bring.... we shall establish a 
multi-faceted Jewish economy - agricultural, industrial and maritime. 
We shall organise a modern defence force, a select army.... and 
then I am certain that we will not be prevented from settling in 
other parts of the country, either by mutual agreement with our 
Arab neighbours or by some other means. Our ability to penetrate 
the country will increase if there is a state. Our strength vis-a-vis 
the Arabs will increase. I am not in favour of war.... but if the 
Arabs behave in keeping their barren nationalist feelings .... then we 
shall have to speak to them in a different language. But we shall 
only have another language if we have a state. "(8) Ben-Gurion's 
objectives were clear, partition was to be a means to an end; the 
end being the ultimate control of the whole of Palestine whether by 
agreement or conquest. 
Whilst Britain pondered the viability of the partition of Palestine it 
was obvious that Weizmann's diplomatic skills were required. Yet the 
Jerusalem branch of the Jewish Agency mistrusted him and attempts 
were made to keep him under close surveillance. As one member of 
the Executive put it: "As for Weizmann., we knew his weakness. 
That was one of the reasons we thought it vital that our people 
should be next to him in London. That was one reason why 
Ben-Gurion had to return there immediately. 11(9) 
There existed the belief that Weizmann would not exert sufficient 
pressure on British government officials and that he did not 
forceably press the urgency of establishing a Jewish Home. He was 
suspected of being easily swayed by HMG. The Foreign Office 
recognising the growing division between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, 
minuted: "Our latest information suggests that Ben-Gurion wishes to 
return to Palestine principally in order to obtain increased influence 
for himself from the Zionist Executive in Jerusalem as against 
Weizmann whom he regards as having 'appeased' HMG too much... 
Weizmann reported that Ben-Gurion had been pretty difficult with 
him. .. 11 (10) 
In December of 1937 when the British government officially declared 
that it no longer considered itself bound to the partition plan, 
Ben-Gurion's response was unambiguous: "If the British decree that 
we are to be abandoned to the Mufti, only the Jewish community in 
Palestine can save us. " It would be necessary, he argued, to oppose 
such a policy: "not with words, not with demonstrations, but by 
concrete deeds.... The youth will arise - they will raise the banner 
of revolt and fight. " If Britain was attempting to abrogate 
its 
commitments then the Zionists would: "withdraw our support of 
Britain, and build up our own military strength, so that we can, 
if 
necessary, fight the British as well. 11(11) 
The 1939 White Paper exacerbated not only the growing rift between 
HMG and Ben-Gurion but also the rivalry between Ben-Gurion and 
Weizmann. The diplomatic skills of Weizmann were seen by 
Ben-Gurion to be wanting and he pointed to the White Paper policy 
as a clear indictment of Weizmann's incompetence. However, the 
enactment of the White Paper also provoked dissension within the 
Agency Executive in Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion proposed that the fight 
against the White Paper take precedence over all else and argued 
that only force would bring London to rescind its policy: "the only 
hope for Zionism is if it becomes a fighting Zionism. "(12) However, 
other members of the Executive rejected this line of action believing 
that a conflict with Britain on the eve of a war with Germany might 
prove disadvantageous to the Zionist cause. Ben-Gurion., although 
recognising the merits of this argument still held discussions with 
the Haganah commanders and outlined his war aims. He declared: 
"the World War of 1914-18 brought us the Balfour Declaration. This 
time we have to bring about a Jewish State. "(13) 
Ben-Gurion's views modified somewhat during the early period of the 
war; his attitude changing with the circumstances to one of 
co-operation with Britain. The relationship between Weizmann and 
Ben-Gurion continued to be tense and certainly reproachful as 
Weizmann was again attacked for failing the Zionist cause through his 
protracted negotiations with the British Government on the question 
of the Jewish army proposals. Ben-Gurion spent much of 1940/42 in 
the United States and it was during this period that American Zionist 
leaders, headed by Nahum Goldmann and Meyer Weisgal.. organised 
the first national conference of American Zionists. According to his 
biographer, Ben-Gurion "saw the conference as the long hoped-for 
platform from which he could present his political programme. 1104) 
The essence of the resolution adopted by the Conference held in May 
1942 at the Biltmore Hotel, which was later to become known as the 
Biltmore Programme, focused attention on three specific areas which 
would satisfy Zionist demands after the War: "Firstly, Palestine 
would be opened to immigration; secondly., the Jewish Agency would 
be vested with control of immigration and with the authority 
necessary for developing the country and, thirdly, after the war 
Palestine would be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated 
in the structure of the new democratic world. "(15) The Biltmore 
Programme emphasised the split within the Zionist leadership, not 
particularly over the content of the resolution but rather more on 
the interpretation of it. Weizmann and Ben-Gurion assessed the 
Programme quite differently. "I would like to say a word about 
the 
Biltmore Programme, of which such a fuss has been made by 
Ben-Gurion, 11 Weizmann wrote acidly some months after the 
Conference: "It has become a new Decalogue... it is nothing of the 
kind. The Biltmore Declaration is just a resolution, like the 
hundred and one resolutions usually passed at great meetings in this 
or any other country - But Ben-Gurion (who has) .... absolutely 
nothing to show by way of achievement has stuck on the Biltmore 
resolution, more or less conveying the idea that it is the triumph of 
his policy as against my moderate formulation of the same aims, and 
he injected into it all his own extreme views. 1106) 
Ben-Gurion, in outlining his view of the Biltmore Resolution stressed 
the importance of immigration. "Support", he argued "would have to 
be gained for mass immigration or for the transfer of perhaps 2 
million Jews in one operation, " adding that he "had no doubt that 
this programme ... would after the War become the objective of the 
Jewish people-11(17) As the Jewish historian, Michael Bar-Zohar 
argues: "The Biltmore Programme was symptomatic of the two men's 
long - smouldering disagreement on principles. 11(18) Clearly, the 1939 
White Paper and the subsequent resistance on the part of the British 
government to the formation of a Jewish army created in Ben-Gurion 
a disenchantment with the policies of Britain, whilst Weizmann, at 
the same time, continued to adhere to his diplomatic tactics. 
Weizmann refused to lose faith in Winston Churchill's Zionist 
sympathies,, and Ben-Gurion's extreme proposals aroused his fear and 
indignation. Some years later in the course of a conversation with 
Sir Alan Cunningham, the post-war High Commissioner in Palestine, 
Weizmann admitted that he "detested the politics of Ben-Gurion. "(19) 
The Biltmore Programme, as interpreted by Ben-Gurion with its 
emphasis on large scale immigration, was accepted unanimously by 
the Zionist Executive in Palestine. Henceforth, the thrust of Jewish 
Agency policy was to be one of potential confrontation with the 
British government. Yet although Ben-Gurion espoused militant 
rhetoric and clearly maintained close links with the Haganah 
it would 
be erroneous to associate him with the terrorism evident in Palestine 
during the years of the Second World War. The terrorist activities 
of that period were perpetrated by fringe organisations of 
the 
Revisionist Party, a movement of the right diametrically opposed 
to 
the socialist Mapai Party. The Revisionist Party had 
been founded 
by Zeev Vladimir Jabotinsky in 1935 and persisted in claiming that 
Zionist rights extended to the area of the original Mandate, 
i. e. to 
Transjordan, which had been annexed in 1922. (20) These off-shoot 
military organisations., the Irgun Zvai Leumi, led by Menahem Begin, 
and the even more extremist Stern Gang, initiated the reign of 
terror by randomly killing Palestinian soldiers; savagely atacking the 
then High Commissioner, Sir Harold MacMichael; and ultimately, 
murdering Lord Moyne. (21) This scale of violence was to continue, 
disquietingly, during the years which followed the War. 
Ben-Gurion, of course, quite accepted the possibility of a struggle 
with the British government over what would essentially be Zionist 
demands for the implementation of Jewish rights, as laid down by the 
Balfour Declaration, with "arms being used in self-defence against 
British attempts to deny those rights by force. "(22) 
However, although the potential for a recourse to violence was 
clearly within the remit of Jewish Agency policy and a discussion 
centring on the niceties of distinction, i. e. provocative or 
self-defensive action might be considered to be purely academic, 
Ben-Gurion's response to the murder of Lord Moyne was unequivocal. 
The Jewish Agency, at the behest of its leader, immediately passed a 
strident resolution: "The Jewish community is called upon to spew 
forth all the members of this harmful, destructive gang, (the Stern 
Gang) to deny them any shelter or haven, not to give in to their 
threats, and to extend to the authorities all the necessary assistance 
to prevent terror acts and to wipe out these organisations, for this 
is a matter of life and death. "(23) The Jewish Agency had resolved 
to co-operate with the British Government against dissidents, but in 
doing so a further polarisation was created within the Zionist camp, 
that between the Militants and the Extremists. 
The irony of this particular period of crisis in the policy direction of 
the Zionist Movement is that whilst the Jewish Agency was 
unquestionably becoming more militant and factions of the Movement 
were resorting to violence, the British Government under the 
leadership of Winston Churchill was in the process of adopting a 
basic programme for the partition of Palestine. Ben-Gurion's 
biographer posits the question: "Who would have imagined that the 
British Prime Minister was preparing plans for a Jewish State? "(24) 
Who, indeed, other than Chaim Weizmann who quite clearly knew, 
for 
in the November of 1943 Smuts had informed him that Churchill was, 
in fact, seriously considering partition. (25) However, by 
this time 
Weizmann had effectively been ostracised by the Jewish Agency; 
dismissed as an "old man who has lost all personal feelings for the 
Yishuv. " (2 6) 
Thus,, during the crucial period when Britain began to reassess the 
White Paper policy of 1939, the Zionist Movement suffered from a 
"lack of co-ordinated authority, duplication and confusion. " (27) which 
resulted in a rapid descent into violence. 
(ii) The Arab Camp 
If bitter wrangling and internecine struggle reflected the severely 
divided Zionist Movement during the years of the Second World Warp 
they were characteristics not shared by the dominant, yet truncated, 
Palestinian organisation, the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine. 
This organisation, although coming into existence in 1936, was one 
year later proscribed as illegal by the British Government, and its 
leader, Haj Amin el-Husseini, better known as the Mufti, escaped 
into exile, not to return to Palestine until 1946. 
This curious state of affairs was a direct consequence of the Arab 
rebellion in 1936; a riot claiming numerous British, Jewish and Arab 
lives, the responsibility for which was found to rest with the Mufti 
and his supporters in the Arab Higher Committee. (28) In response to 
this outburst the British Government ordered the organisation to 
disband and a number of its members were arrested and deported. 
As such, the Arab Higher Committee lost its formal existence 
although the Mufti continued to exercise control over the Palestinian 
Arabs from his exiled position in Syria,, Iraq, and later, Germany. 
According to a Documentary Record submitted to the United Nations 
in 1947, the Mufti,, by expedient use of his followers in Palestine, 
"succeeded in liquidating most of the Arab leaders in Palestine who 
opposed him and his policies. "(29) 
Haj Amin el-Husseini became the Mufti of Jerusalem in 1922 and 
thereafter embarked upon a continuing association with terrorism. 
The Shaw Commssion, appointed by the British government to 
investigate the riots of 1929 attributed to the Mufti a share 
in the 
responsibility for a series of outrages in which 133 Jews were 
killed 
and 239 wounded. (30) After a period of relative calm the 
Arab riots 
flared again in 1936. An interesting and revealing file of the German 
High Command,, captured at the end of the War disclosed that the 
Arab rebellion of 1936 was carried out by the Mufti with funds 
supplied by the Nazis: "Only through funds made available by 
Germany to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem was it possible to carry out 
the revolt in Palestine. 11(31) If this statement is, in fact, true there 
is no indication that Britain was aware at the time of this funding 
or, indeed, of the Mufti's close association with Germany. If British 
Governmental records are to be believed, the major objective of the 
1939 White Paper was the appeasement of the Arabs and the policy 
was viewed as an expression of pre-war expediency. (32) 
Prima facie evidence, therefore, reveals that the British Government 
harboured a suspicion as to where affinities might potentially lie in 
the Arab world in the event of a war, but there is little sign that 
Britain actually knew of Germany's involvement in the affairs of 
Palestine. On the other hand, of course, it could be possible that 
the British Government was secretly aware of an association and this 
knowledge provided the basis for suspicion. 
One scholar has argued: "It is well known that in the 1930s Germany 
and Italy - by skilful propaganda, by judicious disbursements, by 
powerful appeal of their efficiency and success - established 
themselves as the champions of, and set the pace for, Arab 
nationalism. 11(33) With the benefit of hindsight, Kedouries's claims 
appear accurate but as he neglects to substantiate his statement 
little light is shed on the rather shrouded issue of Britain's 
awareness of Germany's financial support of the Palestinian Arab 
leadership in 1936. Unfortunately, the whole question appear s to 
remain unclear 
One fact which presumably must have been brought to the attention 
of the Foreign Office via its Middle Eastern emissaries but was not 
documented at the time, is the correspondence in 1940 between the 
brief encumbent of power in Iraq, Rashid Ali al-Gailani and the 
German Ambassador in Turkey. The memoranda carried a list of 
demands including the confirmation by the Axis of independence of 
all Arab countries; the abolition of the Jewish National Home; and 
the recognition of Arab unity. (34) 
The question of Arab unity was raised in Cabinet a few months later 
when Eden stated: 11 .... the Arabs generally agree that some form 
of 'Arab federation' is desirable,, and I think that we should not only 
refrain from opposing such vague aspirations but even take every 
opportunity of expressing publicly our support for them. 1105) It is 
not unreasonable to deduce that the British Government fully 
recognised the appeal of the Axis to the Arabs and sought in some 
way to redress the balance, by displaying a willingness to 
acknowledge the demand for Arab unity. However, the aspect which 
again is undocumented is the extent to which HMG knew of the 
Mufti's communications with Hitler and other members of the 
hierarchy in the German Reich during the years of the war. 
The Mufti held a personal, if somewhat sycophantic interview with 
Hitler in the November of 1941,, during which they both outlined the 
evils of Jewry and the prospective elimination of the Jewish National 
Home. (36) In many ways the Mufti, despite his willingness to resort 
to terrorism, was essentially a pragmatic figure in terms of what he 
perceived to be advantageous to himself and his supporters. He was 
attracted to Nazism not only by its crude anti-semitic sentiments and 
its opposition to Britain but also by the possible benefits which he 
considered could accrue to the Arab world in the event of Germany's 
success. 
During his meeting with Hitler, the Mufti emphasised his objectives: 
"The objectives of my fight are clear. Primarily, I am fighting the 
Jews without respite, and this fight includes the fight against the 
so-called Jewish National Home because the Jews want to establish 
there a central government for their own pernicious purposes.... 
Our common enemies are Great Britain and the Soviets whose 
principles are opposed to ours. We are now in the midst of a life 
and death struggle against both these nations. This fight will not 
only determine the outcome of the struggle between National Socialism 
and Jewry, but the whole conduct of this successful war will be of 
great and positive help to the Arabs who are engaged in the same 
struggle.... Only if we win the war will the hour of deliverance 
also be the hour of fulfilment of Arab aspirations" (37) 
Whilst Hitler expressed sympathy for the Mufti's aims and the Italian 
Government promised assistance for the Arab cause: "Italy is ready 
to grant to the Arab countries every possible aid in their fight for 
liberation; to recognise their sovereignty and independence; to agree 
to their federation if this is desired by the interested parties; as 
well as to the abolition of the National Jewish Homeland in 
Palestine, "(38) Britain began an initial study of the possibilities of 
an Arab federation. 
The Foreign Office considered a document prepared by an adviser to 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in which it was stated: 
"There is a basic incompatibility between support for a movement in 
the direction of Arab federation, and the fulfilment of obligations 
assumed in 1917 towards the Jewish people. "(39) Despite Eden's 
statement to Cabinet in July 1941,00) the Foreign Office still 
harboured doubts about the formation of such a union and warned 
the government: "This is not the time for endeavouring to formulate 
and carry through a scheme of political federation; " fearing that: 
"The Arab desire for closer union.... is in effect a wish to form a 
bloc of Arab States which will be strong enough to secure what are 
considered Arab rights in Palestine... and to present a united front 
to foreign powers, especially Great Britain. "(41) However, the 
Foreign Office did not advise outright condemnation of such a policy 
but that Britain should show sympathy for Arab aspirations and 
guide them, as far as possible, along lines consistent with British 
interests in the area. Essentially, the initiative for such a union 
was to come from the Arabs and bearing these sentiments in mind 
the Foreign Secretary, in response to a question in the House, 
stated: "Clearly, such an initiative would have to come from the 
Arabs themselves, and so far as I am aware no such scheme which 
would command general approval has yet been worked out*11(42) 
Underpinning the Foreign Office line was the belief that Arab 
disunity would in effect prevent an alliance between the States. One 
memorandum stated: "Like little Black Sambo, we can sit up a tree 
and watch the tigers tearing themselves to pieces, "(43) and 
it would 
certainly be fallaceous to deny the existence of divisions within 
the 
Pan-Arab movement. A report from the British Embassy 
in Damascus 
stated: "The Syrian Arab regards the Iraqi as inferior to 
him in 
culture. The Saudi Arab he considers a poor, unenlightened person 
to be treated with tolerant condescension. The one possible 
cementing factor - the Moslem religion - in itself provides 
elements 
of further disruption. Sunni hates Shiah,, both 
despise the Ismaili, 
whilst the Wahhabi considers himself the only real 
true follower of 
the prophet. "(44) These views were confirmed by Ibn Saud: "Ibn 
Saud repeats the warnings given regarding dissentient Arab leaders 
who are at present agitating for Arab Congresses ... He trusts none 
of them as they are all playing their own hands in order to 
strengthen their positions in their own countries. "(45) However, the 
Foreign Office was fully aware that if there were to be one unifying 
factor upon which they could all agree it would be Palestine. In 
such an event it was feared that the Mufti and his supporters in 
Palestine would set the pace, leaving the Arab States to vie with 
each other in support of demands which would most likely go beyond 
the limits set by the 1939 White Paper. (46) As a consequence, the 
Foreign Office viewed the announcement that an all-Arab Conference 
was to be held in the Autumn of 1944 with a high degree of 
apprehension. 
Nevertheless, the Office still managed to exhibit an element of 
complacency when surveying the prospective conference: "The stage 
is now set. The Arab leaders are all at sixes and sevens. The 
Iraqis are jealous of Nahhas. Nahhas hates Nuri. The Amir of 
Transjordan wants to be King of Syria... Ibn Saud is backing Shukri 
because he hates all Hashemites. The Palestinian Arabs can't agree 
on a delegation to represent them in the absence of the leaders in 
Germany ... there are all the elements of an unedifying dog-fight, but 
we really dare not crash in and tell them to put it off - they would 
then at least agree about our opposition to Arab unity. "(47) 
With regard to both Palestinian Arab representation and the 
possibility of Arab unity the Foreign Office made serious 
miscalculations. At the very last minute the Palestinian Arabs chose 
Musa el Alami as their delegate. Musa el Alami was purportedly a 
mild supporter of the Mufti, (48) whatever that term, in fact,, meant,, 
and was recognised by the Conference as the sole representative of 
the Palestinian Arabs, pending the re-formation of the Palestine Arab 
Higher Committee. The outcome of the meeting was significant. At 
the end of its deliberations the Conference issue five resolutions, 
which subsequently became known as the 'Alexandria Protocol'. The 
first four resolutions dealt with the formation of an Arab League and 
the political, social and economic relations between its members. The 
fifth resolution was concerned with Palestine and noted that 
"it was 
an important element of the Arab countries that the rights of Arabs 
could not be infringed in Palestine without danger to the peace and 
stability of the Arab world. 11 At the same time it stated that the 
engagements assumed by Great Britain, i. e. the 1939 White Paper, 
constituted the 'acquired rights' of the Arabs. These 'engagements' 
were itemised as: the stoppage of Jewish immigration, the protection 
of Arab lands and the preparation of Palestine for independence. 
While expressing sympathy for the plight of European Jewry, the 
Conference declared that this problem must not be confused with the 
question of Zionism. (49) 
The Foreign Office quickly seized upon the relative moderation of the 
Conference's resolutions and lost little time in grasping the 
implications the Protocol had for Britain's Palestine policy: "It is not 
impossible that this solidarity of the Egypt-Arab world may be 
reconciled with our essential interests.... provided we are able to 
adapt ourselves to the new conditions quickly enough. if 9 
however,... we have also in the interests of our world policy to 
adopt local policies in Palestine unacceptable to the Arabs, there is 
little likelihood of our being able to bring a consolidated Middle East 
into friendly co-operation. 11(50) The British Government it seemed 
was being swept along not entirely of its own volition, by a 
movement which it felt powerless to stifle but which was managing to 
narrow HMG1s options in the Middle East. 
The Pact which officially founded the Arab League in March 1945 
directly resulted from the Conference in Alexandria, but although it 
followed the general lines of the Protocol, policy on Palestine was 
re-interpreted. Whereas the Alexandria Protocol was based on 
maintaining the status quo in Palestine as defined by the 1939 White 
Paper, the League Pact took for its point of reference the First 
World War, when the Arab countries, including Palestine, had been 
detached from the Ottoman Empire: "At the end of the last Great 
War., Palestine together with the other Arab States was separated 
from the Ottoman Empire. She became independent, not belonging to 
any other State. The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her 
fate 
should be decided by the parties concerned in Palestine. Even 
though Palestine was not able to control her own destiny, it was on 
the basis of the recognition of her independence that the 
Covenant 
of the League of Nations determined a system of government 
for her. 
Her existence and her independence among the nations can, 
therefore, no more be questioned de jure than the independence of 
any of the other Arab States. 11 ( 51) Moreover, 
the statement 
continued , in consideration of Palestine's special circumstances and 
until such time that the country enjoyed effective independence, the 
Council of the Arab League would undertake the selection of an Arab 
delegate from Palestine to participate in its works. 
Clearly, then the Palestinian Arabs were fully embraced by the Arab 
League and with such support their demands assumed a greater 
potency. The British government was, as a consequence, placed in 
a difficult position: no longer could it view Palestine in isolation from 
the rest of the Arab world. In fact, it was only a matter of a few 
months after the Arab League Pact that the Foreign Minister of 
Syria, Jamil Mardam, headed an Arab delegation to Palestine,, the 
sole purpose of which was to solve the problem of re-establishing the 
Arab Higher Committee. 
The Husseini family agreed to the re-formation of the Committee on 
the condition that the Arab League would induce the British to 
release Jamal Husseini, the nephew of the Mufti, from his internment 
as a pro-Axis leader. Assurance was also given to them that the 
chairmanship of the organisation would be held open for the Mufti on 
his return, and that the vice-chairman ship would be assigned to 
Jamal Husseini. (52) This, in fact, happened when in February 1946 
Jamal Husseini was released by the British and permitted to return 
to Palestine. Four months' later the Mufti returned to Palestine, and 
as predicted assumed the role of Chairman of the Committee, with 
Jamal Phis second in command. 
These developments unquestionably limited the British Government's 
room for manoeuvre. Faced with solidarity from the Arab camp and 
increasing terrorism from Zionist quarters, the battle lines were now 
drawn for the acrimonious fight which was to colour British policy in 
the post-war years. Options were closing for HMG and as a Foreign 
Office minute outlined, Britain could no longer adopt the stance of 
an objective arbiter when Palestine was placed in the wider context 
of the Middle Eastern theatre: "The development of the League 
certainly makes it more than ever necessary that we should not 
evolve for Palestine a settlement which is too great an offence to 
Arab interests... 11(53) 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY 
Labour's Triumph 
Three months before the General Election of July 1945 the National 
Executive of the Labour Party passed a resolution calling upon the 
British Government: "To remove the present unjustifiable barriers on 
immigration and to announce without delay proposals for the future 
of Palestine. "Q) The resolution, in fact, confirmed the sentiments 
enshrined in the Party publication: 'The International Post-War 
Settlement', as indeed did the discussion which took place at 
Conference one month later. In Blackpool,, Hugh Dalton reiterated 
the Party's policy on Palestine: "Last December the Conference 
accepted and welcomed without even the challenge of a card vote, 
the document entitled the Post War International Settlement. That 
stands as the policy of this Movement and of this Party and in that 
document there is a clear and definite statement regarding Palestine 
and the Jewish people. This Party has laid it down and repeated it 
so recently as last April that having regard to the unspeakable 
horrors that have been perpetrated upon the Jews of Germany and 
other occupied countries in Europe, it is morally wrong and 
politically indefensible to impose obstacles to the entry into Palestine 
now of any Jews who desire to go there.. This is not a matter 
which should be regarded as one for which the British Government 
alone should take responsibility... it is indispensable that there 
should be close agreement and co-operation among the British, 
American and Soviet governments, particularly if we are going to get 
a sure settlement in Palestine and the surrounding countries. Steps 
should be taken in consultation with those two governments to see 
whether we can get that common support for a policy which will give 
us a happy, a free and prosperous Jewish State in Palestine. "(2) 
These views, supported by delegates at Conference and well 
intentioned as they may have been, were apparently impervious 
to 
the events actually taking place in Palestine and the 
'surrounding 
countries'. Lord Moyne had, six months' previouslyt 
been 
assassinated by a Jewish terrorist organisation; David Ben-Gurion 
was inexorably leading the Jewish Agency in a militant direction with 
the attendant risk of a confrontation with Britain, and the Arab 
States were about to arrange a conference,, the purpose of which 
would be to discuss the possibility of Arab unity. Within the 
context of these developments, the Labour Party's aim to produce a 
thappy, free and prosperous Jewish State in Palestine' appears at 
once simplistic and naive. Nevertheless., scepticism apart, if one is 
to judge policy intention by Conference resolutions, then clearly, the 
Labour Party entered the fray of a General Election with the avowed 
commitment of establishing a Jewish National Home. 
G. Alderman in his recent study of British Jewry suggests that 
Labour's pro-Zionism may have resulted from a careful attempt to woo 
support from Jewish voters. (3) It is certainly true that Poale Zion 
urged Jews to vote for Labour, as they obviously would, yet a 
picture of the Party being dictated predominantly by electoral 
opportunism seems overdrawn. If this had been the case one 
suspects that the resolutions on Palestine would have been less 
strident in content and less radical in intent. In other words, the 
Party would have resorted to its own tried and tested habit: that of 
fudging the issue. 
When the Election results were announced on 26 July 1945 it quickly 
became apparent that Labour had won an overwhelming victory with 
393 seats in Parliament and the Party entered office with Clement 
Attlee as Prime Minister. However, the composition of the Cabinet 
was not as might have been predicted and certain appointments were 
greeted with dismay from Zionist quarters. The London Office of 
the Jewish Agency dismissed unsparingly the new Colonial Secretary, 
George Hall, as "that caddish sort of fool. "(4) In Zionist eyes Hall 
had not been found sympathetic to their cause during the war and in 
a report of an interview with Professor Coupland it was noted that 
he had "made some hostile remarks about the Jews and said they 
were 'grasping. "' (5) Hall, it appears, was not generally regarded as 
particularly competent and was referred to as "a willing carthorse 
who, if told to pull up hill would burst his collar doing it, but 
would never suggest that some other hill might be easier. "(6) 
Nevertheless, the Agency was heartened by the appointment of 
Arthur Creech-Jones as Hall's Under- Secretary; a long-time 
friend of 
Zionism who stated when gaining office, unrealistically as 
it turned 
out, that "he should be consulted on all Palestine matters, "(7) 
although, Baffy Dugdale casting doubt on their abilities, referred to 
both Hall and 
inexperienced. 11 (8) 
Creech-Jones as "these little men... so 
However, it was the choice of Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary 
which came as a great surprise to many people including Hugh 
Dalton, who had confidently expected the post and to Bevin himself, 
who had hoped for the Treasury. The circumstances surrounding 
these appointments have given rise to many suppositions, the most 
popular of which is that they were the result of Royal intervention. 
It has been suggested that when Attlee submitted his Cabinet list to 
King George VI appointing Dalton as Foreign Secretary and Bevin as 
Chancellor, the King used his constitutional rights to query the post 
suggested for Dalton and Attlee promptly switched the two. (9) 
That a switch occurred is confirmed by Attlee in his memoirs: "It is 
already known that I hesitated for some hours as to whether Bevin 
or Dalton should take the Exchequer or the Foreign Office. Various 
reasons impelled me to my final decision, which was, I think, 
justified in the event. 1100) Kenneth Harris in his recent biography 
of Attlee fails to mention the apparent dilemma facing the Prime 
Minister over the respective posts for Bevin and Dalton and instead 
refers in rather general terms to Attlee's pursuit of 'quality' within 
the Cabinet. He asserts that he was a "good judge of men, 
objective with intuition; the emphasis was on a man's 
trustworthiness. 11(11) Yet in outlining these worthy attributes Harris 
deals cursorily with Attlee's evident disenchantment with Hugh Dalton 
and refers to a: "Note to Cripps about Dalton's economic policy 
suggested that Attlee did not believe in his economic 
expertise... 1102) This statement would indicate that either the Prime 
Minister acted imprudently in appointing Hugh Dalton as Chancellor. 9 
thereby belying Harris' claims or that Dalton's appointment was not 
the result of Attlee's own judgement. 
If the choice of Ernest Bevin as Chancellor seems an odd decision 
then his appointment as Foreign Secretary was an even more curious 
one,, and by any normal stretch of the imagination could also be 
considered an unfitting one. Although Bevin was widely respected 
within the Trade Union Movement and had performed well as Minister 
of Labour and National Service during the wartime coalition, 
his 
wealth of experience did not formally encompass foreign affairs. 
Attlee, when referring to Bevin's appointment, remarked, "I thought 
a heavy tank was what was required, rather than a light 
sniper, "(13) yet there still exist shadows as to the character of 
Ernest Bevin. He was undoubtedly a formidable and intelligent man 
who allegedly "could get the essence out of a memo in minutes. "(14) 
His great gift, according to Hugh Dalton, was that of "seeing 
apparently separate problems as part of a wider whole, "(15) whilst 
Sir Harold Beeley of the Foreign Office referred to Bevin as "a 
colourful personality. -.. earning great respect because of his common 
sense, (and) his very quick penetration of the heart of a 
problem. "(16) Yet he was also judged "an egotist and completely 
ruthless - "Q 7) As to his possible leadership of the Party, 
Creech-Jones revealed interestingly and somewhat mysteriously some 
years after Bevin's death that "Ernie" would never have been leader 
of the Labour Party: "for personal reasons which will never be 
published and on which I would rather not be pushed. (18) 
Bevin's contacts with the Jews both in the 1930s and during the 
early years of the War did not go unnoticed by appreciative Zionists 
yet their pleasure in his appointment was mitigated by the comments 
he made in 1944. In a note of a conversation with a leading 
American Zionist, Dr. Israel Goldstein, Bevin remarked that 
"Britain had had more than enough trouble in Palestine and that he 
was damned if he would allow British blood to be shed for either 
Jews or Arab. " Nevertheless, Bevin thought Zionism was a "good 
thing because it gave the Jews status" and vowed that "if he should 
be in office when the time came he would see that justice be done to 
the Jewish people, " adding after a pause, "and the Arabs. "(19) What 
Bevin exactly meant by the term 'Zionism' is difficult to assess. 
According to Richard Crosmann it was defined in a religious context. 
Two years later, during a rather acrimonious conversation with 
Crossman., Bevin apparently asserted: "There's only a Jewish 
religion, not a Jewish nation. And if those Jews in Palestine aren't 
religious they ought not to call themselves Jews-11(20) 
However, it is 
still unclear as to whether these were Bevin's sentiments 
in 1944. 
The interesting aspect of Bevin's meeting with Dr. 
Goldstein is his 
perception of the role American would play after 
the war: "He was 
afraid that America might do the same as 
in 1918, ie. become 
isolationist. " Bevin asked whether "the United States would 
go with 
Britain to solve the problems of peace, " and emphasised that 
"Palestine would have to fit into the international picture. 11 Bevin 
was critical of the Jews, whom he considered were always "pressing 
for a solution of their own problems instead of the general problem. 11 
The meeting concluded with Bevin stating that he was "an 
internationalist - 11 (21) 
Bevin's informal interest in the affairs of Palestine was no passing 
whim yet there is little evidence to indicate why, at that particular 
time, he should concern himself with the problem. It may well have 
been an expression of his sympathy for the Jewish plight but he did 
not once reassure Dr. Goldstein of the Labour Party's commitment to 
establish a Jewish National Home, should the Party be returned at a 
General Election. His interest it seems stemmed less from anxiety as 
to the relative merits of the Jewish/Arab cases than from an 
overriding concern as to the position America would take vis-a-vis 
Britain in the new international climate which would exist in the 
aftermath of the war. 
As a consequence, his reading of the intricacies of the Palestine 
issue appear superficial as he undoubtedly underestimated the depth 
of animosity which existed between Arabs and Jews. He seemed to 
interpret the situation as being something akin to a carbuncle on the 
flesh of the British Government which could be efficiently lanced if 
America was prepared to assist in the operation. If such were his 
opinions in March 1944 there is every reason to suspect that they 
remained with him when he assumed the mantle of Foreign Secretary; 
for in November 1945 Bevin, in his newly appointed position, invited 
the United States to participate in an Anglo-American Committee of 
Enquiry into Palestine. 
The first few months of the Labour Administration proved 
disappointing to many Zionists who "had hoped so much from the 
change of Government* 11(22) On 22nd August Attlee reconstituted the 
Palestine Committee of the Cabinet which now comprised Morrison, 
once again in the Chair; Bevin, Hall, Dalton, Lord 
Pethwick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India; Lawson, Secretary 
of State for War and Viscount Stansgate, the Secretary of State 
for 
Air. The first meeting took place on 6th September which Morrison 
opened by summarising the work done by the Committee during 
the 
war. The Colonial Secretary concentrated on the problem of Jewish 
immigration and emphasised that a decision would soon be needed as 
only 3000 of the 75,000 immigration certificates allowed under the 
White Paper still remained and these would be exhausted by 
November. Hall then went on to propose that the White Paper quota 
be adhered to whilst a long-term policy was being formulated 
although, he added that the Arabs could be approached with a view 
to further immigration. The meeting was thrown open to discussion. 
Bevin agreed to the proposal but stressed that "it should be our aim 
to associate the United States with our long-term policy in 
Palestine. " Only Hugh Dalton raised doubts about the suggestion. 
However, Dalton's response could be considered predictable given 
that the substance of his views on Palestine had inspired the Party 
declaration, yet it soon became apparent that his opinions had 
modified significantly. He expressed great sympathy for the Jews 
and regret that settlement should be held up by the "intransigence 
of a backward local population. " He also suggested, somewhat less 
stridently, and presumably alluding to his own work, that "party 
statements which have from time to time been made should not be 
overlooked-" However, with an unmistakable sense of realism, 
notably absent from his previous utterances, he proclaimed that he 
"quite recognised the need for taking into account Arab feeling and 
the importance of avoiding civil outbreaks in Palestine. 11(23) The 
meeting concluded with the Committee recommending the continuation 
of the White Paper policy. 
This volte face has been described by some as a consequence of 
inexperienced Labour Ministers being confronted with a novel 
problem with no knowledge or previous guidance other than a stream 
of party declarations. (24) However, Hugh Dalton was no 
inexperienced Minister, he had participated fully in the Wartime 
coalition as Minister of Economic Warfare and latterly President of the 
Board of Trade, and Palestine to him was certainly no novel issue. 
He had, in fact, been the architect of the latest Party statement on 
Palestine and had, four months' previously,, been advocating the 
swift establishment of a 'Jewish State in Palestine. 1(25) 
Why.. then., did he feel the need to alter his views when he became a 
member of the Cabinet Committee on Palestine? He reveals no clue 
as to the possible reason in either his diaries or autobiography and 
one is left with the uncertainties of speculation. He 
had, of course, 
been tipped for the post of Foreign Secretary and his wartime role 
as Party spokesman on foreign affairs had given credence to this 
expectation. On becoming Chancellor Of the Exchequer he may have 
felt that this domain was no longer within his sphere of influence. 
He had observed, shortly after acquiring his new position, that 
"Ernest Bevin is rather fascinated by the Middle East"(26) and it is 
conceivable that Dalton did not wish to interfere in Bevin's territory. 
On the other hand, and maybe more convincingly, he could for the 
first time have realised the profound complexities of the issue and 
the difficulties facing the Government. As Richard Crossman, who 
was to be a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, 
remarked: ".. after a quarter of an hour with Dalton I was convinced 
that, though he had moved the Labour Party Conference motion, he 
knew practically nothing of the issues involved. "(27) 
The first meeting of the Palestine Committee coincided with a 
Conference of British representatives in the Middle East, meeting in 
London under the chairmanship of the Foreign Secretary. Attention 
was focused, during the Conference.. on the implications for Britain 
of the formation of the Arab League. Although the Conference 
decided that the Arab League had not yet "developed sufficient 
cohesion to warrant its recognition as a corporate body 
representative of the Arab States as a whole, " it nevertheless 
acknowledged the fact that it had established "some co-ordination 
among the constituent members of the League, " and that it would be 
inevitable that the British Government would form "political contacts 
with the League from time to time. "(28) Significantly, the Conference 
concluded that in order for Britain to "reach the right solution of 
our Middle East problems it is necessary to consider the area as a 
single region, " adding the caveat that "it would be necessary to take 
into account the political and economic factors arising out of the 
Palestine question... 11(29) Therefore, it is within this wider context 
that the recommendations of the Palestine Committee and the 
subsequent Cabinet decision on the matter have to placed. The 
Cabinet met on the Ilth September and adopted the Committee's 
suggestion. A memorandum was issued stating that party policy 
should for the present be waived: "we consider that the balance of 
advantage lies in the temporary maintenance of the White Paper 
policy. "(30) The Zionist Review predictably attacked the Government 
and urged Ministers to remember their own pledges(31) and 
The 
Times reported that Labour MPs were much in evidence at public 
meetings organised by Zionists and their sympathisers-02) 
Ian 
Mikardol, somewhat naively, informed such a meeting that "the 
Government is ruled by the authority of the rank and file and will 
fulfil its pledges. "(33) 
The episode provides a striking illustration of the Labour 
Government's dramatic reversal of policy over the question of 
Palestine, yet it would be erroneous to view the action as a 
whimsical departure from Party commitments or as it has been 
judged: ". -a bad case of 'Passfieldisml", (34) if anything, it is a sad 
indictment of the profound inadequacies of Conference resolutions. 
As one Labour MP claimed: "I think the average member who 
attended these conferences had about as much knowledge of the 
Palestine problem as I have of the moon. "(35) Party declarations on 
such a sensitive issue as Palestine devised, as they were, from a 
point far removed from the exigencies of governmental office, were 
bound to prove inoperable when Labour gained power. Harold Wilson 
muses over "how different Middle Eastern history might have 
been... 11(36) had Hugh Dalton become Foreign Secretary, but a 
realistic appraisal would suggest that there was little that a British 
Government could do given the difficulties of the Middle Eastern 
situation in those early post-war months. The Labour Party viewed 
Palestine in isolation from its environment and in ignoring the 
formation, and potential power of the Arab League it had produced a 
myopic interpretation of the issue; one which was destined to be 
condemned by the evident constraints of office. As Rita Hinden, 
Secretary of the Fabian Colonial Bureau so accurately pointed out: 
"Labour Ministers. ... seem to have found themselves 
in an infinitely 
more ticklish position than they anticipated. "(37) 
Divisions within the Zionist movement at that time served to prevent 
full negotiations from taking place with the British government. On 
8th October, Bevin conducted an interview with Chaim Weizmann 
during which he outlined the thrust of the Government's short-term 
Policy towards Palestine. At the close of the meeting Bevin insisted 
that he must see Weizmann again very shortly. (38) When Weizmann 
reported the outcome of this meeting to his colleagues in the London 
Office of the Jewish Agency, Lewis Namier considered 
Bevin's 
request to be "very important. " However, at this point Ben-Gurion 
"threw a spanner into the works and refused to talk at all 
to any 
Minister till the White Paper was abolished. " He also disapproved of 
other members of the Agency holding interviews with officials of 
the 
British Government. In response to Ben-Gurion's attitude Weizmann 
apparently "exploded and said that he could not go on if there were 
to be two policies of the Executive, 1109) but Weizmann's influence 
had waned and his style of diplomacy was now outmoded within the 
Zionist Movement. On Ben-Gurion's orders no further discussions 
were to be held with British Ministers and for Weizmann it was 
reportedly "the great Fade Out". According to Baffy Dugdale, 
Weizmann "could never again recover real leadership. 11(40) 
This development may have suited Ben-Gurion and other Executive 
members of the Jewish Agency but it drastically changed the 
relationship between the British Government and the Zionist 
Movement. The traditional personal chats between Zionist leaders 
and senior members of the Cabinet, which had been such a 
pronounced feature of Jewish activity in previous years were quickly 
disappearing, to be replaced by a campaign within the Labour Party 
directed by Poale Zion. Poale Zion urged members of the Labour 
Party to protest to Ministers, the Government and Transport House 
in an attempt to redirect policy(41) and to this end it brought its 
case before the National Executive Committee, which at that time was 
chaired by Harold Laski. This process was an indirect attempt at 
pressurising the Government and may have been considered by 
Zionists to be a more fruitful method of influencing the Cabinet. In 
the event, it proved not to be. 
The NEC decided to appoint a delegation to interview the Zionists 
and a meeting was arranged for 5th October. (42) The Zionists 
Predictably recalled party pledges and stressed, as a first step, the 
need for the immediate admission of 100,000 refugees. They also 
emphasised that there were "no circumstances in which the Jewish 
people will accept the White Paper, " and should it continue, they 
warned, "all means will be taken to avoid its consequences. 11(43) The 
NEC delegation decided to present the case to Attlee, Bevin and Hall 
and on the 22nd October they met for a two hour discussion. 
The 
meeting was certainly not hostile with Laski prefacing the 
discussion 
with the comment that "this is a 'family' discussion and 
it would be 
unfortunate if we were to give the impression that the 
Government 
was under examination by the Party... "(44) He 
later stressed that 
the meeting "implied no criticism of the Government, 
" but was merely 
a fulfilment of "our obvious duty to consider the relation of 
the 
Government's proposals to our policy. " Attlee, 
for his part, pledged 
that the proposals would be built upon the party Policy of abrogation 
of the White Paper and the fulfilm-ent of the Mandate, and the 
rneeting ended amicably. 
However,, two weeks' prior to this meeting Bevin had presented to 
Cabinet a memorandum proposing the establishment of an 
Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry to examine the Palestine 
issue. (45) This development arose not as a result of Party criticism 
of government policy but, more significantly, as a direct 
consequence of President Truman's much publicised statement that 
100,000 Jewish refugees be permitted immediate entry into 
Palestine. (46) Truman, who had been subjected to much pressure by 
the Jewish lobby in America, had in fact, shortly after the Potsdam 
Conference, recommended to Attlee that Jewish refugees in Germany 
be granted immigration certificates to Palestine. Truman argued that 
the main solution of their problem appeared to lie in the "quick 
evacuation of as many as possible ... to Palestine, " and if it was to be 
effective, "such action should not be long delayed. "(47) 
On the 9th October Bevin outlined the aims of a Committee of 
Enquiry which would be firstly, to examine the political and economic 
conditions in Palestine and secondly, to examine the current position 
of European Jewry. It was the Foreign Secretary's intention that 
the Committee would inaugurate a new era of Anglo-American 
co-operation in the Middle East. He hoped that "future policy in 
Palestine would depend largely on the nature of the recommendations 
of the Committee and that the United States would thus be forced to 
bear a share of the responsibility for it. " America would then no 
longer be able to play the part of, in Bevin's words "the 
irresponsible critic. "(48) Sir Harold Beeley of the Foreign Office 
confirmed Bevin's objectives: "America's opinions could not 
be 
ignored and they were putting pressure on the British 
Government 
in the interests of the Zionists and I think the British 
Government, 
including Bevin,, felt that if a way could be found of bringing 
in 
Americans face to face with the problem as we saw it, that this 
pressure would be relaxed ... it would 
force them to look at the 
Middle East problem as a whole. "(49) This goal seems most unlikely, 
if not actually ingenuous, for it completely overlooked 
both the 
nuances of American politics and the 
fact that the United States 
housed half the world's surviving Jews-(50) Its ambitions were 
also 
at variance with the memorandums received 
from Lord Halifax, 
Britain's Ambassador in Washington, who relayed American 
pro-Zionist sentiments to the Foreign Office: "There is a feeling in 
influential liberal quarters that if HMG had admitted more Jews into 
Palestine before the war., more Jews would have escaped Nazi 
persecution; that more might have been done to get Jews out of 
Europe into Palestine during the war and that Palestine is the 
natural asylum for the many Jews who now wish to leave 
Europe - 11 (51) 
A more convincing explanation of the Government's behaviour can 
only be found in the context of Britain's decline as a world power, a 
fact which was readily acknowledged by Bevin and the Labour 
Administration. The recognition that America would have to be 
brought into the problem, one way or another, was evident in 
Labour's resolution on Palestine in 1944; (52) by 1945 it was seen as 
imperative. 
On the 13th November 1945, following America's agreement to 
participate in the Committee of Enquiry, the Cabinet approved a 
statement of policy which Bevin, later that day, presented to the 
House of Commons. (53) Bevin., in announcing the establishment of 
the Committee, gave a fair and balanced appraisal of the difficulties 
facing the British government. He stated "The fact has to be faced 
that since the introduction of the Mandate it has been impossible to 
find common ground between the Arabs and the Jews.. Both 
communities lay claim to Palestine, one on the ground of a millenium 
of occupation, and the other on the ground of historic association 
coupled with the undertaking given in the First World War to 
establish a Jewish home. The problem of Palestine is itself a very 
difficult one. The Mandate requires the Mandatory to facilitate 
Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the 
land, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of 
the population are not prejudiced thereby. HMG have thus a dual 
obligation to the Jews on the one side and to the Arabs on the 
other. The lack of any clear definition of this dual obligation has 
been the main cause of the trouble which has been experienced in 
Palestine during the past 26 years... Any arrangement acceptable 
to one party has been rejected as unacceptable to the other. The 
whole history of Palestine since the Mandate has been one of 
continued friction between the two races, culminating at intervals in 
serious disturbances. " Therefore, the task now facing the British 
Government, he asserted was "to find some means to reconcile these 
divergences", and he proceeded to outline the Committee's terms of 
references: 
tfl" To examine the political, economic and social conditions of 
Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and 
settlement and the wellbeing of the peoples now living therein. 
2. To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe 
where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution 
and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in 
those countries, to enable them to live free from discrimination and 
oppression and to make estimate of those who wish or will be 
impelled by their conditions to migrate to Palestine or other countries 
outside Europe. 
3. To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult 
representative Arabs and Jews on the problem of Palestine and to 
make recommendations to HMG and the government of the United 
States for an interim handling of these problems as well as for their 
permanent solution. 
4. To make such other recommendations to HMG and the US 
Government as may be necessary to meet immediate needs by remedial 
action in the European countries in question or by the provision of 
facilities for emigration to and settlement in countries outside 
Europe. " 
Bevin's thrust of argument became clear when he asserted that "we 
cannot accept the view that the Jews should be driven out of Europe 
and should not be permitted to live again in these countries without 
discrimination and contribute their ability and their talent towards 
rebuilding the prosperity of Europe. " He was convinced that 
"Palestine while it may make a contribution, does not by 
itself 
provide sufficient opportunity for grappling with the whole problem. 
" 
On a more personal level Bevin assured the House that 
"I am 
struggling to the best of my ability as Foreign Secretary to solve 
this problem, not I hope on the basis of the passions 
involved in the 
immediate difficulties now facing us.... I will stake my political 
future on solving this problem, but not in the 
limited sphere 
presented to me now. " Bevin appealed to Members to help 
him carry 
out his task and Labour backbenchers voiced no criticism. 
The response from the Opposition benches to Bevin's statement was 
surprising. Some care had apparently been taken to ensure that the 
policy received a friendly reception from Conservative quarters. 
Bevin's private secretary had explained the Government's proposal to 
Eden four days' earlier, but in the event Oliver Stanley, Shadow 
spokesman on Colonial Affairs, "instead of giving the statement 
general support, as AE asked him to do, reserved his position and 
asked for a debate. "(54) Oliver Stanley's actions seem curious 
especially when viewed in the light of his comments at a meeting of 
the Conservative Imperial Affairs Committee during which he stated 
that "the policy of a National Government, had it been returned 
would have followed the lines of the present Government's 
policy. "(55) It would appear that on this occasion Stanley's response 
should be seen within the context of traditional Parliamentary 
adversarial rhetoric. 
On balance, however, Bevin's statement was well received and it was 
observed that during the following press conference: "Eighty 
experienced and, therefore, cynical newspapermen listened to him 
nearly all of them convinced that here was a man who meant business 
and would bring a new refreshing touch to the handling of the 
Palestine problem. "(56) 
(ii) The Committee's Investigation 
It is interesting that Bevin's first choice of Labour MPs to be 
considered for membership of the Anglo-American Committee was 
Richard Crossman. During an interview in later years Crossman 
recalled Bevin's first interest in him. Crossman had entered 11the 
Labour Party on the question of rearmament and this had brought 
him in on Bevin's side. 11 From then on Bevin had had his eye on 
Crossman and when the appointment for the Committee came up, 
"Ernie included me because he hoped that I would make a good job 
of it and qualify for a position in the Foreign Office. 11(57) Crossman, 
who knew little of the area and held no partisan views, immediately 
accepted the offer and joined the other members of the Committee 
which comprised: Sir John Singleton, the Chairman and an 
ex-Conservative MP and a High Court Judge; Mr. Crick, economic 
adviser to the Midland Bank; Sir Frederick Leggett.. a former 
Ministry of Labour conciliator; Herbert Morrison, and Major 
Manning ham-Buller, a Conservative MP.. on the British side and 
judge Joseph Hutcheson; Ambassador Phillips, Professor Aydelotte; 
Mr. Buxton .a journalist; Dr. MacDonald, onetime High 
commissioner for Refugees for the League of Nations and a lawyer, 
Bartley Crum, on the American side. Sir Harold Beeley was 
appointed Secretary. 
The Committee commenced its work without delay and the enquiry 
opened in Washington. Some members of the British team allegedly 
"felt annoyance and suspicion" that they were to be subjected from 
the outset to the "full blast of Zionist propaganda". (58) Yet 
Crossman recorded that even some of the American members of the 
Committee were shocked by the "totalitarian claims" advanced by the 
American Zionists. (59) The American Zionists, of course, outlined 
the sentiments contained in the Biltmore Programme in strong, 
unequivocal terms. (60) When the Committee arrived in Britain in 
January 1946 for the London hearings an early witness was Nathan 
Jackson of Poale Zion. He argued that Jewish needs demanded a 
Jewish State "whether you call it that or not. " When he was pressed 
by Crossman on the question of Jewish 'double nationality', i. e. the 
double claim of some Zionists to demand the concession of Palestine 
to Jewry as a National Home whilst simultaneously requiring separate 
and exclusive rights within their own Gentile homelands, he replied 
that it was imperative that the Jews had a Jewish State. With 
regard to the question of the Arab population, Jackson made the 
hackneyed response: "There are wide dominions in which the Arabs 
can live in safety and happiness, not so the Jews. "(61) 
It was during the London hearings that Bevin entertained members 
of the Committee at the Dorchester Hotel. Several members of the 
Committee including Crossman were to claim that Bevin, in an 
impromptu speech, promised to do all he could to implement a 
unanimous report. (62) Crossman noted in his diary: "This cheered 
the Americans and will,, when we come to drafting the Report, make 
unanimity seem worthwhile. 11(63) Yet according to Creech-Jones, 
"a 
doubt lingered in the minds of some of us present at the lunch 
whether EB had slipped into some polite pleasantries. Would he 
really accept a report which would further inflame the passions 
already aroused in the Middle East? Would he be party to opening 
the gates of Palestine to solve the problem of European 
refugees? 11 (64) 
However, Crossman took Bevin at his word and reported: "At 
Lausanne, there was a deadlock because the orthodox British., eg, 
Singleton and Leggett would not agree to grant concessions to the 
Jews until they curbed the terrorists. " Apparently, Crossman 
managed to find a colleague to slip the word to Singleton that "Ernie 
wanted a unanimous report and the two sticklers, Singleton and 
Leggett, capitulated. " When the truth came out Crossman "got into 
bad odour. "(65) 
The procedural arrangements of the Committee could be open to 
criticism particularly at times when the terms of reference appear to 
have been contravened. The terms of reference had mentioned the 
examination of the 'political, economic and social conditions in 
Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and 
settlement' before the examination of the position of the Jewish 
refugees in Europe. However, the Committee decided that after the 
conclusion of the hearings in London it would immediately depart for 
Europe in order to study the refugee problem in advance of its visit 
to Palestine and the Middle East. By changing the sequence of their 
instructions the members of the Committee exposed themselves to the 
powerful impact of the plight of European Jewry which, Sir Harold 
Beeley reported made 11 ... a deep impression on them. "(66) 
After viewing the assembly centres in Germany and Austria where 
Jewish survivors tived in hope that they would one day be able to 
start a new life in Eretz Israel (Palestine), Bartley Crum, the 
American lawyer, wanted to issue an interim report which would 
recommend the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine, (67) 
although his colleagues rejected this proposal as premature. Crum, 
however., felt so strongly about the issue that he threatened to 
resign from the Committee and maintains that he was ultimately only 
mollified by a message from President Truman requesting that no 
interim report or recommendations be produced. (68) Interestingly, 
Truman disputed this story when interviewed at a News Conference 
in March 1946. Upon being told that reports suggested he had 
personallly intervened to prevent Crum from resigning, the President 
replied: "That's the first I have heard of it. 
No communication like that between Mr. Crum and me. 
"(69) This 
episode is certainly curious and clearly one or other party was not 
being truthful, the question of course is which. It is possible that 
Truman did intervene but did not want it to be publicly known for 
fear of being accused of meddling. 
The Committee's next stop was Cairo where representatives of the 
Arab League were to present their views. They stated, predictably, 
that "the Zionists had no rights in Palestine beyond those of a 
minority within an independent Arab S ta te, 11 (7 0) and these 
statements were re-affirmed by the evidence submitted by the Arab 
office to the Committee when it moved on to Jerusalem. Jamal 
Husseini, Vice-Chairman of the re-established Arab Higher Committee 
presented the Arab case and stressed that "The whole Arab people 
is unalterably opposed to the attempt to impose Jewish immigration 
and settlement upon it, and ultimately to establish a Jewish state in 
Palestine. " In outlining the Arab argument Husseini essentially 
reiterated the views which had been presented to the Peel 
Commission nearly ten years' previously. The Arabs feared that if 
"Zionism succeeds in its aim, the Arabs will become a minority in 
their own country, a minority which can hope for no more than a 
minor share in the government, for the state would be a Jewish 
state. Husseini recalled the investigations of the Woodhead 
Commission which had shown that there ".. were grave practical 
difficulties in the way of partition; " in that "commerce would be 
strangled, communications dislocated and ... it would be impossible to 
devise frontiers which did not leave a large Arab minority in the 
Jewish state. "This minority", he asserted, "would not willingly 
accept its subjection to the Zionists and would not allow itself to be 
transferred to the Arab State. " In many ways the Arabs understood 
the aspirations of the Zionists, particularly under the leadership of 
Ben-Gurion: "It cannot be too often repeated that Zionism is a 
political movement aiming at the domination of the whole of Palestine, 
to give it a foothold in part of Palestine would be to encourage 
it to 
press for more and to provide it with a base for its activities. 
11(71) 
Yet it was Sir Alan Cunningham's view, the newly appointed 
High 
Commissioner in Palestine,, that even in his own short experience of 
the problem it was clear to him that "these Arabs we are 
dealing 
with will not give an independent view other than extremist, and 
the 
Jewish Agency have been completely uncooperative. 11(72) 
The Committee finally interviewed members of the Jewish Agency in 
March 1946. Weizmann was excluded from the Hearings. He 
complained bitterly to Sir Alan Cunningham that the "Committee had 
made no attempt to contact him personally in spite of the fact that 
Oliver Stanley had written a special letter to Judge Singleton on this 
question. "(73) The Committee took the legitimate opinion, and against 
the unwarranted views of Oliver Stanley, that Weizmann was no 
longer representative of the Jewish Agency and it, therefore, 
concentrated attention on David Ben-Gurion which, in the event, 
proved to be unsatisfactory. Ben-Gurion conducted several 
interviews with the Chairman of the Committee which resulted in 
Singleton commenting that the Zionist leader had displayed "an 
apparent lack of candour. 11 During a long session of the topic of the 
Haganah,, Ben-Gurion singularly refused to answer the questions 
directly - He played on the fact that in Hebrew the word Haganah 
meant defence and categorically stated that there "is no such 
organisation bearing that name, although there are many defence 
organisations... 11 When pressed about the role of the Jewish Agency 
in controlling these organisations he stated obtusely that the Agency 
"with defence we have to do., with an organisation called Haganah, 
no. "(74) The interview continued in this confusing manner and it 
soon became apparent that Ben-Gurion's appearances before the 
Committee had proved to be less than auspicious. There is no 
account of this episode in Ben-Gurion's biography. 
Before leaving the Middle East the Committee received a report from 
the Chiefs of Staff on the military implications of maintaining law and 
order in Palestine. It stated that "In the event of Arab antagonism 
to the solution adopted in Palestine the whole of the Middle East 
would be seriously affected and in consequence violent disorders 
might well occur. Furthermore, the alienation of the Arab states 
would have, for both the USA and GB, far reaching economic and 
Political consequences. " The report's concluding points made clear 
the fact that "Either the Jews or the Arabs are capable of producing 
a serious situation in Palestine., " and pondered upon the possible 
recommendations the Committee could make: "A solution which is 
acceptable to the Arabs but not acceptable to the Jews would 
produce a serious situation in Palestine, but the military problems 
involved would be largely confined to that country. A solution 
acceptable to the Jews but not to the Arabs would, in addition to 
creating serious disturbances in Palestine,, spread the trouble 
to 
other Arab countries. A compromise solution which gained the 
support of a majority of both Jews and Arabs would be the only one 
that could result in a reduced military commitment. "However. " the 
report cautioned, "a compromise which failed to satisfy either Jews 
or Arabs might well result in a heavier and more protracted military 
commitment than any other solution. "(75) 
With this salutory reminder of the difficulties of their task in mind, 
the Committee members left Palestine on the 27th March for Lausanne 
where they attempted to draw up a compromise solution. Crossman 
remembered "After a good deal of wrangling we ... reached our first 
agreement, namely, that both a Jewish State in the whole of 
Palestine and Arab state in the whole of Palestine were injustices 
which must be unequivocally ruled out. "(76) The Report was 
unanimously signed on the 19th April and its recommendations were a 
clear compromise. The Report attempted to balance the views of the 
various parties to the dispute. It recommended the immediate issue 
of 100,000 immigration certificates for Jewish refugees, but rejected 
the idea of either a Jewish or an Arab state in favour of a 
trusteeship. Immigration, however, was not to prejudice the rights 
of other sections of the population and the ban on the employment of 
Arabs in Jewish enterprises should be abolished. The Report 
stressed that Arab economic and educational advancement should be 
encouraged to match that of the Jews and finally, it aimed to make it 
quite clear and "... beyond all doubt to both Jews and Arabs that 
any attempt from either side, by threats of violence, by terrorism, 
or by the organisation or use of illegal armies to prevent its 
execution, will be resolutely suppressed... The Jewish Agency 
should at once resume active co-operation with the Mandatory Power 
in the suppression of terrorism and of illegal immigration and in the 
maintenance of law and order throughout Palestine. 11(77) 
Despite the apparent unanimity of the Report, barely a week after it 
had been issued, Wilfred Crick, a member of the Committee sent a 
letter to Ernest Bevin outlining his thoughts on the findings. He 
wrote somewhat revealingly: "... it will doubtless have occurred to 
you that in order to achieve unanimity, as well as to avoid inflaming 
an already delicate situation some things have been omitted-" He 
went on to suggest that in his opinion the Jewish Agency should 
be 
more effectively controlled and should one day be disbanded, and 
that an 'independent' Advisory committee should be appointed 
to 
supervise any immigration. (78) Doubts' perhaps understandably, 
have been raised as to the efficacy of the Committee. Baffy Dugdale 
certainly had reservations: "I do not believe this Committee are 
sufficiently heavyweight to cut much ice, whatever they report, "(79) 
she remarked at the beginning of their investigations, whilst Sir 
Harold Beeley considered the Committee to be "not totally objective 
because two of the American members were strongly and inpenetrably 
biased from the outset. "(80) Zionists, on the other hand, thought 
that Judge Singleton and Sir Harold Beeley were biased against the 
Jews - (81) 
Nevertheless, the Report was immediately perused by members of the 
Foreign Office who stated that "the adoption of the policy advocated 
in the Report would have disastrous effects on our position in the 
Middle East. "(82) Whilst these deliberations had been taking place a 
renewed outburst of terrorist attacks occurred in Palestine. 
Violence had temporarily abated during the investigations of the 
Anglo-American Committee because of the "desire of both Jews and 
Arabs to avoid prejudicing their cases. "(83) However, on the 25th 
April the Irgun gang attacked a military car park in Tel Aviv which 
resulted in the death of seven British soldiers, (84) and the climate 
of opinion in London began to turn against the recommendations of 
the Committee. 
On the 26th April at the Peace Conference in Paris and four days 
before the Report was to be published, Bevin informed the American 
Secretary of State, James Byrnes, that "we are prepared to accept 
the figure of 100,000 Jewish refugees, but only on certain 
conditions. In the first place it must be clear that immigration must 
not start until disarmament of the Jews had taken place. " Bevin 
confided to Byrnes that he ".. must understand how distasteful 
Britain found it, having to keep four divisions in Palestine in order 
to carry out a thankless task. "(85) However, Bevin was to suffer a 
sharp disappointment when a few days later President Truman issued 
a statement welcoming the Report's publication and placing every 
emphasis on the need to admit the 100,000 refugees: 
"The 
transference of these unfortunate people should now be accomplished 
with the greatest dispatch"; whilst the other recommendations 
he 
considered were "questions of long-range political policies and 
international law which require careful study and which I will 
take 
under advisement. 11(86) 
According to Francis Williams, the President's statement "threw Bevin 
into one of the blackest rages I ever saw him in. "(87) The Foreign 
Secretary had been under the impression that the United States had 
agreed to co-operate with Britain over Palestine, but now the 
President was making public demands, without conducting any 
discussions with the British Goverment. Bevin immediately wrote a 
letter to Byrnes: "I confess that the issue., without consultation, of 
the statement on Palestine of which you sent me the text last night, 
seems likely to give rise to grave difficulties. I must remind you 
that in Palestine British soldiers have been foully murdered by the 
armed forces of the Jews. It is a situation which the British people 
will no longer tolerate. " Bevin went on to stress that the liquidation 
of these private armies was essential both to make possible the entry 
of the 100"000, "to which the US statement attaches such 
importance, " and to prevent a collapse of security in the Middle 
East. The Foreign Secretary was sure, he stated, that the United 
States must "realise-this necessity. "(88) 
Prior to President Truman's statement, Bevin had opted for a 
solution of the issue along the general lines of the Committee's 
Report, and declared as much in Cabinet: " ... if the situation were 
skillfully handled in consultation with the US Government it might be 
possible to bring about a reasonable settlement on the basis of the 
Committee's recommendations. 11(89) However, the crucial factor in 
Bevin's objective was American co-operation and this consideration 
had been uppermost in his mind when he suggested the formation of 
an Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry. His plan, however, had 
badly misfired. 
On lst May in the House of Commons, Clement Attlee articulated the 
Government's displeasure with the United States by deprecating the 
President's selective attitude towards the Committee's 
recommendations; Attlee asserted that he wished to know the extent 
to which America would share in the additional military and financial 
responsibilities of implementing them and he declared that the 
Government could not admit so large a body of immigrants as the 
100,000 underwritten by President Truman, and adopted by the 
Committee "unless and until illegal armies in Palestine had been 
disbanded and their arms surrendered. Jews and Arabs in Palestine 
alike, " the Prime Minister urged, "must disarm immediately and the 
Jewish Agency must take a positive part in the suppression of the 
recent violent attacks on British installations and lives. "(90) 
The British Government fully acknowledged that if the 
recommendations of the Committee were to be implemented a 
substantial financial and military commitment would be required of 
the United States and in a long memorandum to the American 
Secretary of State, Bevin outlined Britain's case. The Foreign 
Secretary estimated the level of expenditure to be "around the level 
of L70,000,000 immediately, increasing to L125,000,000 over a period 
of 10 years. " Apart from the question of finance was the necessary 
military burden, which according to the memorandum, "is more 
important, " because "the implementation of the report would cause 
serious repercussions throughout the Arab world involving additional 
military commitments which the British Government could not 
undertake alone in present circumstances. " It was, therefore, 
essential 11 ... before any decision is taken as to whether the report 
should be put into force or not, the British Government knows what 
assistance they can count on obtaining from the US Government. 11(91) 
The response from the United States again proved to be a bitter 
disappointment to the British Government. Whilst America acceded 
some financial backing it categorically refused to assist militarily, 
arguing that it was believed "the implementation of the report by 
force would prejudice British and US interests in much of the Middle 
East and British and US influence would consequently be curtailed. " 
The Memorandum pointed to economic considerations: "Of greater 
significance is the control of oil in the Middle East. This is 
probably the one large undeveloped reserve in a world which may 
come to the limits of its oil resources within this generation.... 11 
Therefore, it was stated that the United States would not commit 
armed forces or "orient the people of the Middle East away from the 
Western Powers, " as America had a vital security interest in the 
area. (92) 
The American Government seemed to perversely ignore the realities 
of the situation in Palestine. It was clear that the Arabs would 
reject any large scale Jewish immigration and obviously by implication 
such a policy, if adopted, would have to be enforced. By pointing 
to the economic and strategic aspects of the Middle East,, 
the 
memorandum only served to highlight the immense difficulties 
confronting the British Government. 
A few weeks after the exchange of these memoranda, the British 
Ambassador in America informed Bevin: "I had a short talk with 
Byrnes about Palestine yesterday and it was quite apparent that, 
despite all we have said, he takes for granted the admission of 
100,000 as an immediate step.... He was alive to our difficulties, 
but wants you to know that he was under very strong pressure from 
Congress and outside it. "(93) Bevin in his eagerness to forge an 
association with the United States over the question of Palestine had 
underplayed the impact of the powerful Jewish lobby in American 
politics - 
The general feeling among the British Chiefs of Staff was that the 
Report had been the result of a misjudgement. In a letter to the 
High Commissioner in Palestine it was stated: "None of us who know 
anything about the Middle East can understand the Anglo-American 
report. It must have been the last straw for you and seems fairly 
to have upset the applecart, "(94) and if one accepts the reports of 
Richard Crossman, these sentiments were shared by the Prime 
Minister. According to Crossman, Attlee severely reprimanded him: 
"I'm disappointed in you Dick. The Report is grossly unfair to 
Britain. You've let us down by giving way to the Jews and the 
Americans. 11 (9 5) 4 
That both the findings of the Anglo-American Committee and the 
British and American responses had exacerbated an already fraught 
situation in Palestine was evidenced in a letter from the High 
Commissioner to Sir John Martin, the Deputy Under-Secretary at the 
Colonial Office. Cunningham reported that "Jamal Husseini with the 
backing of at least 13 of the Arab Higher Committee is being most 
active in trying to arouse the political ardour of the local Arabs and 
in enlisting the sympathies of not only the adjacent Arab States, but 
also of any other countries whom they think may be sympathetic to 
their cause. As for the Jews the Prime Minister's statement 
has 
plunged them into gloom and they are now suspicious and 
morose. 11 (9 6) 
The response of the Labour Party to the government's 
handling of 
the Report was critical and Tribune condemned Attlee's attitude as 
"equivocal and obscure" and voiced doubt as to whether 
British 
strategy in the Middle East would be threatened by the admission 
of 
100,000 refugees. (97) However, criticism from this quarter 
was not 
totally unexpected as Jon Kimche, a Zionist, was joint editor of the 
paper and contributed many articles on Palestine. 
An aspect which was more worrying for the Government was the 
union between James Middleton, the former Party Secretary, David 
Grenfell and several former Conservative Ministers with the aim of 
urging the Government to accept the findings of the Report and to 
institute " swift action to relieve the sufferings of Jewish 
survivors. "(98) On 8th June a large demonstration took place in 
Trafalgar Square to protest against Government policy and included 
the Labour MPs, Sidney Silverman, Ian Mikardo and Barbara Xyrton 
Gould. (99) 
A House of Commons debate on the issue on lst July proved to be 
impassioned. Attlee and Bevin were criticised by backbenchers, 
Michael Foot, Crossman, Barnet Janner, Silverman and Ayrton Gould 
for their attempts to quell Jewish terrorism by a military operation. 
The Government was attacked for "seeking to reimpose the White 
Paper upon the Jewish community and in trying to disarm the 
Haganah which would only undermine the position of moderate 
Zionists. " Silverman argued that "there is only one way of smashing 
the resistance movement (in Palestine) and that is to liberate it by 
smashing the conditions out of which it has grown. "(100) 
Although these declarations had no impact on the direction of 
Government policy and whilst fully recognising that it was not 
unnatural that Zionist supporting MPs would demur at a policy so 
clearly at odds with the sentiments contained in previous Labour 
Party resolutions, it soon becomes clear that the whole episode 
proved an unedifying and embarrassing one for the British 
Government in general and for Ernest Bevin in particular. if 
anything the problem of Palestine appeared more acute than it had 
when Laobur entered office: not only were there still the difficulties 
of European refugees, the intransigence of the Arab and Jewish 
positions and the renewed acts of violence within Palestine itself, but 
also, and more importantly, the Anglo-American Committee's 
findings 
had actually served to sour the relationship between the British and 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION 
The Attempt to 'Pick up the Pieces' 
The uneasy relationship which had developed between the United 
States and Britain over the contentious issue of Palestine was to be 
exacerbated by the Labour Party Annual Conference. The Party met 
for its usual yearly gathering in June 1946 and on this occasion the 
question of Palestine was raised. Harold Laski in his capacity as 
Chairman., urged during his opening address, that Jewish refugees 
should not become "the victims of hesitancy or timidity in Downing 
Street", but should be immediately permitted to enter Palestine. He 
continued with a particularly barbed comment presumably aimed at 
Ernest Bevin, "A British Statesman who sacrifices the Jews who 
escaped from the tortures of Hitler to the Arab leaders does not 
understand the elementary principles of the socialism he 
professes. 11(l) Harold Laski's position had hardened in the eight 
month interval since informing Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin that 
his representations to them on behalf of Poale Zion "implied no 
criticism of the Government". (2) and the scene now appeared to be 
set for an acrimonious debate as the Party attempted to distance 
itself from the Government. 
Two days later a composite resolution was moved by Nathan Jackson 
of Poale Zion which called for immediate action to remove barriers to 
immigration and land purchase, and which quoted once again the 
Party's war-time declaration. Jackson urged the Party to "Stand by 
a 30 year tradition" and his seconder, Victor Mishcon, addressed 
himself to Ernest Bevin: "The Jewish people have looked to you. 
For years in the Trade Union Movement you championed the cause of 
the oppressed, and expediency was never your shield. You have 
risen to your exalted position upon a reputation in the movement of 
integrity and fairness. Do not hesitate to do what is right 
now.. . 11 (3) 
Richard Crossman's contribution was curiously ambiguous. Whilst 
referring to his participation in the 'impartial' Committee of Enquiry 
and stressing that its findings had confirmed the "Party line which 
has been held for 30 years, " he then proceeded to outline in stark 
contrast to the Party Declaration of 1944 the reasons why a Jewish 
state in Palestine was unviable. He asked delegates to consider 
whether "a Jewish State is the right way to achieve the freedom, 
liberty and equality of the Arab and Jew in Palestine" and 
maintained that it "would not help a delicate situation. " 
Bevin's response was characteristically uncompromising and he 
confronted the assembly by asserting: "Now, do you want a 
settlement of this problem? If you do,, then I would suggest to you 
that you leave the matter where it is after I have explained what has 
happened-" Bevin went on to discuss the existence within Palestine 
of illegal armed forces and argued that "If we put 100,000 Jews into 
Palestine tomorrow, I would have to put another division of British 
troops out there. I am not prepared to do it. 11 After outlining the 
financial costs involved in the problem he stated: "The famous 
Palestine Mandate leaves me with a feeling that it is so drawn that it 
can be argued both ways.... It is a promise to two people. While I 
agree with a Palestine state of some kind I do not believe in absolute 
exclusive racial states. " He then turned to the role of the United 
States and made an aside which was to prove deeply embarrassing in 
his future negotiations with the American Government: "There has 
been agitation in the United States, and particularly in New York, 
for 100,000 Jews to be put into Palestine. I hope I will not be 
misunderstood in America if I say that this was proposed with the 
purest of motives. They did not want too many Jews in New 
York. "(4) Bevins? speech was effective within the context of 
Conference and sensing that Poale Zion's resolution would face 
defeat, Nathan Jackson withdrew it "in view of the Foreign 
Secretary's appeal to us ... 11(5) However, 
Bevin's remark was not well 
received on the other side of the Atlantic. 
According to a cable from Sir Archibald Inverchapel, Britain's 
Ambassador in the the United States, Bevin's comment had a 
"devastating effect throughout America, " and he immediately 
informed 
the Foreign Secretary that "Your criticism of New York has, of 
course,, not only hit the nail of the head but 
driven it woundingly 
deep. "(6) It had also, the Ambassador explained, advertised 
"British-American discord". The Foreign Secretary, failing to 
be 
contrite, replied to Inverchapel "It seems that 
judgements have been 
formed on a few sentences of my speech torn from their context, 11 
and offered to send the full text of his Conference address to 
Congress members - (7) In attempting to cool the situation., 
InverchaPel asked Bevin to reassure not only Washington but also 
President Truman, whom he considered had been personally slighted, 
by issuing a statement to the effect that "Britain had not prejudged 
the question of admitting the 100,000.11(8) Bevin remained 
unconvinced "I am not sure that this is a wise thing to do. I am 
getting upset with this Jewish agitation. We have made out position 
clear. "(9) The position, in fact, was that both the British and 
American Governments were committed to a joint study of the 
implications of the Anglo American Report. 
It was during this period that a correspondence developed between 
President Truman and the King of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud 
, expressed alarm at the President's statement regarding Jewish 
immigration into Palestine and asserted: "In my desire to safeguard 
and strengthen in every way possible the friendship which binds our 
two countries together ... I reiterate my feelings when this friendship 
is endangered. " He then explained how "the Jews are only 
aggressors seeking to perpetuate a monstrous injustice, at the 
beginning, speaking in the name of humanitarianism, but later openly 
proclaiming their aggressiveness by force and violence, " and 
concluded by urging the President to reconsider his "announcement 
in support of the Jews in Palestine and its demand that floodgates of 
immigration be opened in such a way as to alter the basic situation 
in Palestine. 1100) 
Truman, in reply, stated that he was mindful of the Arab case but 
emphasised that the American Government had given "assurances that 
it would not take any action which might prove hostile to the Arab 
people" and that no decision would be reached with regard to the 
basic situation in Palestine "without prior consultation with both 
Arabs and Jews. " However, somewhat incongruously, conceivably 
deliberately so, he argued that: "I do not consider that my urging 
of the admittance of a considerable number of displaced Jews into 
Palestine or my statements with regard to the solution of the problem 
in any sense represent an action hostile to the Arab people. 
" He 
went on to stress his "anxiety to do all that I can to aid 
in the 
matter" and assured Ibn Saud that "the government and people of 
the United States are continuing to be solicitous of the interests and 
welfare of the Arabs. 11 (11) 
Despite Truman's simplistic appraisal of the implications of his 
statements on Palestine it would clearly be unwise to consider him 
ignorant of the nuances of the affair. He was well briefed by his 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Co-Ordinating Committee 
of the strategic importance of maintaining a pro-Western bias in the 
Middle Eastern theatre. In a memorandum from the Chiefs of Staff it 
was argued that 11 ... if the peoples of the Middle East turn to 
Russia,, this would have the same impact in many respects as would a 
military conquest of this area by the Soviets. "(12) It would not, 
therefore,, be unreasonable to interpret Truman's response to Ibn 
Saud as a bid to placate an influential Arab leader and to project an 
image of the American Government as something akin to an honest 
broker. It could also be seen that in claiming to be a dispassionate 
observer the United States was distancing itself from the British 
Government who, in its Mandatory role, was so obviously and 
profoundly embroiled in the issue. 
Towards the end of June Britain's attitude shifted even further 
against the question of immigration into Palestine. The renewed 
series of attacks on British soldiers by Zionist terrorists served to 
strengthen the Government's resolve to make Jewish immigration into 
Palestine conditional on the cessation of violence. The High 
Commissioner., Sir Alan Cunningham stressed that all negotiations on 
the admission of 100,000 Jews be suspended until terrorism was 
curbed and that he be given authority to implement locally, at his 
discretion., action against the illegal Jewish organisations and the 
Jewish Agency. (13) Further deputations were made to the British 
Government on the question of Jewish violence by General Evelyn 
Barker, the Military Commander in Palestine who, in a letter to 
Ernest Bevin, outlined the urgency of controlling the Irgun and the 
Stern Gang. However, although Barker argued that "... it is 
essential that we get rid of the extremists now, whether more 
outbreaks occur or not,, " he reminded the Foreign Secretary that 
".... it is impossible perpetually to subjugate a country by force, 
especially a virile and intelligent people like the Jews. The ultimate 
solution must depend on a satisfactory political answer. "(14) This 
was clearly sound advice yet Bevin still desired American 
co-operation in achieving some form of political settlement. 
When the matter came to be discussed in Cabinet it was generally 
agreed that it would be unwise to break off negotiations with the 
United States on the question of Jewish immigration. Enrest Bevin 
persisted in the belief that although "strong action" was required to 
contain Jewish terrorism "the importance of securing the support of 
the United States for this" was paramount. 05) The Cabinet decided 
to take a determined stand by suppressing the illegal organisations. 
it was agreed that the offices of the Jewish Agency would be raided 
as there existed suspicions as to the relationship between the 
Agency and the Haganah. On 29th June 1946, military and police 
forces occupied buildings in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, including the 
Jewish Agency, arrested 2000 people and seized large quantities of 
documents which revealed the close connection between the two 
organisations. 06) Interestingly, and certainly reflective of Britain's 
distrust of American reaction, it was agreed at the Cabinet meeting 
of the 20th June, to notify the United States Government, at the last 
minute, of Britain's intentions. As such., Truman was notified only 
hours before the raid took place. 
Attlee sent a cable to Truman at 1.15 am on 29th June informing him 
that: "In view of the continuance of terrorist activities in Palestine, 
culminating in the recent kidnappings of six British officers, HMG 
have come to the conclusion that drastic action can no longer be 
postponed. It is proposed to raid the Jewish Agency and to occupy 
it for a period necessary to search for incriminating documents. 1107) 
Truman revealed publicly in a Press Release from the White House 
that he very much regretted these developments. (18) it is difficult to 
assess whether these were the President's own sentiments or 
whether, in fact, his views had been coloured by the conversation 
he conducted with representatives of the Jewish Agency just prior to 
the Press Release. In any event, it served to exacerbate the 
growing uncertainty as to the possibility of Britain acting in concert 
with the United States on the question of Palestine. 
The worsening situation in Palestine convinced the 
British 
Government that a way would have to be found of circumventing 
the 
recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee and, as such, on 
Ilth July the Cabinet considered yet another long-term policy 
for the 
area. The Colonial Secretary, George Hall, presented 
his Cabinet 
colleagues with a paper arguing that "the recommendations of 
the 
Anglo-American Committee were unworkable" . and pointed to the 
arguments of British representatives in the Middle East who advised 
that "the adoption of this policy would have a disastrous effect on 
Britain's policy in the region ... whilst the Arab peoples would be 
made more easily accessible to Russian propaganda and 
influence. 1109) Sir Hugh Stonehewer- Bird. the British Ambassador in 
Iraq had informed Ernest Bevin four months' previously that "there 
is strong evidence of an underground Communist party in this 
country ... and it has now reached a level at which it can no longer 
be either ignored or suppressed. Evidence suggests that the Army 
has been affected by Communist ideas... 11(20) 
According to the Chiefs of Staff the implementation of the Report 
together with the suppression of the illegal armies in Palestine would 
"necessitate reinforcement by two infantry divisions, one on the spot 
and one at short call, an armoured brigade and three infantry 
battalions, together with some additions to naval and air forces. " 
The necessary army reinforcements could not be found in Britain, 
".. save at the expense of withdrawing from other commitments from 
which, in fact, withdrawal is not possible. "(21) 
Hall's proposal that two semi-autonomous provinces should be created 
in Palestine, one Jewish the other Arab, operating under a central 
trustee government, with the way left open for partition into two 
independent states or towards partnership in a federal constitution 
was not a novel idea but rather... "a contingency plan which had 
existed in the Colonial Office for some time. "(22) In Cabinet there 
was agreement that the report of the Anglo-American Committee 
offered no solution to the problems in Palestine and Lord Tedder, 
the Chief of Air Staff made a timely reminder to Cabinet members 
that "whatever constitutional solutions were found, Britain's strategic 
needs in the Middle East., particularly with regard to communications 
and oil supplies, depended on the good will of the Arabs. " It was 
decided, therefore, that a team of senior American officials should be 
invited to attend a conference in London, headed by Sir Norman 
Brook,, the Secretary to the Cabinet., in order to discuss the 
Anglo-American report. Although it was considered "unwise 
to 
reject the Report immediately in the forthcoming discussions with 
the 
United States, " there was agreement that an "appropriate moment" 
should be found for bringing this alternative plan to 
their 
attention. (23) 
The tactics agreed upon by the Cabinet proved successful at the 
London Conference which opened on 19th July and the American 
deputation headed by Henry F. Grady appeared to favour the 
proposals previously outlined by the Colonial Secretary. As such, 
the plan which was later to become known as the Morrison-Grady 
Plan, was a policy of provincial autonomy in which Palestine would 
be divided into two partially self-governing Arab and Jewish 
provinces with an overall central government. The Mandatory Power 
would maintain direct jurisdiction over Jerusalem and the Negev. (24) 
However, a dramatic event which occurred in Palestine two days 
after the London Conference emphasised the urgency of not only 
discussing a solution to the problem but, more importantly, of 
enacting one . 
On 22nd July the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, a wing of which 
was used as British army headquarters, was blown up and 
ninety-one people were killed. The Irgun gang, under the 
leadership of Menachen Begin claimed responsibility. This action 
provoked a sense of outrage both within the Government in London 
and the British Administration in Palestine. Sir Alan Cunningham, 
the High Commissioner, advised that ".. only two alternatives were 
now open to the British: either to institute widespread searches for 
arms with a view to breaking up the Jewish resistance movements, 
which would create conditions tantamount to a state of war; or the 
British government could announce a final solution to the political 
problems and impose it themselves - 11(25) 
The Cabinet met on 23rd July to discuss the attack and to consider 
Cunningham's statement. Attlee argued that "It would be a mistake 
to rush into a widespread search for arms, which would be taken as 
a measure directed against all the Jews in Palestine and might have 
the effect of alienating all sections of Jewish opinion. " On the other 
hand, he considered it would 11 .... equally be a mistake 
for HMG to 
take a sudden decision on the political problem. " In his opinion, the 
right course was to press on with "Anglo-American conversations and 
to seek an early agreement with the United States government on a 
long-term policy. " If such an agreement could be reached, 
he 
maintained, "We should announce our joint policy and try to rally 
the 
support of world opinion in favour of its adoption. 
"(26) Ernest 
Bevin, George Hall and other members of the Cabinet agreed with 
the views expressed by the Prime Minister. The meeting concluded 
on a note of optimism as it was felt that the discussions at the 
London Conference had gone well and it seemed probable that 
conclusions on the principles of a settlement could be formulated 
very soon. The United States delegation hoped to be able to obtain 
approval of their Government to the proposals outlined at the 
Conference and there existed the collective belief that a solution to 
the problem was in sight. 
When Attlee and Bevin met the American Secretary of State at the 
Peace Conference in Paris on 28th July there seemed further cause 
for optimism. James Byrnes agreed to recommend to the President 
public acceptance of the Morrison-Grady Plan as a basis for a 
solution. (27) Three days later the Plan was announced in the House 
of Commons by the Lord President of the Council, Herbert Morrison, 
as a viable alternative to the recommendations of the Anglo-American 
Committee of Enquiry. 
Whilst Morrison urged the assembly to accept that "His Majesty's 
Government believe that these recommendations represent the best 
line of advance towards a solution of the problem in that this plan 
provides as fair and reasonable a compromise between the claims of 
Arab and Jew as it is possible to devise and that it offers the best 
prospect of reconciling the conflicting interests of the two 
communities, " he emphasised the need for American acquiescence of 
the proposal: "The full implentation of the expert's plan as a whole 
depends on United States co-operation. I hope that will be 
forthcoming. " He went on to state that "we had hoped before the 
Debate to receive from President Truman his acceptance, but we 
understand that he has decided, in view of the complexity of the 
matter to discuss it in detail with the United States expert delegation 
who are returning to Washington for the purpose. The President is 
thus giving further consideration to the matter,, and we hope to hear 
from him in due course. "(28) 
During the Debate,, however, Morrison spoke of the King David Hotel 
bombing in harsh and emotive terms: "The curse of Hitler is not yet 
fully removed some of his victims fleeing from the ravaged ghettoes 
of Europe have carried with them the germs of those very plagues 
from which they sought escape - intolerance, racial pride, 
intimidation, terrorism and the worship of force... The world is 
weary of this senseless strife of Jew and Arab and sickened 
by its 
barbarous incidents. 11 This speech served as a salutory reminder to 
Zionist sympathisers on the backbenches that violence was taking a 
strong grip in Palestine and events were far more serious than had 
been realised. 
Oliver Stanley, the Opposition's spokesman on Colonial Affairs, was 
scathing: "Today, for the first time for 12 months we have some idea 
of the Government's long term policy in Palestine. Who would have 
believed, after hearing some of the declarations given during the 
Election that we should have to wait 12 months for a declaration of 
policy... Anyone reading those declarations would have been 
justified in believing that they were made by people who had made 
up their minds, who knew what they were going to do. The fact 
that they were made by right hon Gentlemen who were not in 
opposition but in Government who must have been presumed to know 
the difficulties and reactions and who must have been presumed to 
have discounted them in advance, must have strengthened the belief 
that the people who made those pledges in June 1945, would be in a 
position to announce a policy earlier than July 1946.11 Stanley was 
clearly striking a raw nerve and appositely continued with his attack 
on the Labour Administration: "I confess I had expected that we 
should spend most of our time during this Debate discussing the 
Report of the Anglo-American Palestine Committee. But as I 
understand from the Lord President's statement today, that Report is 
dead ... The Committee members.. came,, they saw, and it appears now 
that they have vanished. "(29) 
Although Stanley's first line of attack was fully justified, his 
criticism of the handling of the Anglo-American report was 
subsequently revealed to be an attempt to belabour the Government. 
In the second half of his seemingly circular speech he admitted that 
he".. did not think that the proposals of the Committee did, in fact, 
offer any permanent solution to the Palestine problem. Their report 
was in the nature of a compromise - But frankly it struck me as not 
a very good compromise, a compromise in which one side got all the 
action and the other side just got the words, 11 and in referring to 
the rejection of the Report he stated, "I am glad that the 
Government have taken that decision. " 
In a final attempt to square the circle, Stanley argued that 
he did 
not agree to a return to the White Paper policy of 
1939 on the 
grounds that "Jews and Arabs are further apart than they were in 
193911 and that it was idle to believe 11 ... one could look, in 
accordance with the White Paper, to the acquiescence of the Arabs in 
Jewish immigration into Palestine. " Furthermore, he was not 
enamoured of the present proposal before Parliament. Admittedly, it 
was not "a novel ideal' and Stanley was quite accurate when he 
argued that the plan "had been in the Colonial Office for some time. " 
He asserted that he had always regarded the scheme as "second 
best ... some step towards cantonisation, towards giving some separate 
life to Jews and Arab, but it is far from going the whole way. 1100) 
'Going the whole way' for Stanley meant partition but his views were 
not shared by members of his own party. In an Imperial Affairs 
Committee meeting held some days before the Palestine Debate in 
Parliament Stanley outlined the views which he was to reiterate in 
the House. He argued that under partition, sovereign states would 
be set up, the boundaries would be guaranteed by the UNOV which 
would have to step in if these boundaries were threatened, or if 
bloodshed broke out between Jewish and Arab States. " 
Recalling his days at the Colonial Office he maintained that "Each 
wave of Jewish immigration resulted in Arab resistance and British 
repression. " This was unacceptable as was "the Arab demand for 
complete cessation of Jewish immigration. " He doubted if there was 
any future for a bi-national State; "We have never ruled anywhere 
with such a lack of popular support, certainly not an advanced 
people such as the Jews, and even in recent years, the Arabs" 
partition, then "is the only line along which to proceed. "(31) Other 
members of the Committee, however, were less enthusiastic about the 
idea. R. Mannin gham- Buller, who had been a member of the 
Anglo-American Committee, argued that "partition was no answer, " 
whilst Major Legge-Bourke maintained that partition "would result 
in 
the Arabs turning to Russia, in which case we should be likely to 
support the Jews with the result that all hope of reconciliation with 
the Arabs would disappear. 11 Lord Hinchingbrooke reaffirmed 
that he 
would "stand by the 1939 White Paper" and favoured 
"facilitating the 
migration of the Jews back to Europe, regardless of 
American 
opinion. 11 Stanley eventually concluded the meeting 
by stating that 
with regard to the Palestine issue "the difficulty was 
that the Party 
was not unanimous. 1102) 
it must also be acknowledged that at this stage mounting concern 
was discernible among Labour MPs who were alarmed at the extent of 
Zionist violence and the casualties being inflicted on the British 
army - During the Debate in House on 31st July, S. N. Evans 
warned members that "for the first time in my experience ordinary, 
decent working men are talking in their pubs and clubs, at the 
barber's and at work, about the lot to which our lads are being 
subjected in Palestine at this moment. "(33) A resolution from Poale 
Zion condemning the arrest of Zionist leaders drew no response from 
the NEC and Harold Laski failed to persuade the National Council of 
Labour to register a protest at the direction of Government 
policy. (34) Nevertheless, in July 1946 Richard Crossman together 
with Michael Foot published a strong attack on the Government. 
Both Attlee and Bevin endeavoured to persuade Crossman to 
moderate his views but as Bevin later confessed: "nothing I can say 
will make (Crossman) alter his ideas about Palestine which derive 
from his lack of judgement and his intellectual arrogance. 11(35) 
However,, despite criticism of the Government at certain levels, 
Cabinet members, Dalton and Morrison,, were beginning to realise 
that "fishing in Bevin's territorial waters was particularly 
inexpedient. 11(36) Outside the Cabinet Arthur Creech-Jones, despite 
earlier promises that he would concern himself with all consultations 
regarding Palestine, now found that "I was too preoccupied with the 
other major tasks of the Colonial Office.. to follow as closely as I 
would have liked; and in any case questions of Palestine from the 
start of the Government were taken at top level. "(37) Whether, in 
fact, one judges Creech-Jones' statement as a form of apology for his 
ineffectuality in the matter, one cannot dispute Bevin's grip on 
policy, as indeed, Creech-Jones was to discover. He recalled 
speaking "to Silkin.. about helping us against the Bevin policy", and 
finding that "Bevin's hold on the Labour Party was too strong for 
him to do anything. "(38) 
In any case, as a result of Jewish terrorism in Palestine 
the general 
mood of the Laobur Party seemed to be shifing. In the words of 
Jon 
Kimche "a deep bitterness against all Palestinian Jews now prevailed 
even among the Ministers who had favoured Zionism. 
Anyone who 
was at that time in close touch with the Labour 
Movement and with 
its members in the Government could not 
fail to sense this 
transformation. "(39) Certainly, the possibility of Palestine 
becoming 
a Jewish State, as envisaged by Labour in 1944, was dismissed by 
Tribune as "such an extreme Jewish demand" which could no longer 
be justifted. (40) Even G. D. H. Cole succumbed to pragmatism, 
arguing that "although British commitments cannot honourably be 
evaded it is equally outside our power to help the Jews make 
Palestine a predominantly Jewish country at the cost of a head on 
conflict with the League of Arab states. "(41) 
The Jewish political factionalism within Palestine also had an impact 
on Poale Zion, who found it was suffering attacks from 'Revisionists' 
and 'General Zionists' for being affiliated to the 'untrustworthy' 
Labour Party-(42) The Zionist Review stated "Let us be quite clear 
as to what is the 'crime' that Poale Zion are accused of having 
committed. They obtained a pledge from the Labour Party when 
they were in opposition and now they, Poale Zion, are being held 
responsible for the non-honouring of the pledge by the Labour 
government. This ... misrepresentation would do credit to our 
enemies, not to our colleagues. 11 (43) 
Teddy Kollek, a member of Poale Zion raised doubts about the 
dependence of the organisation on the Labour Party's intentions and 
the trust it had placed in the Government to follow, as Labour 
Zionists saw it, the right course. Poale Zion he believed had 
"pinned its hopes on Creech-Jones and Labour ... it was obvious who 
the real leaders were, Ernest Bevin was not our friend and he did 
not pretend to be. -I found myself in sharp conflict with all 
the 
naive supporters of the Labour Party. "(44) 
Sargent argues that the British Zionist Movement failed at this time 
to "influence either the Labour Government or the Party"(45), and 
there is truth in this assertion. However, if it failed to 'influence' 
it could undoubtedly embarrass the Government, particularly as 
the 
Left of the Labour Party had taken up the Zionist cudgel, and were 
prepared to pursue it for what it was worth-(46) 
The second phase of the London Conference opened 
on 9th 
September 1946 and somewhat paradoxically was attended 
by no 
Palestinian delegates, neither Arab nor Jewish. The 
Jewish Agency 
had decided to reject the Morrison-Grady plan and not 
to take part 
in formal talks whilst their leaders continued 
to be detained. The 
Palestinian Arabs , on the other hand p declined to attend because of 
Britain's refusal to receive Haj Amin al-Husseini, who had returned 
to Palestine from exile and was once again leader of the Arab Higher 
Committee of Palestine. Of the Arab States only three sent 
delegates: Hafez Ramadan of Egypt, Faris el-Khoury of Syria and 
Nuri es-Said of Iraq, whilst Azzam Pasha represented the Arab 
League. The Conference began in a rather desultory manner. 
Ernest Bevin presented the Morrison-Grady Plan but was unable to 
convince the Arab representatives of the viability of the proposal. 
They believed that a system of provincial autonomy would inevitably 
lead to partition and that once there was a Jewish state in Palestine, 
however small, it would become a bridgehead for Jewish political and 
economic penetration of the whole area. The Jews, they argued, 
would fill their state with immigrants from Europe until such time 
that it would be possible to issue a claim for greater living space 
which would inevitably lead to expansion of their territory by 
force. (47) The Arabs proposed, somewhat predictably, the 
maintenance of a unitary Palestinian state with a legislature elected 
by all citizens, with Jewish representation being limited to one third. 
Under this system all Jewish immigration would cease and land 
restrictions would remain intact. A treaty would be signed under 
which Britain would receive military facilities. (48) 
Meanwhile, the Jewish Agency informed the British Government 
independently that whilst they would not participate in the 
Conference, they would be prepared to consider a solution which 
gave them a Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine. (49) Once 
again this renewed attempt at bi-partite negotiations seemed doomed 
to failure from the outset but on this occasion the precipitating 
factor in its demise was a statement made by President Truman and 
released to the Press on 4th October 1946. Truman mentioned the 
London Conference and the overtures being made by the British 
Government in an attempt to achieve some form of settlement. 
However, he went on to re-state Zionist demands: ".. the 
Jewish 
Agency has proposed a solution of the Palestine problem by means of 
the. creation of a viable Jewish state in control of its own 
immigration 
and economic policies.. It proposes furthermore 
the immediate 
issuance of certificates for 100,000 Jewish immigrants. 
" At this 
juncture the thrust of his argument became apparent and rendered 
him vulnerable to charges of "playing political 
tactics for the New 
York vote" in the Democratic Congressional campaign. 
(50) He argued 
that the Jewish Agency proposals had ".. received wide-spread 
attention in the United States, both in the press and in public 
forums. From the discussion which has ensued it is my belief that a 
solution along these lines would command the support of public 
opinion in the United States.. To such a solution our Government 
could give its support. " As such., he believed and urged that 
"substantial immigration into Palestine cannot await a solution to the 
Palestine problem and that it should begin at once. "(51) 
The Morrison-Grady Plan had effectively been discarded by the 
American President. Attlee was furious and accused Truman of 
frustrating the patient efforts "of a country which has the actual 
responsibility for the government of Palestine to achieve a 
settlement" and warned that the consequences of his pronouncement 
would be the "loss of still more lives in Palestine. 11(52) Bevin was 
incensed by Truman's statement and asserted in Cabinet that 
although he had "hoped for more satisfactory progress in the 
informal conversations with Jewish representatives, " the prospects of 
persuading them to adopt a more reasonable attitude had been 
"impaired by the statement of Truman. 11 (5 3) The British 
Government's indignation with President Truman was completely 
understandable and even Crossman conceded that "any British 
Foreign Secretary would have been annoyed at American 
pronouncements on Palestine, 11(54) although Creech-Jones maintained, 
admittedly two decades later, that ".. it would have been better if 
Bevin and Attlee had not lost their temper with Truman. "(55) 
By the end of October Britain's Palestine policy was in a state of 
suspension. Two weeks' previously Attlee appointed Arthur 
Creech-Jones, an avowed Zionist sympathiser, as Colonial Secretary 
in attempt to win the good faith of the Zionists, but by 18th October 
talks between Britain and the Jewish Agency ended without any 
definite undertakings on either side. (56) The hope was expressed 
that there might be some return to negotiations in the new year and 
as such the London Conference was adjourned until January 1947. 
In a Cabinet meeting on 25th October, Bevin outlined three possible 
options open to the British Government in the increasingly likely 
event of a negotiated settlement being unattainable. The 
first 
course was to impose a settlement acceptable to one or other of 
the 
two communities in Palestine; the Chiefs of Staff having advised 
the 
government that Britain did not have the means to impose a solution 
that was resisted by both sides. The second alternative was to 
surrender the Mandate and withdraw from Palestine; an option which 
Bevin and the Foreign Office, at that time, did not favour because 
of the serious effect it would have on Britain's strategic position in 
the Middle East. The third possibility was to propose a scheme of 
partition which might provide for the Arab part of Palestine to be 
merged into Trans-Jordan. (57) It was agreed at this meeting that no 
decision would be taken until Bevin consulted with President Truman 
when the Foreign Secretary visited America in December. 
Bevin purportedly was reluctant to go to America to discuss the 
situation with Truman and relations between the two men "began in a 
very chilly way. "(58) However, an extract of a confidential note of 
the meeting between the Foreign Secretary and the American 
President at the White House on 8th December, reveal the 
discussions to be not only cordial but also surprisingly frank. 
Bevin told Truman that he thought the Morrison-Grady Plan a "very 
fair and practical proposal. One of its advantages was that it would 
not involve a referral to the UNO11 which would essentially mean 
bringing in other powers, especially the Soviet Union. Truman 
evidently agreed that it would be wise to keep them out. Bevin 
admitted that the Jews were difficult: "They somehow expect one to 
fulfil all the prophecies of all the prophets.. " but he confessed that 
"the Arabs are difficult too. " At this point Truman made an 
admission which vindicated Bevin's criticism of him ".. he (Truman) 
went out of his way to explain how difficult it had been with so 
many Jews in New York, " and stated that "If the British Government 
reached an accord over Palestine the US Government would be very 
pleased to give any help they could, including finance. " Bevin 
replied that "he did not expect to reach an 'accord', as it would 
never be possible to get Jews and Arabs to agree with each other. 
The trouble was, " he confessed, "that HMG had given conflicting 
pledges, " to which Truman answered, with disarming honesty, "So 
have we. " The meeting ended amicably, if somewhat inconclusively, 
with Bevin explaining that it was 11HMG1s job to narrow the 
differences so that there would not be too much hostility from either 
side to whatever policy was pursued-1109) 
However , if Bevin's 
interview with Truman failed to produce a 
definitive policy towards Palestine, it certainly affected the 
Foreign 
Secretary's perception of the issue and forged an acceptance of 
its 
intractability. In a speech made shortly after his return from the 
United States, Bevin stated that "The question facing Great Britain 
now is whether an insoluble problem would be present for all time or 
whether this problem could be handed back to the United Nations 
with a confession that we could not solve it. "(60) 
(ii) Referral to the United Nations 
on lst January 1947 a minute of a meeting between Bevin and 
Creech-Jones was sent to the Prime Minister. The Foreign Secretary 
had outlined his views on the London Conference which was due to 
take place on 21st January, and the possible options open to the 
British Government if, as he firmly believed, agreement would not be 
reached. He stated "There are only two courses open to us; firstly, 
to impose a solution, thus overcoming the active resistance of Arab, 
Jew or both; secondly, to divest Brtain of all further responsibility 
for Palestine. 11(61) Bevin went on to argue the disadvantages of 
following the first alternative: "it would involve us in a continuing 
military commitment which would be a heavy one and last a long 
time. It is doubtful whether we have the resources to sustain a 
burden of this kind or whether public opinion would countenance the 
pursuit of a policy which did not seem to be leading to the 
pacification of Palestine and a substantial withdrawal of British 
troops from the country. " If these assumptions were right, he 
continued, "we should admit our failure to deal with the intractable 
problem of Palestine and hand it over to others for solution ... we 
would be fully jusitified in surrendering the Mandate to the UN. 11 
However, Bevin added revealingly, before surrendering the Mandate 
to the United Nations it should be offered to the United States; "Of 
course, they would almost certainly refuse. But I feel we should 
make the offer to them first, despite the resentment which this 
would cause among the Arabs because it would then be possible to 
say to them (the Americans) that, as they were not prepared to 
shoulder the burden which we have already carried far too long, we 
had no alternative but to lay it at the feet of the UN. 11 The Foreign 
Secretary's views indicate that despite the confessional nature of his 
interview with President Truman and the apparent accord which 
superficially existed between America and Britain, relations were far 
from well between the two nations over the question of Palestine 
and, maybe more significantly, the British Government was not above 
considering devious manoeuvres which would place the United States 
in a sensitive position. 
Nevertheless , although Bevin was attracted by the idea of referring 
Palestine to the UN he was fully aware that "We could not commit 
ourselves to this policy without considering its effects on our 
strategic position in the Middle East as a whole. On this we should 
need the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff. The diplomatic and political 
implications of evacuating Palestine in this way would also be serious 
and would have to be weighed in the balance against the release 
from an embarrassing and thankless task in Palestine. 11 
The Foreign Office was cautious on the question of American 
involvement as evidenced in a memorandum to Sir Harold Beeley, the 
Adviser to the Foreign Secretary on Palestine, from P. Mason of the 
Eastern Section: "Since the demise of the League of Nations, no 
Mandate technically exists merely a moral obligation to administer the 
territory in accordance with the terms of the original Mandate. 
Therefore,, a transaction with the USA would seem to amount to a 
bilateral arrangement that on a given date we should move out and 
the US would from that moment take over the administration. I 
suppose that an arrangement on these lines would be technically 
feasible, the question of legality, perhaps, not strictly arising since 
there would be no Mandate to transfer. Whether it would be 
politically feasible is not for me to say though I should have thought 
that it might be open to a charge of power politics. "(62) 
During the discussion between Ernest Bevin and the Colonial 
Secretary it became clear that the notion of Britain surrendering the 
Mandate was an anathema to Creech-Jones. He maintained that if the 
British government were to announce its intention to do so, the 
administration of Palestine would immediately become untenable: 
".. intensified Zionist terrorist activities would follow" and such a 
Proposal "would bring on our heads Arab hostility. 11(63) The Colonial 
Office feared the creation of a state of anarchy in Palestine, and in 
many ways,, understandably so, for they had ... built up the 
administrative structure,, the social services, etc and were naturally 
dismayed by the prospect that their work might be destroyed. 11(64) 
However, another consideration concerned Creech-Jones and served 
to not only distance the objectives of the Colonial 
Office from those 
of the Foreign Office, but also, to place a schism between himself 
and the Foreign Secretary. The minutes of the meeting indicate that 
Creech-Jones was aware of party political factors: "The Colonial 
Secretary lays stress on the fact that a considerable section of the 
Government's supporters, both in Parliament and in the country, 
would be severely critical of the policy proposed and liable to raise 
difficulties for the Government in view of the many declarations on 
the subject made by the Labour Party, and particularly that made 
immediately before the General Election. He also added that the 
Labour Party is deeply committed to the policy of the Jewish National 
Home. " In essence, Creech-Jones favoured partition in the belief 
that 11 ... it would be acceptable to opinion in this country and to 
important sections of the Zionist Movement. "(65) 
This line of argument was summarily dismissed by Ernest Bevin and 
the Foreign Office who accused the Colonial Office of pursuing a 
policy, the principle aim of which "was to reach an agreement with 
the Zionists. " Bevin added that "desirable as such an agreement 
would be, it is from the Foreign Office point of view, far more 
important that we should avoid a quarrel with the Arab States over 
Palestine.. " In a subsequent comment on the discussion a member of 
the Foreign Office staff stated: "It is not clear what is meant by the 
statement that the 'Labour Party is deeply committed to the policy of 
the Jewish National Home'. The policy of favouring the establishment 
of a Jewish National Home in Palestine is embodied in the Balfour 
Declaration and the Mandate, and has at no time been renounced by 
any British Government.. The Colonial Secretary may, of course, 
mean that the Labour Party is committed to doing more for the 
Zionists than carrying out the previous engagements of HMG11. (66) 
This deliberately obtuse interpretation of Creech-Jones' statement 
clearly suited Foreign Office officialdom and Bevin refused to give 
his colleague's views greater countenance. Admittedly, Creech-Jones' 
stand was biased as he admitted some years later: "On becoming 
Secretary of State I immediately urged what my liberal and my 
Jewish friends had hoped might be the line of advance - 
partition, 11(67) but of potentially greater significance was the fact 
that several senior Ministers, sensing maybe that this could be a 
last 
ditch attempt to influence Bevin, now hastened to follow 
his lead. 
At a Cabinet meeting on 16th January 1947 Creech-Jones circulated a 
memorandum in support of partition. Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, agreed with the Colonial Secretary arguing that it 
was now clear that "Arabs and Jews would not work together and 
that since Zionists insisted on an area under their control partition 
was the only solution. " Aneurin Bevan, the Minister of Health, 
endorsed this view. He feared that Zionist leadership would pass 
into the hands of extremists if Britain repressed by force the 
continuing disorder in Palestine. Emmanuel Shinwell, the Minister 
for Fuel and Power warned that Britain should not follow a course of 
action which would alienate the United States and he judged that 
"the US would support partition. 11(68) 
Dalton summarised the meeting in his diary: "On Palestine a number 
of us have been shouting for partition - Creech-Jones is very good 
on this and much more decisive than his Predecessor. EB and PM 
try to tangle up the merits of various solutions with hypothetical 
conclusions of who would vote for this or that solution at the UN. I 
have been trying to keep these distinguished and have been urging 
that partition is the least objectionable of all policies and that, if we 
decide on this, we should then go on to consider how the local and 
political obstacles can be overcome. The present state of things 
cannot be allowed to drag on. There must be a Jewish State - it is 
no good boggling at this - and even if it is quite small, at least 
they will be able to let lots of Jews into it - which is what they 
madly and murderously want! "(69) Dalton had once again adopted his 
arrogant and ignorant reading of the situation by completely 
underestimating, if not actually discounting, the implications of such 
a policy. 
Herbert Morrison was reportedly ".. coming over to a decent partition 
scheme"(70) and Shinwell had aroused Bevin's anger by publicly 
criticising his policy in the Middle East. (71) ýClearly, opposition to 
the Foreign Secretary was mounting within the Cabinet but with such 
obviously ill-considered opinions which revealed a total lack of 
understanding among his colleagues as to the complexity of 
the 
issue, it is hardly surprising that Bevin stuck to his guns, rejected 
partition and effectively appeared unchallengeable. In a re port on 
Palestine issued by the Foreign Office on 27th January 1947 it was 
forcefully argued that: "The adoption of partition would 
be regarded 
by all Arabs as a capitulation by HMG to 
Zionist pressure. 
Anglo-Arab relations would be affected not only by 
the initial 
enforcement of the policy but also by the continuing 
friction between 
the Jewish state and its Arab neighbours. To how great an extent 
partition would result in an estrangement between GB and the Arab 
peoples it is not possible to estimate. But the consequences of such 
an estrangement would be so grave that the risk of it should be a 
major consideration in the examination of partition as a possible 
policy. The loss of Arab goodwill would mean the elimination of 
British influence from the Middle East to the great advantage of 
Russia - 
At no time have HMG promised to establish a Jewish State. In the 
Balfour Declaration itself the undertaking to facilitate the 
establisment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people was 
qualified by the pledge that nothing should be done which might 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine. Any policy which would involve placing a 
large number of Arabs under the rule of an independent Jewish 
State would be liable to challenge as inconsistent with our past 
undertakings. 11 (72) 
The abortive last-bid attempt to reconvene the London Conference at 
the end of January effectively dispelled the opposition Bevin had 
encountered, particularly from the Colonial Secretary, who emerged 
from the unproductive, intransigent meetings with Arab and Jewish 
representatives somewhat less than enamoured of the prospect of 
partition. Brought face to face, for the first time, with the 
implacable rejection of partition by the Arab delegates; the 
difficulties of maintaining law and order and the expansionist aims of 
the Zionist Movement under the leadership of Ben-Gurion, 
Creech-Jones confessed that he had become increasingly 
ft 000 impressed by its practical difficulties. It would 
be difficult to 
establish a viable Jewish State without prejudicing the vital interests 
of the Palestine Arabs; and where the frontiers were drawn, large 
numbers of Arabs must inevitably be left under Jewish rule-? ' 
However, he was now convinced that the greatest problem in the 
enforcement of partition would be the extent of "rebellion and 
disorder in Palestine which might last for a considerable time.. "(73) 
There is evidence to suggest that Creech-Jones' disenchantment with 
the prospect of partition was the result of influence exerted 
by 
Bevin. Sir John Martin recalled that "it was difficult for 
Creech-Jones to stand up to such a formidable figure as Bevin. 
They had been together in the Trade Union world and Creech-Jones 
was then in a position of subordination. Therefore, Creech-Jones 
was completely out gunned. " (74) Creech-Jones argued, as he 
obviously would, that his change of heart and his subsequent 
participation with Bevin on a joint memorandum was not a 
consequence of "Bevin's work. "(75) He explained that his support 
for partition was based on the views of the High Commissioner in 
Palestine and his advisers in the Colonial Office. (76) 
It is clear from representations made to the Colonial Office by the 
Jewish Agency that moderate Zionists favoured partition, as, indeed, 
did the Colonial Office. (77) However, a Foreign Office memorandum 
maintains that Bevin's most persuasive argument which effectively 
convinced Creech-Jones was the conviction that "partition would 
never be approved by the UN because the Soviet bloc is bound to 
join with the Arabs in opposing it. "(78) Creech-Jones may have 
fallen victim to his own political naivete in supporting a policy of 
partition, the ramifications of which he had not considered. He 
admitted himself that "the longer I examined the detailed implications 
of partition the more unrealistic it became. "(79) 
On 7th February 1947., the Cabinet met to discuss a final attempt to 
secure an agreed solution for Palestine, and it considered a joint 
memorandum by the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies. The memorandum outlined a plan which had "as its 
objective the establishment of self-government in Palestine leading to 
independence after a transition period of five years under 
Trusteeship. " It provided for a substantial measure of local autonomy 
in Arab and Jewish areas, which would enable Arabs and Jews to 
collaborate together at the centre. It also contained special 
safeguards for the 'human rights' of both communities and provided 
for the admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants over two years and 
for continued immigration thereafter by agreement between the 
two 
communities., or failing that, by arbitration under the 
United 
Nations. Bevin explained to Cabinet that "he sought authority 
to 
put the plan before the Arabs and the Jews, 11 and 
if it commanded a 
measure of acquiescence, "the Cabinet would be asked 
to decide 
whether HMG should go ahead with it. " If on the other 
hand, there 
was no prospect of acceptance, "it would be necessary 
to submit the 
whole problem to the United Nations, explaining 
the various efforts 
which had been made to find a solution 
but making no 
recommendations. 11 (80) 
Creech-Jones stated that he was in "full agreement with the 
proposals which were based on the hope that Jews and Arabs would 
collaborate in a unitary state. "The general views of the Cabinet 
Ministers supported the presentation of the Plan to "both parties as 
a basis for negotiation, " but emphasised the urgency of negotiating 
quickly, "within the next week or so-" If the plan was rejected then 
"reference to the United Nations would be necessary. 11(81) 
It is not too difficult to see this attempt to bring together Arabs and 
Jews as window-dressing. Bevin obviously knew the plan would be 
rejected by both parties and ultimately the problem would be 
referred to the United Nations. He was simply engaging in tactics, 
and to give Dalton credit, he was the only one to recognise it: 'IEB 
goes doddering round and round with the Arabs and Jews and 
nothing ever happens except a long and rising series of outrages in 
Palestine .... yet the Cabinet is all behind Bevin now. "(82) 
Predictably, both the Arabs and the Jews rejected the proposal. 
Ben-Gurion saw them as a retreat from the Morrison-Grady plans in 
the direction of the White Paper of 1939. He argued that the British 
conception of an independent state of Palestine meant one with an 
Arab majority: it would be "a State composed of Palestinian nationals 
of Arab and Jewish race. This was unacceptable. They were first 
and foremost Jews and they wanted a Jewish state in Palestine in 
which the Jews would be a majority. "(83) By contrast, the Arabs 
interpreted the plan differently, arguing that these proposals would 
lead to partition. 
On 13th February, Bevin and Creech-Jones., in another joint 
memorandum stated that they had concluded that it was impossible to 
arrive at a peaceful settlement in Palestine on any basis whatsoever, 
except with the backing of the United Nations. Britain had to 
shoulder its present responsibilities until the matter could be 
referred to the General Assembly. (84) The following day Bevin 
explained the situation to the Cabinet, and asserted that it was his 
and the Colonial Secretary's recommendation that IIHMG should give 
immediate notice of their intention to refer the problem of Palestine 
to the judgement of the General Assembly of the United Nations and 
whilst not making any recommendations, should invite the Assembly 
to find a solution to the problem. "(85) It was Bevin's belief that 
"both the Jews and Arabs were anxious to avoid discussion of the 
problem in that forum and it might be that if we now announce our 
firm intention to take the matter to the UN Assembly this might 
bring them to a more reasonable frame of mind. " Attlee added that 
once it was announced that the question was to be submitted to the 
UN "there was some reason to hope that both communities in 
Palestine would exercise restraint so as to avoid prejudicing the case 
which they would have to present at the General Assembly-" 
Opposition to this proposal was voiced . but it was effectively 
silenced by Bevin. The Chief of Air Staff, Lord Tedder expressed 
alarm that if the "future of Palestine were left to the decision of the 
UN Britain could not be sure that it would be able to secure there 
the military facilities it required-" The most forthright critic was 
John Strachey, who argued that for strategic and moral reasons the 
"just claims" of the Zionists should be supported. This view was 
quickly defeated by Bevin's counter-argument that in view of the 
recent activities of the Jewish terrorists in Palestine it was not to be 
assumed that a "policy of full support for the Jewish claim would be 
acceptable either to public opinion in this country or to the British 
troops in Palestine. 11(86) Bevin was correct in his assertion; only 
two weeks' previously The Times had reported of the "uneasiness 
now felt in the country at the failure of the Government to maintain 
public security in Palestine in the face of the deliberate challenge of 
the terrorists to the authority of the Mandatory Power. "(87) Attlee 
concluded the Cabinet discussion by stating that in his view the 
right course for HMG would be to make every effort to maintain the 
status quo during the interim period until the General Assembly met 
in September and it was agreed that the Government should give 
notice of their intention to refer the problem to the United Nations. 
The impression gained of the mood of this meeting is that of an air 
of desperation and an eagerness to be rid of an intractable problem 
which was diverting ever more attention from the Government's 
growing domestic difficulties. Yet the advantages of being freed 
from a task which not only brought Britain international censure but 
was also being increasingly resented at home had to be balanced 
against the strategic interests in the Middle East. There was clearly 
no easy solution. 
Britain kept the United States informed of developments but 
interestingly there is no evidence to suggest that the British 
Government actually offered America the Mandate. The whole idea, 
of course, may well have been a bluff. Truman's response to Bevin 
on learning of the proposed referral to the United Nations was that 
flit would be wise to lay the matter before the Trustee Council rather 
than wait for the General Assembly. "(88) Bevin ignored the 
suggestion and announced in Parliament on 17th February 1947 that 
the Palestine issue would be referred to the United Nations. (89) The 
proposal was well received on all sides of the House. Stanley 
supported the policy as did Churchill. Churchill had, in fact, first 
recommended referral in the July of 1946: "The Government should 
say that if the United States will not come and share the burden of 
the Zionist cause, we should now give notice that we will return the 
Mandate to the UNO and that we will evacuate Palestine within a 
specific period. "(90) 
One week later, the Foreign Secretary, with a comprehensive brief 
drafted by the Foreign Office, spoke again to the Commons on the 
subject of Palestine. Bevin was in belligerent mood and a good deal 
of his speech was devoted to the charge that America's 'intervention' 
in Palestine had "set the whole thing back ... in international affairs I 
cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local 
elections. 11(91) His bitterness with American and Zionist pressure was 
more than evident but one pointed comment aroused backbench 
Zionist sympathisers. He remarked that the Mandate "had provided 
for what was virtually an invasion of the country by thousands of 
immigrants. 11(92) Harold Lever attacked Bevin and Benn Levy 
congratulated the Foreign Secretary on "the best exposition of the 
Arab case that I have ever heard. " Crossman continued to argue in 
favour of partition whilst Barbara Ayrton Gould urged the 
impossible: "A unitary State should still be attempted, in which Jews 
and Arabs could very well solve their differences in the future, as 
they have in the past. "(93) 
These attacks, many of which were ill-considered, were, of course, 
only to be expected and Bevin emerged in control of the situation. 
He was no doubt by this time accustomed to carrying the chief 
burden and opprobrium of Britain's policy towards Palestine. Yet 
in 
many ways he could rest in the comfort that by referring the 
issue 
to the UN he had gone some way in the direction of resolving the 
problem, even, indeed, if this was the only rational option open to 
him - 
In his defence he could always argue that as Foreign Secretary he 
was obliged to take a non-sectarian stance, adopt the broader view 
and assess national interests above party resolutions. However, the 
issue was not as simple as this,, the Labour Party including Ernest 
Bevin, had raised Jewish expectations, had courted the Zionist 
causes, had promised the moon then in the cold reality of office had 
been seen to negate its stated policy intentions. If this policy 
reversal indicted Bevin, then it surely condemned the whole 
policy-making machinery of the Labour Party who, in Opposition, 
unwisely, if not tragically, espoused imprudent sentiments which 
were doomed to be inoperable in Government and would lead to 
unnecessary rancour with the Party. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE END OF THE ROAD 
The United Nations Decision 
On the 2nd April 1947 the British delegation to the United Nations 
requested the Secretary General to summon a special session of the 
General Assembly with the intention of setting up a committee which 
would investigate the Palestine question and report to the regular 
meeting of the Assembly in September. As such,, on 15th May 1947 a 
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was instituted, comprising 
representatives from eleven neutral states. The Committee was 
invested with the "widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and 
to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of 
Palestine"; to "conduct investigations in Palestine and wherever it 
may deem useful". and to report to the Secretary General not later 
than lst September 1947.0) 
The Times had welcomed Britain's referral of the problem to the UN 
on the grounds of the "unsuitability of the Mandate".. yet it 
condemned the Government's refusal to present any guidelines to the 
Assembly: "They (the Government) have been slow to recognise that 
a solution by consent of the contending parties is 
impracticable.. their efforts would have been better directed to 
framing a clear cut plan to present to the UN. 11(2) The Times 
completely misunderstood Bevin's intentions. At a Cabinet meeting 
on 29th April 1947 the Foreign Secretary had stressed that not only 
should Britain not offer any suggestions to the UN but also that the 
Government should not commit itself in advance to accept any 
recommendations of the UN concerning the future of Palestine. 
He 
argued that "The Assembly's recommendations might prove 
to be 
wholly impracticable for political or other reasons and 
HMG would 
then be placed in a most difficult position 
if they had committed 
themselves in advance to accept them-110) 
This line of argument was prudent, after all 
Britain was attempting 
to extricate itself from a troublesome affair and 
in order to do So it 
would obviously attempt to distance itself 
from the problem, even if 
this action did occasion criticism from other quarters. Hector 
McNeil, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs kept Clement Attlee 
informed of events in the United States: "There is already adverse 
comment in the American press and in Zionist circles at the 
unwillingness of HMG to declare in advance that they will accept the 
Assembly's recommendations. 11(4) Bevin, cognisant of this criticism 
suggested to Attlee that in order for the British Government to 
avoid accusations of obstructiveness, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the 
British representative at the UN, should present a more or less 
non-commital statement to the Assembly on the lines of: IIHMG have 
invited the Assembly to consider this problem and the Assembly must 
itself be the sole judge of its own recommendations. HMG would, 
therefore, regard it as quite inappropriate that they should 
themselves make any suggestion to the Assembly as to the form 
which its recommendations should take, and they do not propose to 
do so. They will confine themselves to placing at the disposal of the 
Assembly all the information which it requires and facilitating its 
consideration of the problem to the fullest possible extent. HMG 
have brought this problem before the Assembly in the confident hope 
that the Assembly will succeed in recommending a practicable and 
just solution, which will be accepted by all the parties concerned 
and will thus provide a basis for the final settlement of this difficult 
problem. "(5) Both Attlee and Arthur Creech-Jones agreed with this 
statement(6) and by the time UNSCOP representatives were arriving 
in Palestine and the Labour Party Conference opened in Margate, the 
Government's position was set. 
However, if the Labour Government was becoming more adept at 
outmanoeuvring its critics overseas there seemed, at first sight, to 
be little chance of its avoiding sharp criticism over its handling of 
the Palestine affair, at the Annual Conference. Harold Laski 
predicted there could be dissension at Conference and wrote to 
Creech-Jones asking him to take any discussion on Palestine: 11 ... as 
I thought you would produce an atmosphere of conciliation and good 
feeling that might very easily be lacking in a reply such as Ernest 
Bevin would make. If you could do it I think the whole Conference 
would avoid a difficult and nasty corner. " Laski then went on 
to put 
pressure on Creech-Jones: "I write to you about this 
frankly 
because I myself feel that if EB is to deal with Palestine along 
the 
lines of past and really quite indefensible utterances, even as 
you 
know, without any full grasp of the problems 
involved, it would be 
very difficult for me as a matter of conviction to stay on the 
Executive of the Party. If you were in full charge of the whole 
policy I should feel quite differently since I know that you 
understand its elements sympathetically. I cannot feel that, however 
hard I try, about EB and 1,, therefore,, put this suggestion before 
you as a way of coming out of a difficulty, in part at least of the 
Government's creationt however much it has been exacerbated by 
terrorism, which would redound to the credit of the Government and 
greatly strengthen the position of the Party. "(7) 
Laski clearly not only overestimated Creech-Jones' political influence 
and his own standing but also the mood of the majority of the 
delegates at Conference. The Daily Herald, which was essentially 
the voice of the traditional industrial wing of the Party, had always 
supported Bevin and had only three months' previously, at the time 
of the referral to the UN, proclaimed in a leader article that: "We 
think the Foreign Secretary is right... Efforts have been steadfastly 
continued despite outbreaks of terrorism in Palestine and despite a 
violent anti-British campaign by remote and financially powerful 
propagandists for Zionism in the United States. "(8) 
In fact, the General Council of the TUC had been most dismissive of 
the Histadrut (the Zionist Labour Organisation) when it requested an 
intervention on behalf of Jewish refugees. The council took the 
view that "the onus of responsibility for the situation should be 
thrown on the Palestine Jews". and the Zionists were told they 
should work for a peaceful settlement with the Arab population. (9) 
The Conference did not go as Laski had hoped and Bevin addressed 
the Assembly. Maurice Rosette of Poale Zion moved a resolution 
which requested action in line with the Party's war-time promises, 
several of which were actually included in the resolution. In an 
impassioned speech to Conference Rosette condemned the "scandalous 
position of refugees after two and a half years of a Labour 
Government, " and urged a message of hope to be made in an attempt 
to rally moderate Jewish opinion. 00) 
However., by a curious twist of fate., Rosette's position was 
undermined by a fellow Jew, Henry Solomons of Hammersmith South, 
who rose to speak on behalf of his Divisional Labour Party. 
Although he deeply regretted publicly disagreeing wit ha 
co-religionist, he felt that Rosette's resolution was steeped in the 
past and had failed to take account of recent developments: "Those 
of us who during the last few months have been perturbed by 
events in Palestine and have investigated the position ... have come to 
this Conference, not as pressure groups, but with some change in 
our views ... There cannot be peace and tranquility in Palestine 
unless there is co-operation between the Arab,, the Jewish and the 
Christian inhabitants of the country. "(11) He recommended further 
attempts at Jewish-Arab co-operation, and called for the withdrawal 
of the resolution on the grounds that at this stage it would 
embarrass the United Nations and the Jewish Agency in Palestine. 
Bevin, intuitively, seized Solomons' statement with both hands: "My 
advice is the advice which was given by Mr. Solomons. Let the 
thing go. Let the UN deal with it ... The thing is so bitter, feelings 
are so high between Arab and Jew, and it is so difficult all over the 
world that I will say nothing. "(12) 
Rosette declined to withdraw his resolution but this time was 
defeated by Richard Crossman, who successfully managed to prevent 
a vote taking place by using the procedural device of moving the 
'previous question'. This was a strange move for Crossman to make, 
as he had established himself at the Zionists' 'friend' and he later 
attempted to explain his behaviour as being the result of the fact 
that there was to be no separate debate on the issue. (13) He may 
simply have followed Solomons' cue but he effectively stifled any 
possible dissension. On the other hand, and maybe more 
convincingly, he probably sensed that the delegates would not 
support the resolution and was attempting to save the Zionists 
embarrassment. If this was indeed his objective he acutely displayed 
that he was more the 'Party man' than the 'Zionists' man', wherever 
his personal sympathies lay, for a vote against this resolution, 
containing as it did all past Labour Party statements and promises to 
the Jews, would have been deeply humiliating for the party as a 
whole, even if it had vindicated Bevin and the Labour Government. 
The whole episode and especially Crossman's action implies a great 
deal about how the Palestine problem was being perceived 
by 
members of the party. It was becoming clear that although 
Zionists 
within the party often spoke of profound disappointment and 
bitter 
suspicion of the Government's intentions(14), Poale Zion, 
despite 
protest and lobbying did not receive the sympathetic concern of 
previous years. Instead of the widespread support the Zionist cause 
had received in the past from party members the Palestine problem 
was now becoming increasingly linked with the demands of a vocal 
group of left-wing critics who opposed the Government's whole 
approach to foreign policy. 
in October 1946 , twenty MPs in an 'Open Letter' to the Prime 
Minister, complained that "in Palestine and the Middle East the 
pledged policy of the Labour Party has been sacrificed to the needs 
of Imperial defence. "(15) Among the signatories were many who had 
not hitherto expressed strong opinions on the subject of Palestine, 
but were beginning to view the Palestine issue in the context of a 
Labour Government squandering resources in a misguided attempt to 
assert British presence in the Middle East, which was, they claimed 
"a negation of the advocated Socialist foreign policy. " 
In May 1947 a pamphlet entitled 'Keep Left' signed by Richard 
Crossman, Michael Foot, Ian Mikardo and nine other MPs, demanded 
a time-table from the Government for the withdrawal of British 
troops from Palestine in order that it could become self-governing. 
Crossman may have had this idea in the back of his mind when he 
engaged in his tactics at Conference. He may have thought it 
foolish to upset the negotiations of the UN when they may have been 
considering the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. 
However, it is ironic that the Left, in their attempt to link the 
Palestine issue with a 'Socialist' foreign policy, so obviously 
overlooked the inconsistency, indeed incompatibility, of traditional 
Labour policies towards Palestine and the Party's 'socialist' tendency. 
The question of national self-determination, a basic tenet of the 
'socialist' foreign policy school of thought, had long been at variance 
with Labour's pro-Zionist leanings. 
As early as 1917, a number of critics had begun to question the 
compatibility of a commitment to Zionism with an overall policy of 
Support for self-determination. (16) The argument at that time 
had, 
predictably, been fudged, as it was to be again during the post-war 
Labour Administration. If self-determination could not be accorded 
to Palestine before the War, and it must be remembered that the Left 
of the Labour Party continued to support the Mandate during the 
1930s, then the question remains, why was Britain's presence in 
Palestine so unacceptable to the Left after 1945? One historian has 
observed that "much of the heat generated against Ernest Bevin on 
the Left stemmed,, directly or indirectly, from Britain's policy in 
Palestine. 11(17) It is conceivable that the converse was the case, in 
that Palestine was used as a weapon with which to attack the 
Government. In other words, Palestine was a sensitive yet arguably 
not crucial issue, and therefore, could be adopted by the Left as a 
cause, irrespective of the profound difficulties inherent in the 
Arab/Israeli conflict. 
In the leading journals of the Left, Tribune and the New Statesman 
and Nation, the Government's policies provoked incessant criticism. 
Tribune, under the editorship of Jon Kimche, a Zionist supporter, 
continually attacked the Labour Government in general and Ernest 
Bevin in particular. If there was one theme which did not lose its 
central position in the late 1940s it was that the mess in the Middle 
East was all directly due to the wrongheaded decisions of Ernest 
Bevin. On 25th April 1947 two months after the announcement that 
the issue was to be referred to the UN, the Editorial in Tribune 
read: "What's the use of mincing words or resorting to polite formula 
when the British Government has embarked on a course which may 
not only recoil on its own head but even more so upon the great 
hopes of the British Labour Movement and its high aspirations. The 
Labour Government - our Labour Government - has set out on a 
road of .. terror.. Can the Government produce nothing 
better than 
another bout of words in New York - accompanied by bombs, 
hangings, curfews and reprisals in Jerusalem - "(18) 
Richard Rose observed that "one of the few things upon which 
Kingsley Martin and Ernest Bevin would have agreed was that the 
periodical had no influence whatsoever on the Government's foreign 
policy. "(19) This is a rather ingenuous statement for it would have 
been most surprising,, not to say unusual, if any article appearing 
in 
either the Tribune or the New Statesman would have had any 
impact 
upon the policy direction of the Government, or 
indeed, should 
have. Statements in either publication could at best only serve 
to 
embarrass the Government and to reveal a factionalism which, 
to any 
seasoned observer of the Labour Party, would 
have been already 
known. Ernest Bevin had in fact foreseen possible opposition 
from 
Kingsley Martin in 1945, whom he had greeted at the victory rally 
after the General Election with the words: "I give you about three 
weeks before you stab us all in the back. "(20) 
Ironically, criticism of the Government by the Left seemed to incline 
a rallying around the Government by other Labour members and to a 
large extent the Palestine issue was caught up in this dissension. 
Lord Boothby, a Conservative pro-Zionist, and also a fellow maverick 
within his own Party, remembers an occasion in the midst of the 
Palestine crisis, sitting with Crossman in the Smoking Room of the 
House of Commons and the pair "being cut, left, right and 
centre. "(21) 
A few years later., admittedly when the Palestine issue had cooled 
and arguably not only due to the manner in which Crossman had 
condemned the Government over its handling of that particular 
problem, Richard Crossman was severely criticised by a fellow MP, 
John Mallalieu: "Dick sometimes seems about as much at home in a 
Labour Party meeting as a chronic inebriate would be at a Methodist 
Conference... One moment he will argue for. The next moment he 
will argue against. At best, that gives him a reputation of being 
clever. At worst, it gives him a reputation for insincerity. Either 
way he has become 'untrustworthy' and, when he rises to speak, the 
bristles of the party meeting rise with him. Ninety-nine times out of 
a hundred, if it comes to choice between Bevin and Crossman, their 
colleagues will thumb down on Crossman without raising their eyes 
from the local paper. "(22) Admittedly, there may have been a 
measure of personal animosity in this statement but the fact that 
Crossman had associated himself with the Zionist cause brought him 
into discredit, particularly, in light of the fact that two British 
sergeants had been hanged by Zionist terrorists in Palestine, the 
culmination of a series of terrorist atrocities which had been 
continuing for months. (23) For Hugh Dalton, his somewhat loose 
support of the Zionist cause finally evaporated: 
"After that", he 
wrote, 111 went absolutely cold towards the Jews 
in Palestine and I 
didn't care what happened to them in their 
fight with the 
Arabs. "(24) 
The news of the murders of the British soldiers and 
the way in 
which their bodies had been boobytrapped was 
lept on by certain 
sections of the British press. The Daily Express published 
a front 
page picture of the dead men, hanging from a tree and a wave of 
anti-Jewish riots took place in a number of cities. (25) The Express 
newspapers had always struck an anti-Zionist pose dating from the 
time in 1923 when Beaverbrook visited Palestine, met an Arab 
deputation and promised them the co-operation of the Express 
newspapers: "In a common hostility to Zionism. "(26) However, The 
Times feared the possible ramifications of such levels of violence: "It 
is difficult to estimate the damage that will be done to the Jewish 
cause not only in this country but throughout the world by the 
cold-blooded murder of the two British soldiers, "(27) and letters to 
the newspaper reflecting the sense of public outrage, attacked the 
Government "for not avenging the murders of British citizens in 
Palestine. 11(28) For the first time since the Labour Party had 
assumed ofice and responsibility for the direction of policy in 
Palestine, public opinion became of significant importance in the 
Government's thinking. 
As a result of the murders, the Conservative Party demanded a 
debate in Parliament and during the discussion it became clear that 
speakers from all sides of the House were now stressing the urgent 
need for the Government to withdraw from Palestine. Conservative 
MP, Brigadier Mackeson and Shadow spokesman on Colonial Affairs, 
Oliver Stanley, both attacked the Government for "weakness and 
vacillation. " Stanley asserted that "there was only one alternative - 
evacuation. This country cannot continue to carry the burden of 
blood and treasure on anything like the same lines as it had in the 
past. Let the UN do something towards carrying the burden. " 
Stanley's speech was met with cheers throughout the House. (29) 
However, the severest critics of the Government came from the Left 
of their own Party. The Government was accused of allowing the 
situation to deteriorate in Palestine and it was held responsible for 
the deaths of British citizens. Michael Foot shouted "It is not right 
to keep British soldiers in Palestine. The British Government should 
declare now that whatever decision is made at the UN we are coming 
out of Palestine. " Harold Lever, a Jewish MP, 
delivered the most 
vitriolic and telling speech: "I confess to a measure of surprise 
that 
the House is allowing the government on this issue to get away so 
lightly with two years of planless.. gutless and witless 
behaviour 
which has not only cost us treasure in terms of money, 
but 
uncountable treasure in manpower and loss of 
life, all in order to 
prove that we are master of a situation of which we obviously 
are 
not a master., and all for some obscure reason made plain not to our 
troops, not to the people of Palestine and certainly not to us. "(30) 
Michael Cohen's verdict on this Parliamentary debate was that it 
displayed "a unique all party consensus which was a clear 
manifestation of the national will. "(31) There is no doubt that 
Ministers were sickened by the violence in Palestine and both Labour 
and Conservative Members argued in favour of one line of action, 
even if their analyses and motives differed. However, in many ways 
this rhetorical consensus played into the hands of the government. 
For the first time,, the Cabinet was offered a policy option which 
would not face censure in the House from the Conservative benches 
or, indeed, from Leftwing members of their own Party. Termination 
of the Mandate and British withdrawal from Palestine was the course 
to be followed - all opposition had effectively been silenced, not of 
course, by the strength of the Government's argument, but by 
events in volatile Palestine which clearly precipitated this outbreak 
of all-party unity. The question for Attlee and Bevin now was how 
to negotiate such a policy with the United States and the United 
Nations. 
The Government had already established an escape clause in its 
decision not to be bound by the recommendations of UNSCOP. In 
the event, the UNSCOP report, which was signed on 31st August, 
presented two possible solutions to the Palestine problem. Firstly, it 
produced a majority plan which suggested the partition of Palestine 
into an Arab state, a Jewish state and the city of Jerusalem. This 
plan advised a transitional period towards independence which would 
commence from the ist September 1947, during which time Britain 
would continue to administer the Mandate, under the auspices of the 
United Nations, and would admit into the proposed Jewish State, 
150,000 immigrants. Jerusalem would be under an international 
trusteeship. Secondly, the Minority plan, which was proposed by 
India, Persia and Yugoslavia, recommended an independent federal 
state after a transitional period not exceeding three years, during 
which time the responsibility for administering Palestine would be 
entrusted to an authority designated by the General Assembly. 
(32) 
Three days before the Cabinet was due to discuss UNSCOP's 
proposals, Attlee penned a personal note to Bevin suggesting that 
the forthcoming statement on Palestine should be as follows: 
"If the 
Assembly should fail to come to any conclusion Or if it were to 
propose a settlement for which HMG could not accept responsibility, 
the only remaining course would be for us to notify the UNO that we 
cannot continue to be the Mandatory power, and that it is for the 
UNO to decide in what way and by what other power or powers its 
proposals are to be implemented. We should also state that we will 
withdraw our administrative offices and troops from Palestine by a 
definite date which could not be longer than 6 months.. even if no 
agreement has been come to between the Arabs and the Jews. "(33) 
The Foreign Secretary reported that he was in agreement with this 
suggestion - 
Kenneth Morgan, in his recent study of the Attlee government 
implies that it was only Bevin who objected to UNSCOP's 
recommendations (34), and Creech-Jones always maintained that Bevin 
made it his job to "square Clem" before Cabinet meetings. (35) 
However, on this occasion the position seems to have been reversed. 
Certainly, Attlee was beginning to take more interest in the Palestine 
affair, prompted possibly by what he considered to be "the close 
parallel between the position in Palestine and the recent situation in 
India. " He believed that 11salutory results would be produced by a 
clear announcement that HMG intended to reliquish the Mandate. "(36) 
Sir Harold Beeley explained Attlee's participation in the Palestine 
policy: "This was the year in which we left India, by rather a 
similar procedure. Attlee was responsible for the Indian decision. I 
think this was the way his mind was working in general and he 
applied the same thoughts to Palestine. 1107) Nevertheless, by 
likening Palestine to India, Attlee displayed a remarkable lack of 
perception as to the difficulties of the Palestine problem. 
The Cabinet meeting took place on 20th September and Bevin 
presented the agreed line to his colleagues. He maintained that he 
feared when UNSCOP's proposals were presented to the UN General 
Assembly "other countries might be tempted to put forward 
unworkable plans relying on the fact that it would be for HMG to 
implement them. " To obviate this, he suggested, Britain must make 
its position clear from the start. He maintained "there would be 
grave disadvantages in any decision by HMG to undertake the task 
of carrying out either the recommendations of the Majority report or 
any alternative plan of partition which might be proposed on 
the 
recommendations of the Minority report. " He concluded that 
"the 
right course for HMG was to announce their intention to surrender 
the Mandate and to plan for a an early withdrawal of British forces 
and Administration from Palestine. " Bevin did not wish to express 
any opposition to the recommendations of either report but he was 
satisfied that "unless HMG announced its intention of abandoning the 
Mandate and of withdrawing from Palestine there was no prospect of 
any agreed settlement" and he was "not willing that British forces 
should be used to enforce a settlement which was unacceptable to 
either the Jews or Arabs. "(38) 
Clearly, Bevin was defining Britain's escape clause, i. e. that the 
British Government could not be a party to a settlement which would 
be 'unacceptable to either the Jews or Arabs. ' He. of all people, 
knew after so many abortive attempts to gain agreement between the 
Jews and Arabs, that no proposed solution to the problem would be 
acceptable to both communities in Palestine. Nevertheless, it was a 
useful tactic to employ against potential pressure from the United 
Nations and the United States and it could, for the first time, place 
Britain in the desired position of a well-meaning onlooker. 
The Cabinet meeting went as expected with Creech-Jones, 
Alexander., the Minister for Defence, Hugh Dalton and even Aneurin 
Bevan agreeing that the Government should relinquish the Mandate 
and withdraw from Palestine. If anyone doubted the efficacy of 
Britain's decision a report from Baghdad received by the Foreign 
Office seemed set to dispel such misgivings. Sir Hugh 
S toneh ewer- Bird, Britain's Ambassador in Iraq, related to Ernest 
Bevin the warnings he had received from members of the Iraqi 
government to the effect that "if the UN decided to partition 
Palestine the Iraqi Government and nation will fight for the full 
independence and security of Palestine. Iraq was unable 
to stand 
by without giving the utmost help to defend the 
just rights of the 
Palestinian Arabs and would help them with money, arms and 
armies. 11 (39) 
Three days' later Creech-Jones announced to the United 
Nations ad 
hoc Committee on Palestine Britain's intention 
to withdraw from 
Palestine; "I desire on behalf of the British government 
to state that 
they endorse without reservation the view 
that the Mandate should 
now be terminated. -and we shall willingly 
lay down the obligations so 
that the goal of independence may be brought within 
realisation. 
"His Government" . stated the Colonial Secretary, "must plan for an 
early withdrawal of all British forces and British administrators from 
Palestine. 11 (40) America was alarmed. The Times. correspondent in 
Washington reported: "The British decision over Palestine leaves the 
United States without a policy and with little hope of finding one. A 
headline in today's Washington Daily News stated 'US in dither over 
Palestine' and that is an exact description of the position. American 
foreign policy has been able to get along for so long without 
committing itself on this question that it comes as an unpleasant 
shock to find that the moment has come when one is needed. With 
next year's election there is no certainty for either party that the 
Jewish vote in New York can be decisive. The Zionists will bring all 
possible pressure to bear on President Truman as they have done so 
often before. The most noticeable development during the recent 
past has been an increasing tendency to take Arab threats seriously. 
The absence of any Arab vote in the US has meant that 
policy-makers have under-rated the importance of the opinions of the 
Arab states. They do not do so now. "(41) 
Britain had played her trump card and Bevin informed Attlee 
sardonically: "It appears that the United States Government have not 
fully appreciated our determination to withdraw our Administration as 
well as our forces from Palestine. 11(42) The British press was most 
supportive of the government. The Times spoke of the "malignant 
misrepresentations made against Britain by both Arabs and Jews" 
and defended the government's position on the grounds that "this 
country is not disposed indefinitely to shoulder unaided a burden of 
responsibility which rightly belongs to the United Nations. "(43) The 
, 
Daily Herald, predictably,, of course, welcomed British withdrawal 
from Palestine and appealed to both Jews and Arabs to exercise 
moderation and forestall catastrophe. (44) Only The New Statesman 
and the Tribune added a note of censure. The New Statesman 
urged the Government to "refrain from hasty withdrawal and take 
part in imposing a political solution",, (45) as did the Tribune: 
"There 
are two ways of getting out - One is to pack up, 
to wipe one's boots 
on the mat and to march out, leaving the locals to clear up 
the 
mess. The other is to take the opportunity.. -to 
lay the foundation 
that may save the Middle East from chaos and collapse. 
"(46) Yet 
both publications readily accepted that withdrawal was 
to take place 
even if they disputed the exact timing of the exercise. 
There was one voice of foreboding , which in essence represented a 
cry in the wilderness, and that emanated from the poor beleagured 
man on the spot,, Sir Alan Cunningham, the High Commissioner. He 
feared that "if the Jews and Arabs did not reach some form of 
agreement the aftermath of Britain's withdrawal would be economic 
chaos and bloodshed, in so far as both sides are drifting fast into 
an acceptance of a preparation for war. "(47) Although, there was 
some sympathy for Cunningham within the Colonial Office: Sir John 
Martin, the Deputy Under-Secretary stated that "Our pressures were 
nothing compared to our man in Palestine"(48) the impact on the 
Government was negligible. The Labour Government was riding on 
the crest of a wave. At last their policies on Palestine were 
seemingly successful. They had managed to pull the rug from under 
the American government; they were supported in the Press and in 
Parliament; they had stemmed the tide of criticism within their own 
Party; British public opinion was behind them; in short, all was 
going very well. The question surfacing, however, was how long 
would it last? 
On 29th November 1947 the United Nations General Assembly voted to 
approve the UNSCOP Majority Plan of Partition. The United States 
and the Soviet Union supported the resolution; Britain 
abstained. (49) It was agreed that the Mandate would be terminated 
and that all Britain's armed forces would be withdrawn "not later 
than lst August 1948". The resolution looked forward to a 
progressive transfer of power from the British Mandatory authorities 
to a Palestine Commission. However, this was not to be the case as 
Britain refused the Commission entry into Palestine until the Ist May 
on the grounds that it "would be intolerable to have to share 
responsibility". (50) Sir Harold Beeley of the Foreign Office, summed 
up Britain's apparently obstructive position: "We were unhelpful. 
The military said they were having enough difficulty attempting 
to 
keep order under extremely trying conditions without a roving 
body 
of international officials doing things that would upset one community 
or the other; the task of looking after their security added 
to the 
existing security problems would have been 
impossible. 11(51) 
Bevin and the Foreign Office may not have realised 
it at the time 
but these last few months of Britain's involvement 
in Palestine and 
its subsequent response to the State of Israel was 
to prove to be a 
most debilitating period for the Attlee government. 
(ii) Withdrawal and the Aftermath 
On the Ilth December 1947 Palestine was once again discussed in 
Parliament but on this occasion The Times reorted: "No cheers or 
comments broke the profound silence which descended on the House 
of Commons"(52) as the Colonial Secretary announced that "the 
Mandate in Palestine would be terminated before the completion by 
the ist August 1948 of the withdrawal of our troops and the date the 
Government had in mind was the 15th May 1948.11(53) The Times was 
not strictly accurate for comments were made which were a clear 
indication of the unease felt, if not from the Opposition then 
certainly on the Government's own backbenches. 
The Conservatives were openly supportive of the government - 
Oliver Stanley stated that he "could see no alternative but for HMG 
to lay down the Mandate and evacuate Palestine at the earliest 
possible moment, 11 and other Conservative speakers paid tribute to 
"the friendship felt by this country both for Jews and Arabs. "(54) 
Anthony Eden,, the shadow Foreign Secretary asserted that "The 
Mandate had proved unworkable and we have to admit that our 
endeavour has failed. " He added, in line with the Government that 
although "we must do our best to facilitate the transfer of the 
burden, we should do no more than our share - That we could 
continue to carry the burden of transfer until it suited the 
convenience of others is neither just nor reasonable. " 
The Conservative reaction may at first sight seem unusual yet Harold 
MacMillan explained it in these terms: "There was one painful and 
hideous problem which faced the British Government after the war. 
It was that of Palestine... The target date for withdrawal was 15th 
May. Although the decision was unpalatable, it was accepted as 
unavoidable. 11(55) This explanation seems reasonable after all the 
Conservatives had been calling for withdrawal. Nevertheless, it is 
surprising that the Opposition benches did not engage in the 
rhetoric they had used so often on previous occasions when the 
Labour government pursued policies which their party would have 
followed had they been in Office-(56) One reason for the 
Conservatives' behaviour may lie in the fact that Churchill who had 
fervently supported the Zionists' cause had apparently 
lost interest 
in their aims and there is little doubt that other prominent members 
of the Party favoured the Arabs. Bearing 
in mind that this 
Parliamentary debate followed closely on the UN decision to partition 
Palestine into a Jewish State and an Arab State, and that this 
decision was not accepted by the Palestinian Arabs or their 
neighboursq one can see why the Conservatives chose to be 
supportive of the Government. Anthony Eden, although allegedly 
"never an anti-semite, was personally less sympathetic to the Jews 
than Churchill-" According to his biographer, Eden commented to a 
colleague: "Let me whisper in your ear that I prefer Arabs to 
Jews-11(57) Lord Boothby, who was a close friend of Chaim Weizmann 
and a Zionist supporter claimed that he was alone within his party 
during this period: "Churchill did not play an active part in the 
House - It was not an easy thing to do when the King David Hotel 
was blown up and British sergeants were being killed by Irgun 
terrorists; for a while the going was very rough. "(58) Boothby 
found a soul-mate in Richard Crossman and they would often meet to 
discuss the Palestine affair. One evening Boothby recalls 
confronting Crossman: "Look here, I don't want office and if I did I 
would not get it; but you are putting your whole political career in 
jeopardy. " Crossman replied: "I know I shalln't get office from this 
lot, and probably never will. But I am going on, because I know 
that we are right. " Boothby was impressed by Crossman's commitment 
to Zionism: "On many subjects a mercurial and erratic politician, on 
this one he was not. "(59) This association reflects the low status 
with which the Zionist cause was regarded, certainly within the 
Conservative Party and largely within the Labour Party during that 
period. Here were two essentially undisciplined members of both 
parties, meeting secretly to discuss an issue which only a few years 
earlier had been openly supported by high ranking ministers within 
the Conservative Party and overtly embraced by the Labour Party. 
The Parliamentary debate on Palestine continued the following day by 
which time the Government gained a clear indication of the nature of 
the disagreements within its own backbenches. The main concern of 
pro-Zionist speakers, including Crossman, Silverman, Janner and 
Mikardo,, was that the Government should do all 
in its power to 
assist the United Nations and to facilitate the work of the 
Commission 
appointed to co-operate in the implementation of the 
decision in the 
transitional period. For William Warbey, the MP 
for Luton, the issue 
was "a test case for the world, and for this country 
in particular of 
whether or not the UN is going forward 
to be a genuine and 
effective world organisation or whether it 
is going the same way as 
the League. 11 The Government, he asserted, "now have a great 
opportunity to help to make the UN organisation begin to become 
something of a reality - an organ of genuine world authority, 
capable of introducing an era of law and order and eventually 
justice. "(60) On the other hand., Stokes, Reid and Philips Price 
considered the UN decision to be violently partisan and Reid argued 
that "purely on legal grounds, we are not in the least bound to 
carry out the advice of the UNOII. (61) 
The argument had shifted, no longer were there heated discussions 
on the relative merits of the Arab/Jewish cases, now the focus of 
attention was the authority and future of the United Nations; an 
argument which the Government could not be seen to ignore. The 
difficulties centred on the refusal of the government to allow the 
international UN Commission entry into Palestine during the 
transitional period. It all pointed to ostensible British disregard for 
a UN decision. Bevin was clearly alarmed and in a memorandum to 
Attlee stated: "The situation in Palestine is so delicate that I feel it 
essential if we are to keep our policy straight, that any public 
pronouncements, including the answers to any questions in the 
House, should be cleared personally by the Minister of Defence; the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies and myself (or in my absence, by 
you). If this is not done I feel that we may find ourselves in 
serious trouble. "(62) 
On the 5th February 1948 the Cabinet met and Aneurin Bevan argued 
that "the failure to contribute to any international force and to baulk 
at a gradual transfer of authority to the United Nations Commission 
would be inconsistent with our professed support for the United 
Nations. "(63) However, the weight of opinion within the Cabinet 
went against this view. Bevin and Creech-Jones warned that 
if the 
Government changed its policy the "main burden of responsibility 
for 
events in Palestine would necessarily fall on Britain. 
" This,, of 
course, was true but it left the Government open 
to charges of 
partiality. Creech-Jones reported to Bevin 
from New York that "The 
Jews are worried and gloomy. The Jewish 
Agency who are 
concerned primarily that the Security Council should provide 
the 
means of enforcement of the General Assembly's policy 
urge that we 
shall adopt a more generous attitude towards 
the UN Commission in 
the task of implementation, to be less partial as 
they see it, to the 
Arabs in Palestine and to the Arab States. 
"(64) Elizabeth Monroe 
maintains that Britain's attempt at neutrality stemmed from the belief 
that it could only help execute a solution "if it was agreeable to both 
parties, and partition was not so, " although she agrees that "to be 
passive about the execution of partition was to impede it, and ipso 
facto to take the side of the party that did not want it. 11 (65) 
However, Monroe seems rather too willing to take Bevin's statements 
at face value, as there were, not surprisingly, financial 
considerations at play. 
Bevin and Creech-Jones had prepared a joint memorandum for 
Cabinet discussion on 5th February which outlined the financial 
imperatives of Britain's supposedly impartial position. It asserted: 
"It is possible that the intervention of any international force in 
Palestine would have the effect of prolonging and extending the 
conflict which is now inevitable in that country and would be 
exceedingly dangerous from the point of view of HMG... Any 
extension of the conflagration would furthermore have grave economic 
repercussions in Western Europe. The Marshall Plan is to a 
considerable extent dependent on the uninterrupted flow of Middle 
Eastern oil to Western Europe. Already there is a serious prospect 
that the flow of Iraqi oil through Haifa may be interrupted for some 
time. If either Syria or Iraq were drawn into the conflict in 
Palestine, Iraqi oil would also cease to flow through the pipeline to 
Tripoli and in addition all projects for piping Arabian and Persian 
Gulf oil to the Mediterranean would be indefinitely suspended. HMG 
are not prepared to participate in action to enforce the Assembly's 
resolution on Palestine. If, on the other hand, they were to oppose 
it., HMG would be accused of wrecking a plan, which they assured 
the Assembly they would not obstruct. It thus appears that the 
only logical attitude is to refrain from expressing an opinion. "(66) 
Meanwhile,, the Foreign Affairs Group of the PLP were anxious that 
the Government continually refused to be drawn in the House on the 
question of Palestine and as a result held a number of meetings on 
the subject. The Group passed a resolution which was in turn 
forwarded to Bevin, expressing "concern at the Government's refusal 
to allow the UN Commission to enter Palestine any earlier than a 
fortnight before the end of the Mandate. "(67) According to Herbert 
Morrison's biographers, Bevin "resented any interference from the 
Group and was never on good terms with 
it. "(68) The first 
Chairman., Seymour Cocks, an ardent pro-Zionist,, had resigned 
in 
disgust at the futility of his job. His successor,, was John Hynds 
who, "unlike Cocks was an inconspicuous chairman, like Cocks was 
politically impotent. "(69) However., there was now developing what 
the Manchester Guardian termed "a cold war" among Labour 
members. (70) Forty of the government's critics sent a telegram to 
Tryge Lie3, the Secretary General of the United Nations, expressing 
the view that Palestine was a test case for the organisation: "We on 
our part are urging the British Government to carry out the 
obligation laid upon it by the General Assembly. "(71) 
However, the list of those who signed the telegram and who opposed 
the Government on the second reading of the Palestine Bill(72) which 
terminated the Mandate., reveals the revolt to be the result of an 
alliance between Jewish and Leftwing backbench MPs. Hugh 
Berrington calculates that of the 30 who entered the opposition lobby 
twelve were drawn from what he terms the 'Left or Ultra left' and 
twelve from the 'Central Left'(73) Nevertheless, although Poale Zion 
continued to speak of the "striking betrayal of our friends, " and 
paid tribute to "those members of the PLP and Labour 
Movement.. who, have remained firm to their socialist principles and to 
the pledges of the Party on the Palestine question despite the 
government's breach of faith with the Jewish people", Tribune 
reported that "most party members were now heaving a sigh of relief 
that the party's difficulties on this question seemed to be nearing an 
end. "(75) It is clear that although Britain's response to the UN 
decision and its general handling of the Palestine affair was 
generating some ill will within the PLP, nothing Bevin's critics could 
say or do had any impact on the Government's policy. 
One month before Britain's official withdrawal date from Palestine, 
Sir Alan Cunningham, the High Commissioner, wrote to the Colonial 
Secretary, outlining the position in Palestine: "Our authority 
has 
progressively weakened to an even greater extent than 
I had 
foreseen. Jewish settlements and Arab villages are raiding one 
another with impunity. All that is happening 
is most damaging to 
British prestige. I fear that as we withdraw the country will 
be left 
to warring tribes. "(76) Once again Cunningham was accurate 
in his 
prediction. With the departure of the High 
Commissioner on 14th 
May 1948, the State of Israel was proclaimed and the 
following day 
witnessed the commencement of the 
first Arab/Israeli war. The 
General Assembly of the UN in an attempt to resolve 
the crisis, 
appointed as its Mediator, the Swedish diplomat, Count Folke 
Bernadotte. Three months later he was assassinated by the Stern 
Gang in Jerusalem and the fighting continued until early January 
1949. (77) 
This period marked the Labour Government's most difficult phase. 
On the 14th May the United States had seized the initiative, 
up-staging Britain by extending de facto recognition of the State of 
Israel. Britain failed to do likewise. At a Cabinet meeting on 27th 
May, Aneurin Bevan argued that it might cause considerable 
embarrassment to Britain if, as seemed likely.. many Commonwealth 
Governments granted recognition. Bevin, however, was adamant: 
IIHMG does not intend to recognise Israel, at any rate not until the 
picture has become more settled. "(78) 
If the Left of the Labour Party and certain pro-Zionist constituency 
parties(79) urged recognition, the Conservatives, for the time being 
anyway, supported the Government. The Times reported: "The 
Opposition will not press for a debate over Palestine. Mr. 
Churchill discussed the matter fully with Conservative MPs and at a 
Special meeting earlier this week the general attitude of the 
Opposition appears to be to exercise the greatest restraint so that 
the Foreign Secretary's efforts may be in no way impeded. "(80) 
The Times itself, in a leader article reviewing the events in 
Palestine, levied no criticism at the Government: "Confronted with a 
clash of world forces which they could not contain and with a schism 
between Arab and Jew which they could not close, the British might 
well have gone from Palestine sooner. The present Government, 
however, were confident that they could find a solution. They 
hoped that the US might at last support the constant flow of 
American advice and censure on British policy by sharing the 
responsibility. When this hope was rudely dashed, they looked 
finally to the UN. The UN too has been baffled. The scheme of 
political partition and economic union recommended last 
November, 
now only serves to provide the Zionists with a pretext 
for applying 
those portions of the scheme which confirm their 
determination to 
create a secular state in the face of Arab resistance. 
The peoples 
of Palestine will now make good their independence with violence 
and 
bloodshed. 11 (81) 
Whilst the Government was supported by the Conservatives and the 
Press it could withstand criticism in Parliament from its own ranks. 
Throughout the summer and early autumn, Bevin was urged to 
recognise Israel. Harold Lever argued in the House "recognition of 
the State of Israel is necessary both in the interests of this country 
and in the interests of peace. It is perfectly clear that peace in 
Palestine.. is possible only on the basis of recognition ... Since the 
State of Israel has been recognised by half the world. How much 
longer has Britain to lag behind. "(82) However, by December the 
situation changed drastically. During that month Israeli troops 
advanced deep into Egyptian territory. On 29th December,, the 
Security Council ordered an immediate cease fire; Britain now issued 
an ultimatum to the Israeli government and threatened to employ her 
forces in accordance with the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the Defence 
Committee of the Cabinet agreed to send British troops to the 
Transjordanian port of Akaba. (83) On 7th January an event occurred 
which radically altered the climate of opinion towards Bevin's policy. 
On the day the Egyptians had accepted a cease fire, four British 
spitfires were allegedly shot down on the Israeli side of the frontier. 
Neither the United States nor any Commonwealth countries were 
prepared to support the British government and Cudlip in a full 
page spread in The_Mirror sharply attacked Bevin. (84) This resulted 
in serious disquiet within the Cabinet, although Bevin denied the 
incident: "at least three of the aircraft have been found well inside 
Egyptian territory; one has been found inside Palestine, having 
apparently crossed the frontier in the course of the air-fighting or 
perhaps even after control of the aircraft had been lost. "(85) 
Stafford Cripps was, nevertheless, convinced of the need for a 
change of course, and Aneurin Bevan contemplated resignation. 
(86) 
Hugh Dalton informed Attlee that he would press in Cabinet for a 
change in policy without which he was convinced, correctly as 
it 
turned out, that "we shall run into very heavy 
trouble soon in 
Parliament and outside. "(87) 
Stafford Cripps spoke to Crossman of a revolt within 
the Cabinet on 
17th January(88). Dalton noted in his diary "we greatly pushed 
EB 
towards recognition, 11(89) although Creech-Jones,, admittedly 
some 
years later, asserted that he "had no recollection 
of a row in 
Cabinet. "(90) 
However, if there was not a stand up fight 
in Cabinet, certainly 
harsh words were spoken. Aneurin Bevan 
dominated the meeting. 
In the course of a long and indignant outburst he reminded his 
colleagues of his long held doubts about relying on the "unstable 
and reactionary Governments of Arab States. Furthermore,, 11 he 
argued, "the Government's policy had been inconsistent with the 
spirit of traditional party policy. De facto recognition could no 
longer be withheld. "(91) Despite the strength of Bevan's argument 
the Cabinet's agreement to accord de facto recognition of Israel was 
prompted by the fear that the Conservative Party was becoming 
restive and that a statement had to be made to the House in order to 
avoid a vote of censure, "otherwise the impression might be created 
that the Government had changed their policy in response to 
Parliamentary pressure. "(92) The following day in answer to a 
Private Notice Question from Churchill, Bevin was most conciliatory 
and requested that the House agreed to a one week delay before 
debating the subject. (93) His request was granted and all might 
have gone well if Bevin., at a Cabinet meeting on 24th January, only 
two days before Parliament was due to discuss Palestine, had not 
shifted his position. During this Cabinet meeting it was Bevin 
rather than Bevan who held sway. He reported that his initiative 
designed to secure the recognition of Transjordan by the United 
States which he had hoped would enable him to announce that "a 
common understanding on Middle Eastern policy had been reached, " 
had failed. "In the circumstances". he argued "it would be a 
serious mistake. -to proceed forthwith to accord recognition 
to the 
Government of Israel. "(94) He proposed., therefore, to simply 
announce in Parliament that consultations were taking place. Attlee 
strongly recommended this line. and amid a muted response, this 
action was accepted. 
Whether the Cabinet was simply bowing to the authority of the Prime 
Minister and the Foreign Secretary or whether their acknowledgement 
of the extent of Parliamentary opposition had been misjudged 
because 
of the relative silence on the Opposition benches 
in the House six 
days' previously, it is difficult to judge. 
Certainly one Minister was 
outraged. Gaitskell recorded Aneurin Bevan's 
fury that the Foreign 
Secretary was seemingly seeking to evade the 
decision of the Cabinet 
to recognise Israel. At a dinner held 
by Cripps, "Nye came out 
quite strongly against Bevin and seemed 
to be anxious to start an 
intrigue to get rid of him. While nobody else 
joined in, I think most 
Of us felt fairly critical (of Bevin). 
"(95) According to the Zionist 
Review, not of course, noted for its objectivity, 
there may have 
existed a sense of loyalty amongst Cabinet Ministers towards Bevin 
because "his resignation might lead to an even less agreeable Foreign 
Secretary being appointed. 11(96) Exactly who the Zionist Review had 
in mind was left open to conjecture. Hugh Gaitskell's assessment of 
the situation appears convincing: "Nye Bevan in a private talk with 
me was strongly anti-Bevin and anti-the PM. Part of this, of 
course, is just ambition and jealousy, but it really is impossible to 
defend the situation we have got ourselves into in the Middle East 
now and if Bevin were not so powerful I would expect changes to be 
made. In practice I do not think they will be made because the PM 
would never sack him and he certainly will not go of his own 
accord. "(97) Notwithstanding Gaitskell's slight on Bevan his 
statement rings true. The Foreign Secretary was enormously 
powerful. It also seems clear that Bevin, who only with the greatest 
reluctance agreed to accede to the demand to recognise Israel(98), 
essentially had little intention of doing so. 
In the event, the Parliamentary debate on Palestine on 26th January 
1949 turned into what Bevin had purportedly sought to avoid: a vote 
of censure on the Government. Churchill led the Opposition in a 
most vitriolic attack on the Government and especially Ernest Bevin. 
Churchill not only accused Bevin of "making public blunders and 
obvious misjudgements" but also of ignorance: "There has never 
been the slightest comprehension of the Palestine problem by the 
right hon. Gentleman. Every word that he says is known by those 
of us who have lived our lives with this great problem for many 
years,, to be subject to wrong emphasis. Nor will he take advice. " 
The leader of the Opposition then made a remarkable and in many 
ways truthful assertion: "No one has done more to build up a Jewish 
National Home in Palestine than the Conservative Party, and many of 
us have always had in mind that this might some day develop into a 
Jewish State. " Although he admitted that he was speaking for 
himself, he continued: "The Conservative party has done a great 
task over twenty-five years, with Parliaments which had a 
Conservative majority, in trying to build a Jewish National Home in 
Palestine and now that it has come into being it is England that 
refuses to recognise it and by our actions, we 
find ourselves 
regarded as its most bitter enemy. All this is 
due, not only to 
mental inertia on the part of the Ministers concerned 
but also to the 
very strong and direct streak of bias and prejudice on 
the part of 
the Foreign Secretary. " He concluded by stating that 
it was the 
duty of his party to oppose the government in the division 
lobbies. (99) It is difficult to understand why Churchill should at 
this stage have levied such a brutal attack on the Government and 
have chosen to reaffirm his Zionist sympathies. His colleagues, of 
course3, rallied to his support sensing that the time had come to 
severely embarrass the Government, and perhaps even to defeat it. 
Oliver Stanley's speech, although less accusatorial contained a 
cutting edge: "At the Colonial Office, I came to the conclusion that 
the only practical solution for this problem would be that of partition 
but I was not blind to its obvious dangers. Maybe I should have 
acted differently myself and I am not blaming Mr. Bevin that when 
he first came to power he did not keep his Election pledges. My 
complaint comes later. My complaint is that from then on he has 
remained obstinately and deliberately blind to the facts of the 
situation as they have developed and the realities as they have 
become more and more apparent. The real point is that there has 
now been for several years a Jewish State in Palestine. We may like 
it or not. We may think it a good thing or a bad thing, but it has 
been there and we must now recognise it. "(100) 
If this was simply an opportunistic manoeuvre by the Conservative 
Party there can be no doubt that Churchill was concerned at 
Britain's declining reputation resulting from its handling of the 
Palestine problem: "Tonight we must make our protest against the 
Government's course of action which has deprived Britain of the 
credit she had earned.. and made her the mockery and scapegoat of 
so many States. "(101) 
Richard Crossman made it clear during the debate that he could not 
support the government when the House divided. In the event only 
283 Labour MPs supported the government, 50 backbenchers 
abstained and the Government's majority of 90 was one of the lowest 
it had secured on a major issue of policy - Gaitskell believed that 
the fall of the Government had been at serious risk, (102) and The 
Times reported that "most of those who backed Mr. Bevin 
in the 
lobby seemed relieved to know that the majority had not 
been even 
smaller. 11 (103) 
For the Government the whole episode had been one of major 
humiliation. It was clear that Bevin's policy had reached 
its nadir 
and only four days' later Britain granted 
de facto recognition to 
Israel. According to Creech-Jones "recognition was a natural step 
to take and was deliberately timed to follow the Jewish 
elections. 11(104) However, this had not been stated in Parliament and 
it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that the government had 
fallen into the very trap it had sought to avoid, i. e. of seemingly 
giving way to Parliamentary pressure. The Times reported that the 
division had been "chastening to the Government" and recorded that 
this was the "first occasion in this Parliament on which the 
opposition has voted against the Government on any issue of foreign 
policy. 11 (105) 
MacMillan remembered the debate as a troubled affair: "For the 
moment the concern of the House of Commons was relieved even if its 
anxieties were by no means resolved. This protracted crisis 
naturally fell most heavily upon the government of the day for upon 
them lay the full responsibility. But the Opposition was also 
unhappy. My sympathies were with Churchill. 11006) Certainly, the 
Conservative Party was not pleased with the Government's direction 
of policy towards Palestine as evidenced in a speech made by 
Anthony Eden to the Annual Conference in Llandudno in October 
1948; "When we contrast the promises made by the Labour Party at 
the General Election of 1945 with the performance achieved since we 
deplore and condemn the weakness, the hesitation and delays which 
have led to so much bloodshed and human misery. "(107) The question 
which poses difficulties is why the Conservative Party chose to 
support the Government for so long. It is clear that Bevin's refusal 
to recognise Israel was short-sighted and leading to international 
criticism and it is conceivable that the Conservative opposition may 
have resulted from a prudent acknowledgement that Britain could no 
longer stand on the sidelines with regard to the Middle East. Maybe 
Eden's statement provides a clue to the answer: "The Palestine 
problem of recent years has gravely complicated our relations with 
many of our old friends and allies. The whole of the Middle 
East 
with the support of Britain and the United States could be built up 
into a great area of security and economic prosperity. 
11008) 
Bevin was held in high regard by Anthony Eden who, although 
admitting that his handling of some events would 
have differed from 
that of the Foreign Secretary, maintained that 
"Bevin was a man of 
stature and sincere conviction. I was in agreement with 
the aims of 
his foreign policy and with most of what he did. 
"(109) Eden, 
however, was to quick forget the humiliation his Party had imposed 
on Bevin over Palestine. Only one year after that devastating 
Parliamentary debate, Eden announced: "So far as foreign affairs are 
concerned it would be true to say that throughout his period at the 
Foreign Office, Mr. Bevin has had more criticism to bear from the 
Leftwing of his own Party than he has had from us. "(110) This of 
course was quite correct but it was also true that Bevin could 
sustain criticism from the Left; votes of censure from the 
Conservatives and resultant humiliation he could not. 
As regards the Labour Party, recriminations were to continue for 
some time, not only against Bevin but also those who were believed 
to be guilty by association. In January 1950, Harold Laski wrote to 
Creech-Jones: "You are the one man who might have prevented, 
from the period of your appointment as Colonial Secretary, the 
terrible tragedy of Bevin's policy in Palestine. By choosing to 
accept and indeed to be responsible for some of its terrible 
consequences was a big disappointment. As Secretary of State for 
the Colonies you were the main co-operator of the Foreign Secretary 
in imposing a policy that was both a denial of specific pledges given 
by the Party and an outrage upon our good name as a country all 
over the world. 11011) Creech-Jones replied "Bevin undoubtedly 
influenced the Cabinet along his line of policy and in the broad it 
was the inevitable one. "(112) 
Bevin, himself, was deeply troubled at the criticism levelled at him 
both within the Party and internationally. Sir Knox Helm, the first 
British Ambassador to Israel recalled Bevin's attitude towards Israel: 
"He was hurt by Jewish attacks on him personally", and apparently 
told Helm to "pay no heed to the past, your job is to build up 
relations for the future. The Jews will have nothing good to say 
about me, but you must not attempt to justify the past. 
11013) 
According to Creech-Jones, after the Palestine debacle "a gloom 
descended on Bevin for he had laboured without 
tools, his health 
was dwindling and his critics in the Labour 
Party were 
unsparing. 11(114) Cynically, one might say, Bevin 
'had it coming' but 
then so did the Labour Party, whose wounds one might argue, 
were 
self-inflicted. The High Commissioner, Sir Man 
Cunningham, when 
departing Palestine stated: "We have left, I hope with 
the flag 
flying. I am convinced that in the future the method of 
our going 
and the conduct of the British throughout 
the 25 years will be 
looked on as something to be admired -" (115) Both the Labour and 
Conservative Parties would be well advised to study these sadly 
misjudged sentiments and to ponder their own roles in the sorry 
affair of Palestine. 
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"Differences in Office between one party and another are less likely 
to arise from contrasting intentions than from the exigencies of 
Government. 11 
Richard Rose. 1980 
(i) British Government Policy Towards Palestine 
The Palestine issue was undoubtedly one of the more difficult 
problems to confront successive British Governments in the pre- and 
post-war years. It is possible to argue, of course, that Britain had 
only herself to blame. Rash and conflicting promises made, as a 
result of wartime calculation, to two potentially hostile communities in 
a narrowly defined territory were imprudent at their inception. Yet 
politicians are wont to accept short-term expediency in the pursuit 
of national interest as the rationale underpinning policy direction. 
It has been the intention of this thesis to illustrate the complexities 
and limitations imposed on three differing Administrations in their 
handling of the Palestine affair. In doing so, it has rejected the 
Cohen., Sheffer and Rose(l) indictments of British policy. Michael 
, Cohen's study of Britain's Mandatory period in Palestine although 
thorough and fully cognisant of the 'insoluble dilemma' of the 
episode, maintains that British policy towards Palestine had "to be 
determined strictly, and if necessary callously, according to the 
goals of Britain's grand policy in the Middle East as a whole. "(2) 
Both Rose and Sheffer whose works on Palestine centre on the 1930s, 
albeit from differing perspectives, point to Britain's "Imperial 
ambition" and "profound self-interest" as the reasons behind policy 
direction. (3) 
We consider the argument that foreign policy based on economic and 
strategic objectives is somehow reprehensible and provides reasonable 
grounds for an attack on British Government policy making 
to be 
unrealistic. Foreign policy is invariably governed 
by nationalistic 
instincts. 
The term 'national interest', of course, is open to a number of interpretations. In fact, David Vital argues that it "is beyond 
precise definition both by those intimately concerned with its pursuit 
and by the historian in retrospect. 11(4) The potency of this 
statement is readily recognised and the thesis accepts, indeed 
argues,, that the perception of Britain's national interest varied 
according to the internal and external exigencies imposed upon 
Governments in the period under examination. It also acknowledges 
Vital's argument that observers of foreign policy "--make the common 
error of ascribing consistency and rationality to a pattern of 
administration which owes more to chance, emotion and intuition. "(5) 
Certainly, emotion was to affect both Winston Churchill's and Ernest 
Bevin's attitude to the Palestine problem, but the important point of 
departure is that Britain's policy towards Palestine was never 
altruistic and always determined by an assessment of her interests as 
circumstances dictated. Sometimes there was a clash of interests 
particularly after the Second World War, when Britain's Palestine 
policy threatened to sour her relations with America. However 
Britain appreciated that the crude oil produced by the Iraq 
Petroleum Company, and fed to Consolidated Refineries Limited, 
which was 100% British owned,, was crucially necessary "because of 
the shortage of refining capacity throughout the sterling area. " Any 
upset in Britain's relations with the Arab world would, it was 
reported,, have "a most serious effect on the oil situation in the 
sterling area. "(6) The risk of losing this economic link with the 
Arab world was considered to be more important than momentarily 
disturbing Britain's association with America, especially in light of 
the fact that the Soviet Union was beginning to consolidate its 
influence and potential power as a threat to Western interests in the 
Middle East. 
It is argued then, that it is possible to define national interest in a 
case study on Palestine in terms of what was considered best for 
Britain at any given time, be they economic or strategic benefits. 
The fact that Cohen argues that "a conflict of policy-goals existed 
between the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office"(7), although 
accepted as a correct interpretation of the relative Departmental 
attitudes towards Palestine in 1937, in the later period can be 
explained as a difference which was often more apparent than real. 
The Colonial Office, despite its often pious statements that it "was 
concerned for its wards" was not above assessing Britain's economic 
and strategic needs as important, as was the case with Churchill, 
Amery, Malcolm MacDonald, George Hall and to a certain degree, 
Arthur Creech-Jones. If it sometimes adopted an administrative, 
colonialist emphasis on maintaining law and order within Palestine it 
was only because, as a Department it, was concerned with such 
matters and shouldered that responsibility. 
Britain's policy towards the Middle East in general and Palestine in 
particular was guided by successive Governments' perception of 
national interests. In fact, the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate 
itself were dictated by such concerns. It was Churchill's belief in 
1922, the year in which the League of Nations sanctioned the Mandate 
inclusive of the Balfour Declaration, that Jews should be encouraged 
to establish a homeland in Palestine in order for the area to flourish 
under British protection, and Leo Amery, the Colonial Secretary in 
1925 readily admitted that at first his interest in Palestine was 
"largely strategical". (8) 
Nevertheless, no-one could deny that these two Conservative 
politicians were sympathetic to the Jewish cause even if national 
interest was their primary concern. Jewish historians have sought 
to condemn pro-Zionist British politicians for somehow failing to meet 
Jewish aspirations and for placing British interests above Jewish 
ambitions. Cohen states "Churchill was most liberal with promises of 
a Jewish State made in confidence to the Zionist leader, Weizmann, 
but for all that he never in fact compromised generally accepted 
British interests for the sake of Zionism. "(9) Certainly, it would 
have been most unlikely for Britain to have forsaken her own 
interests in favour of the Jews or, indeed, the Arabs. Clearly, this 
is an unreasonable criticism of Britain's foreign policy direction and 
whilst not denying that intentions to establish a Jewish National 
Home in Palestine were propounded, we accept as a basic premise 
that Britain's national interests were paramount. Within this ambit it 
has been our objective to analyse why certain Governments between 
1937 and 1950 chose to pursue specific policies. Elizabeth Monroe's 
argument that Britain 'muddled through'(10) in her responses to the 
Palestine problem is acknowledged yet not accepted. Britain may 
have given that impression because of apparent vacillations in her 
policy towards Palestine but appearances were deceptive. 
In 1937., a Britishs, essentially Conservative Government instituted a 
Commission of Enquiry to investigate the Arab revolt against Jewish 
settlement in Palestine. The Commission found in favour of partition 
and thereby a termination of the Mandate. The British Government 
were fully prepared to accept this solution, notwithstanding certain 
reservations expressed by pro-Arabists within the Foreign Office. 
Nevertheless, the Government failed to seize this initiative, which 
might have provided Britain with a positive, though difficult 
resolution of the problem before international events, and therefore 
strategic considerations, circumscribed Britain's options. The 
Government could have referred the matter to the League of Nations 
and in the event of a reaction f rom the Arab States, which were not 
united at that time, any ensuing conflict would probably have been 
localised. Of course, it is difficult to ponder the possible outcomes 
of an untested policy and judgements relying on hindsight are always 
in doubt. However, a crucial factor in the Government's response to 
partition was the attitude of Chaim Weizmanno the influential 
spokesman for the Jewish Agency, who refused to accept the 
recommendation, arguing that "if it was unacceptable to the Jews 
they would do everything possible to oppose it. "(11) Unacceptable in 
Zionist terms meant that the land apportioned to the Jews was 
insufficient. Ben-Gurion would have accepted the Report but only 
with the ulterior motive that it would provide Israel with a vantage 
point to extend its boundaries: "A partial Jewish State is not the 
end but only the beginning ... We shall organise a modern defence 
force, a select army - -and then I am certain that we will not be 
prevented from settling in other parts of the country, either by 
mutual agreement with our Arab neighbours or by some other means. 
Our ability to penetrate the country will increase if there is a state. 
Our strength vis-a-vis the Arabs will increase... if the Arabs behave 
in keeping their barren nationalist feelings.. then we will have to 
speak to them in another language. But we shall only have that 
language if we have a state. "(12) At that time, however, Ben-Gurion 
was only just consolidating his position within the Jewish 
Agency and 
had yet to challenge the authority of Weizmann's moderation. 
The 
fact that moderate Zionists initially rejected the 
Commission's 
recommendations, only to be followed by an equivocal 
line within the 
Jewish Agency prompted Zionist sympathisers within the 
Government 
and Parliament to oppose the whole concept of partition 
per se. 
Churchills, Creech-Jones, Attlee, Sinclair, Lloyd George and 
Dalton 
all roundly condemned partition on the grounds 
that if the Jews 
rejected the proposal there seemed little point in supporting it. Also 
the rather vague statement by Creech-Jones suggests that 
pro-Zionists were unclear in their own minds as to what a Jewish 
National Home should be: "I do not know whether it would be wise 
for those who have supported the establishment of a Jewish National 
Home in Palestine to support a proposal which is a considerable 
limitation and might prove to be a big modification in the conception 
of the Balfour Declaration. "(13) The unquestionable ambiguities 
enshrined within the Mandate as to whether a National Home implied 
Jewish minorityhood; Jewish statehood in a small portion of Palestine 
or Jewish supremacy within the whole of Palestine were to prove 
increasingly problematic as they so clearly were open to a number of 
varying interpretations and more importantly gave rise to 
expectations, disappointment and resulting criticism of the British 
Government. 
Although Cohen acknowledges, quite correctly, that the Zionists at 
that time possessed insufficient vision , to press unreservedly for 
partition", we disagree with his accusation that "various Opposition 
groups close to the Zionists" operating "on their own narrow party 
interests"(14) were responsible for this missed opportunity. Why 
these Opposition groups behaved as they did will a theme to which 
we shall return. 
The Arabs, of course, had rejected partition immediately and the 
Foreign Office followed this cue. Sheffer points to the Foreign 
Office as being the chief force behind the Government's rejection of 
the Peel Commission's recommendations. Certainly, the Foreign 
Office was not enamoured of the plan, but more crucially neither 
were the Zionists. The Zionists' and their sympathisers' initial 
rejection of partition should not be understated for it played a major 
role in the government's eventual decision. It must also be 
remembered that the Colonial Office, under the direction of 
Ormsby-Gore, strongly favoured the proposal but found it difficult 
to defend given the mounting hostility to it from both Arab and 
Jewish quarters. To the Colonial Office, partition offered 
Britain 
the only honourable exit from an ignominious episode or as 
they put 
it "a means of escape"(15). If Britain's interests were narrowly 
defined in terms of colonial responsibility and British prestige, 
it 
was because Palestine at that time was perceived as a colonial 
responsibility and was fully under the aegis of 
the Colonial Office. 
This responsibility was to shift decisively in 1938 to the Foreign 
Office. Henceforth, the Colonial Office, in practice,, would follow in 
step with the Foreign Office's interpretation of Britain's wider interests. 
In the meantime,, however., the Foreign Office could take the view 
that as the government's recommendation to implement partition had 
not been endorsed by Parliament largely on account of Zionist 
opposition and as there had been negative reaction to the Policy from 
the Arab nations there was little reason to support a scheme which 
clearly antagonised the two communities it sought to appease. 
Pro-Arabists within the Foreign Office were, in any case, not in 
favour of a Jewish National Home, but other members of less 
conviction acknowledged the polarity of views and political rivalry 
between the Arab States and fully realised that this could "provoke 
an artificial and inconvenient interest in the Arab cause in 
Palestine. 11 (16) 
At this point the Government fell foul of the constraints of office as 
defined by: the volatile nature of the issue itself; the rejection of 
the proposal by both communities in Palestine and Parliamentary 
opposition expressed by Zionists and their supporters. By the time 
the Zionists began to favour the scheme in 1938 other considerations 
were narrowing the Government's policy options. As has been 
illustrated the deteriorating European scene now obliged Britain to 
view the Middle Eastern situation, in general, and Palestine, in 
particular, in a rather different perspective. With the background 
of Munich in Europe the British Government could no longer see the 
problems of Palestine in isolation and strategic considerations came 
into play. The Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain and 
significantly, the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, readily 
acknowledged that if Britain were to insist upon the partition of 
Palestine into Arab and Jewish States, in the event of a war, the 
friendship of the Arab world would be forfeited. Not wishing to 
alienate the Arabs and recognising that the Jews would of necessity 
align themselves with those fighting against Germany, the 
Government adopted the only viable option open to it and published 
a White Paper in 1939 which drastically curbed Jewish 
immigration 
into Palestine and anticipated the abrogation of the Mandate within 
10 
years. This action has been widely condemned as calculatingly 
inhumane to Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi persecution in Europe. It 
also lends itself to the interpretation of 'muddling through', as 
Government policy seemingly shifted within a couple of years from a 
pro-Zionist to a pro-Arab direction. However, given the profound 
external exigencies and given the Government's primary pursuit of 
national interest., this policy option was the only rational one open to 
Chamberlain and his Cabinet. 
Although, policy towards Palestine was put into abeyance during the 
war years, there can be no doubt that the change in the complexion 
of the British Government in 1940 reflected a sense of unease about 
the 1939 White Paper. With Churchill in the role of Prime Minister 
and members of the Labour Party embraced within the War Cabinet, 
all of whom pronounced some sympathy with the Jewish cause, there 
appeared the probability, indeed almost inevitability, that Britain 
would pursue a different policy after the war. Churchill was 
beginning to favour partition, realising that as a result of the 
Jewish holocaust there existed an abiding need for Jewish people to 
have a nation state and recognising that with the continuation of the 
White Paper policy, Britain could lose the powerful support of 
American Jewry. It was generally expected that some form of 
partition policy would be advanced after the war. This was not to 
be the case. The change from Zionist moderation to Zionist militancy 
under the direction of Ben-Gurion and the violent outbursts of the 
Stern Gang and the Irgun Zvai Leumi precipitated an alteration in 
the climate of opinion, at least as far as Churchill was concerned. 
On hearing of the murder in 1944 of his close friend, Lord Moyne, 
by the Jewish terrorist organisation, the Stern Gang, Churchill 
ordered all Cabinet discussion of partition to be postponed. This 
was the main reason why the White Paper of 1939 remained the 
government's policy when the General Election was called in July 
1945. 
The Labour government assumed office in 1945 with a strongly 
pro-Zionist commitment, the development of which will be 
discussed 
below. The point of importance at this moment, irrespective of the 
political persuasion of any Government, was the recognition of 
Britain's decline and America's potential dominance as a world power. 
Bevin unquestionably accepted this fact and attempted 
to elicit 
American support in pursuance of a policy towards 
Palestine. 
Britain in her restricted financial position could no 
longer afford to 
undertake policies a propos Palestine alone. 
The Government was, 
therefore,, obliged to seek American co-operation, which culminated 
in the Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry. When this line of 
policy failed, Attlee and Bevin were left in the untenable position of 
being unable to forge an agreement between the Jewish and Arab 
communities in Palestine and unable to act in concert with the United 
States. Britain did not have the economic or military resources to 
impose a solution on Palestine without the assistance of America, 
which, of course, was not forthcoming. In this context the only 
viable policy for the British government was to refer the matter to 
the United Nations, in the hope that it could then extricate itself 
from what was rapidly becoming a debilitating affair. However, 
Britain could not be seen to recommend a solution or indeed even be 
a party to a UN decision for fear of upsetting its crucial economic 
relationship with the Arab world. This essentially was the 
underlying rationale behind Bevin's refusal to recognise Israel. 
Britain was unquestionably sensitive about its position internationally 
yet felt its primary concern should be to attempt some sort of 
understanding with the Arab nations. As such, within this narrow 
interpretation, the British government felt they were vindicated in 
their policy of non -recognition. Cabinet reported on the attitude of 
the Arab states towards Britain in January 1949: "they (the Arab 
states) are thoroughly disillusioned about the prospects of 
international collaboration through the UN and have been bitterly 
disappointed by American de facto recognition of the State of Israel. 
In spite of this, however, the position of the UK in the Arab world 
is still good .... and all our efforts have been resPected. 
"(17) The 
fact that Parliamentary opposition obliged the British Government to 
confer de facto recognition of Israel against its better judgement is a 
clear illustration of the impact of contradictory constraints on 
Government policy. 
It also gives support to William Wallace's assertion, in his analysis of 
British foreign policy in the 1970s, that "the pressures of Britain's 
international objectives and obligations must be weighed against 
domestic demands. "(18) The government could sustain opposition from 
its own ranks only as long as the Conservatives were supportive. 
However, given the extent and virulence of the Conservative revolt 
coupled in that which can only be expressed as an uneasy 
alliance 
with left-wing backbenchers., the Government was caught 
between 
Left and Right-wing opposition to a policy which was seeming 
to be 
less than creditable. It was not so much the votes 
in the division 
lobbies which mattered . the Government with its large majority was 
unlikely to fall over the issue, despite rhetoric to the contrary, but 
the humiliation and opprobrium of the entire episode. Bevin, in any 
case, was operating outside the Foreign Office line, in his reluctance 
to recognise Israel; an attitude which distinctly contradicts the 
widely held view that Bevin was a captive of his administration. 
Before the Cabinet meeting of 24th January 1949, a Foreign Office 
minute to Bevin recommended that an "announcement should be made 
immediately after the Cabinet meeting to the effect that recognition 
would be granted in the very near future" and that HMG had 
"various questions to discuss with the Jewish Government arising 
from our former position as Mandatory. 11(19) This, as has been 
shown,, was not to be the case. 
In essence, then, between 1937 and 1950 successive Administrations, 
in their responses towards Palestine, operated on the principle of 
preserving Britain's economic and strategic interests, as a result of 
which, policy options were restricted. There are certain instances 
when rationality gave way to emotion, e. g. Churchill's attitude in 
1944 and Bevin's insistence on non-recognition in January 1949, but 
on neither occasion were British interests disregarded, there was 
simply a different point of emphasis. It was apparent by 1938 that 
some form of mutual concord between Arabs and Jews would never be 
reached and although the Peel partition plan was by far the best 
solution it was most unlikely that the government of the day would 
seek to impose such a policy on a Jewish community which was 
quibbling over territorial dimensions and an Arab population who 
were profoundly hostile to the entire concept. Whilst Zionists 
desired the control of the whole of Palestine and Palestinian Arabs 
became increasingly threatened by the number of Jewish immigrants 
entering the country it was clear that animosities could only worsen. 
Despite the fact that the Second World War provided a brief hiatus 
in the pursuit of policy towards Palestine it was quite obvious 
that 
the situation in the post-war years would demand a resolution of 
the 
problem based on international agreement. Bevin's attempts at a 
negotiated settlement between the two communities 
in 1946 and 1947 
should be viewed rather more in the light of 
domestic party politics 
and efforts to maintain national interests 
than in the context of a 
Foreign Secretary blindly ignoring the realities of the 
issue. With 
America's unwillingness to participate with 
Britain in a possible 
solution and with the weight of press and public opinion against the 
government., Bevin had no alternative but to look to the United 
Nations. 
The following section will now assess the second theme within the 
thesis: the relationship between Government policy and party policy. 
(ii) Party Policy Towards Palestine 
The Labour Party's initial sympathy for Jewish people was a 
consequence of the wave of anti-semitic pogroms in Poland and 
elsewhere at the close of the First World War. The subsequent 
development of its sympathy for the Zionist cause resulted from its 
affinity with the socialist leanings of the Workers of Zion Movement, 
Poale Zion., and this group's later affiliation to the Party. There can 
be little doubt that before the Second World War, Poale Zion acted as 
an influential pressure group within the Party, but there certainly 
exist doubts as to whether this was the case during the post 2nd 
World War years. Andrew Sargent, in his doctoral study of the 
organisational impact Poale Zion had on the Labour Party suggests 
that the party was unduly influenced by this group. The reason for 
Labour's so called 'betrayal' of the Jews after 1945, he argues, was 
the result of the declining influence of Poale Zion "whose 
interventions to the NEC and at Party conferences were now to little 
effect". (20) We disagree with Sargent's analysis and argue that the 
Party's disenchantment with the Zionist cause after the Second World 
War was partly a result of extemist Jewish violence within Palestine 
itself and partly due to the fact that the Left of the Party began to 
espouse pro-Zionist sympathies, which led to a factionalism within 
the Party and to a certain extent a re-grouping around the Labour 
government. Indeed, it is true that some Jewish MPs were waning 
in their support of Zionism and were beginning to look favourably 
upon Ernest Bevin's attempts to find a solution. 
However, during the 1930s there was unquestionable support for the 
Zionist cause amongst the majority of Labour MPs and 
in 1937 when 
the Peel Commission recommended partition, the general mood of the 
party was against the proposal. To return to 
Michael Cohen's 
criticism of Zionist sympathisers as being responsible 
for the 
rejection of partition at that time, the question must 
be asked: what 
prompted the party to respond as it did? 
The accusation that 
Opposition groups were reacting only in order to embarrass the 
Government seems insubstantial. Of course, there are always 
aspects of Parliamentary tactics at play but this alone cannot explain 
Labour's action. Attlee clearly revealed that the lead for the party's 
reaction came from Zionists themselves: "I assure our comrades that 
this matter is one of continuing anxiety to us.. we shall keep in close 
touch with our Labour friends in Palestine and take whatever action 
is necessary in Parliament. 11(21) The fact that David Ben-Gurion 
attended a meeting with PLP members and that the NEC subsequently 
issued a statement proclaiming that "any suggested plan for a Jewish 
State should be examined from the standpoint of its practicability as 
a unit of Government, its security, and the possibility of its 
growth"(22) indicates a certain congruity of opinion between the 
British Labour Party and the Jewish Socialist Party in Palestine. 
Implicit in this statement was the belief that if there were to be a 
Jewish State, it could presumably be extended as the needs of Jews 
dictated. In fact, Stafford Cripps quite favoured partition: "as a 
temporary expedient which would enable immediate help to be given 
to Jewish refugees" and could be "reconsidered at a future 
date. "(23) 
Of course, and understandably so, there was much sympathy for 
Jewish refugees escaping the excesses of Nazism in Europe. In 
Zionist eyes the Peel plan had not allocated sufficient land for there 
to be a viable Jewish State and, therefore, of necessity should be 
opposed. The Labour Party, duly sympathetic, opposed the 
recommendation in Parliament. Ben-Gurion had his sights set on the 
whole of Palestine if not through agreement, then through conquest. 
Whether the Labour Party accepted the logical conclusion of his 
argument is debateable. Certainly the policy they considered to be 
the best solution was termed as the continuation of "a properly 
administered Mandate. "(24) What exactly was meant by this is 
unclear but it possibly implied a policy which would allow Palestine 
to eventually achieve a Jewish numerical majority. How this meshed 
with the party's policy of encouraging national 'self-determination' 
reveals an instance of Labour's Janus-like quality. 
Labour's participation in Government during the war years sheds a 
new light on its commitment to Zionism, for whilst 
Attlee remained 
equivocal and Morrison argued against any 
increase in Jewish 
immigration into Britain, Bevin was negotiating on behalf of the Jews 
and Dalton was pondering over Labour's prospective post-war foreign 
policy and its clear pro-Zionist commitment. Of course, the plight of 
European Jewry received the greatest sympathy from the Labour 
Party and the 1944 revelations of the appalling massacres of Jews in 
Europe only further confirmed the belief of most party members that 
in the development of Palestine lay the main hope for the Jewish 
people in the post-war world. It was essentially within this 
emotional context that Labour's document, 'The International Postwar 
Settlement'. which contained the memorable phrase "Let the Arabs be 
encouraged to move out as the Jews move in"(25) was framed. This 
statement was not the result of Poale Zion's influence within the 
party but more a consequence of Dalton's attack of megalomania and 
the inability of Conference to provide an arena for careful study, 
deliberation and consideration of prospective policy. John Grantham 
argues that the party's 'International Postwar Settlement' was "the 
last foreign affairs policy statement to be formulated by a Labour 
Party which did not anticipate being in a position to implement its 
proposals in the foreseeable future. "(26) Grantham's view is a stark 
condemnation of the Labour Party's unrealistic sentiments and he 
goes on to state: "The experience of the 1945-51 Government under 
Attlee's premiership would lead to an increased awareness throughout 
the movement of the limits within which foreign policy formulation by 
the party must be viewed. "(27) This point is debateable. Either the 
party did not realise the implications of its policy proposal, 
particularly, on Palestine, even though it had participated in 
Government for a number of years; or it was ready and willing to 
produce ideological or sentimental gobbledegook in the expectation 
that it would never be put to the test - 
Certainly, Attlee, as Kenneth Morgan states, was "an almost obscure 
figure"(28) and his wartime experience in Government 
had been 
overshadowed by Churchill,, but even the Labour 
Party at its most 
simplistic could not reasonably have produced a six page 
document in 
the expectation that it would not gain office. 
They may have 
doubted the achievement of a landslide victory 
in 1945 but to have 
consciously anticipated downright defeat and 
to have acted 
accordingly seems less than feasible. 
On the other hand, J. 
Alderman maintains that the party, in its statement, 
deliberately 
courted the Jewish community in Britain 
for purposes of electoral 
gain. (29) The argument that Labour studiously 
and calculatingly 
captured Jewish voters in the electoral process 
only then to 
deliberately renege on its policies, although compatible with 
contemporary leftist criticism of subsequent Labour Party tactics, 
suggests a naked cunning at which, at least on this particular issue, 
we would demur. If the Labour Party had electoral designs on the 
Jews in Britain it would only have had to produce a document which 
fudged policy intention,, for example,, on the vague lines of 
establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. The fact that its extreme 
statement on Palestine alarmed members of the Jewish Agency as well 
as Jewish members of its own party hardly supports Alderman's 
analysis. Although we do not consider it impossible to contemplate 
that Labour could 'overpromise' on certain issues in order to gain 
votes, on this specific issue, the party, probably well-meaning in its 
intention, misjudged the difficulties of the Palestine situation, 
underestimated the animosities between Arab and Jew and generally 
were incompetent in their assessment of the potential hazards of 
pursuing such a policy. 
In the event the party fell into a trap of its own making for when it 
gained office in 1945 not only did it have to contend with the acute 
problem of Palestine but also with rancour and opposition within its 
own ranks. The fact that the party had overtly committed itself to 
an untenable policy and that it lacked the prudence to foresee 
Britain's declining influence in the post-war world indicates a most 
profound naivete. It also provides a clear illustration of R. M. 
Punnett's analysis of Opposition behaviour: "Where commitments are 
made in Opposition these can prove awkward for the party leadership 
when the party returns to office, when policies turn out to be 
impracticable or unpalatable. 1100) 
The government and Bevin especially were castigated for their 
alleged indifference to the Zionist cause and their rejection of a 
party commitment. The fact that Bevin attempted to pursue the only 
viable option open to the Government., i. e. that of seeking 
to gain 
American co-operation in finding a solution to the Palestine problem 
clearly left the Government open to charges of 
'betrayal' and 
'imperialistic ambition' from factions within the Party. 
Bevin's own 
intemperate remarks and general exasperation with 
America's 
non-involvement and the recourse to violence within 
Palestine itself 
served, at least in the early period of the 
Attlee Administration, to 
exacerbate the growing divide between party and 
government. 
Bevin's belief that he was doing all he could under 
increasingly 
trying conditions was never appreciated by Zionist sympathisers 
within the party, who saw in his attempts to gain some form of 
agreement between Arabs and Jews, and his refusal to bow to 
pro-Jewish American pressure,, evidence that he in someway 
harboured anti-semitic sentiments. The two factors which mitigated 
the extent of opposition to the government within the Labour Party 
were, firstly, the appalling levels of violence and crucially the 
murders of British citizens in Palestine, and secondly, the growing 
identification of the Left with the Zionist cause. 
There can be little doubt that the violent outbursts within Palestine 
changed opinion within the Party into one which was less sympathetic 
to Zionism, less willing to attack the Government for reneging on its 
electoral promises, more critical of America's lack of co-operation and 
more willing to accept the inherent difficulties of the Palestine issue. 
However, maybe more crucial to the resultant rallying around the 
Government particularly after Britain had withdrawn from Palestine, 
was the Left's adoption of pro-Zionist sympathies. 
The Left's espousal of the Zionist cause raises a number of 
questions. Was it indeed genuine or was it adopted as a tool with 
which to attack the Government? Left wing publications had 
certainly changed their line regarding Palestine within fifteen years 
and although that does not provide conclusive evidence of 
opportunism it is nevertheless interesting to note. The New 
Statesman and Nation in 1929 stated: "We shall have to abandon both 
the appearance and the reality of that pro-Zionist bias which 
inspired our original acceptance of the Mandate ... the Balfour 
Declaration was a dangerous leap in the dark. Moreover, it cut 
across other pledges which we had previously given to the Arabs. 
It was a blunder.. In short the historical case of Jewish rights 
in 
Palestine with all its religious, political, financial and sentimental 
backing is, in truth, no case at all. "(31) Of course, the position of 
Jews in Europe and Palestine had altered drastically by 1945 and 
it is 
possible to appreciate the Left's concern for Jewish refugees and 
the 
the Jewish community in Palestine as a legitimate and understandable 
sympathy for the beleagured underdog. 
However, it is the Left's defence of 'socialist' foreign policy and 
national self-determination during Labour's period of 
Office, which 
although not difficult to understand 
in itself, is curious when 
applied to Palestine and the Jewish question. National 
self-determination in the context of Labour Party views implied the 
relinquishment of imperial control in favour of the indigenous 
community. As far as it is possible to see Palestine in this light, 
self-determination would mean handing over power to some form of 
legitimate assembly which would comprise of Arabs and Jews sharing 
power in a ratio which reflected respective population figures. It 
certainly did not suggest,, as members of the Left favoured in the 
1930s, that Britain should remain as the Mandatory power until such 
time there was a Jewish numerical majority in Palestine, achieved 
through European Jewish immigration. 
The fact that by 1947 the Left were advocating Britain's withdrawal 
from the Middle East because they rejected what they termed 'the 
needs of Imperial defence' is quite logical in the context of adhering 
to a socialist foreign policy. However, the Left's vocal sympathy for 
the Jews and their numerous attacks on the government both in the 
Press and in Parliament essentially meant that pro-Zionism was being 
'tainted' by appearing to be a left-wing cause, and losing support as 
a result. Certainly, Richard Crossman's espousal of the Zionist 
cause and his identification as a Left-winger, albeit not a militant 
one, did little to endear other party members to Zionism. In fact, 
the Trade Union sponsored MP for Wembley North wrote to Attlee 
conveying "the deep resentment of many of my Trade Union 
colleagues" against the Government's critics, whom he felt "had put 
Zionism before Socialism" and had revealed a contemptuous disregard 
for party loyalty in an attempt to enforce a minority viewpoint. "(32) 
Of course, it could be argued that Trade Union associates would, 
almost as a reflex action, support Bevin and, therefore, would be 
less than enamoured of the arguments presented by the so-called 
'intellectual' Left. However, for many Labour members 'party loyalty' 
was an emotive term and definitely not something to 
be dismissed 
lightly, which on occasions the Left appeared to 
do rather too 
willingly. 
The Left's criticism of the Government's handling of 
the United 
Nations decision and its subsequent refusal to grant 
de facto 
recognition of the State of Israel seemed 
to stem less from its 
commitment to Zionism than from a 
belief that Britain was 
contravening the authority and threatening 
the future of the United 
Nations. Whether in fact the Left were deeply attached 
to Zionism at 
that time or simply adopted it as a rod with which to beat the back 
of the government can only be left open to conjecture. If the Left 
were sincerely attracted to Zionism, and in many ways no one can 
doubt that notions of a kibbutzim way of life were attractive to those 
on the Left., it must also be acknowledged that the Palestinian Arab 
case was not even perceived let alone considered, and within such a 
cloistered perception, sympathy for Zionism may be understandable. 
The irony of the situation, of course, is that if Zionism was 
identified as a left-wing cause in the 1940s, then some thirty years 
later the Palestinian Arabs were to arouse left-wing sympathies. 
There is no doubt that despite leftwing carping at the direction of 
Government policy in the post-war years,, Ernest Bevin had little 
opposition from the Conservative Party. It is a paradox that the 
Conservative Party, who had never as a whole, espoused pro-Zionist 
sympathies had, as Churchill put it: ".. done more to build up a 
Jewish National Home in Palestine than anyone-1103) What, then was 
the reason for this? Clearly, the Party's structure must play an 
important part. The historic Conservative Party was not notably 
policy oriented, and certainly annual conferences were never to 
assume the significance of those of the Labour Party. It can be 
seen, therefore, that in the absence of a decision-making body 
within the party greater importance was attached to the views of 
individual leaders and influential party members. Certain members 
of the Party were unquestionably sympathetic, albeit with a certain 
amount of pragmatism, to Zionism: Winston Churchill, Leo Amery, 
Malcolm MacDonald, who although aware of the economic service the 
Jews could render Palestine, were attracted by the urbane and 
cosmopolitan qualities of Jewish people, especially when encapsulated 
in the charismatic figure of Dr. Chaim Weizmann. 
It was Winston Churchill who was responsible for the 1922 White 
Paper on Palestine which essentially prepared the way for the 
inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in the Mandate. This White 
Paper set out the conditions of establishing a Jewish National 
Homeland within Palestine on the understanding that Jews were to be 
in Palestine 'as of right and not on sufferance'. It also set out the 
notion of Britain's 'dual obligation' to both Arabs and 
Jews and 
looked forward to the time when both communities would participate 
in a full measure of self-government. Of course, as events 
developed in Palestine this objective could be dismissed as wishful 
thinking but Churchill's sympathies remained with Zionism until 1944. 
Churchill's change of heart, only eight months before the General 
Election of 1945 which was to place him as Leader of the Oppositiont 
is crucial when analysing the behaviour of the Conservative Party 
during the Attlee Government. It is conceivable that had Churchill 
not been so disenchanted with Zionism he, as leader of the Party 
and therefore enormously influential, might have mobilised opposition 
to Bevin's seemingly unsympathetic policies towards the Jews. In 
the event, Churchill assumed a low profile and as a result the 
Shadow Cabinet was generally supportive of the Government. With 
Churchill's pro-Zionism waning, debates in the House were often 
conducted by Oliver Stanley or Anthony Eden, who had never 
disguised his preference for the Arabs. Of course, as minutes of 
the Imperial Affairs Committee reveal the Conservative Party had no 
alternative policy on Palestine. Stanley always asserted that he 
favoured partition but invariably added that in his experience as 
Colonial Secretary,, he was more than aware of the dangers of 
pursuing such a policy. Other members of the Committee were 
genuinely at a loss to know what to do about the problem and until 
January 1949 it is quite possible that the attitude 'there but for the 
Grace of God go 11 prevailed. 
The interesting, but nevertheless difficult point is why the 
Conservative Party chose to oppose the Government over the 
question of granting de facto recognition of Israel. It may, of 
course, have been, as Attlee suspected, a party manoeuvre designed 
"with a General Election not so far away, to snatch a victory for the 
Conservative Party, "(34) although, realistically the Palestine issue 
could never be viewed as a potential vote-catcher. On the other 
hand, the Conservatives may have been alarmed at the degree of 
international censure on Britain and sought to place the issue in the 
wider context of national prestige. Another possibility, and 
probably a more convincing one, is that the Party simply engaged 
in 
its traditional pragmatism. The State of Israel existed, albeit with 
undefined boundaries; it had been recognised by the 
United States, 
the Soviet Union and a number of other countries, and as 
Oliver 
Stanley said 'like it or not' it had to be recognised. 
Britain could 
not distance itself from the international arena; 
it had to come to 
some form of agreement with Israel as 
it was quite clear that, with 
American backing,, the State was here to stay. Also and maybe more 
significantly, important oil pipe-lines now crossed 
Israeli territory 
and it was apparent that some form of arrangement would have to be 
reached with the Jewish Government. Certainly, Palestine itself, 
was not of central concern to the Conservatives and many 
biographies dismiss the whole affair with just one line of narrative. 
With such circumstantial evidence it is not easy to arrive at a 
definitive conclusion. All that can be said of the Conservative Party 
and its attitude to the Arabs and Jews in Palestine is that its 
responses to the affair in general were flexible and based on a 
assessment of Britain's national interests. Malcolm MacDonald, the 
pro-Zionist Conservative Colonial Secretary in 1939 admitted that 
policies towards Palestine 'had been a little bit cynical' and perhaps 
this is a fitting judgement of Conservative reactions to the Palestine 
problem. 
What then are the final conclusions to be drawn? Clearly, in order 
to gain a realistic understanding of the direction of Government 
policies during the period 1937 to 1950, Palestine must be viewed in 
the context of Britain's perception of her own national interests. 
When placed within this ambit it becomes apparent that policy choices 
were severely restricted. As regards Britain's party politics it is 
evident that the Conservative Party's pragmatic realisation of the 
limits of their policies towards Palestine coupled with their basic 
recognition of the realities of office placed them in a far more 
comfortable position than that of the Labour Party. The Labour 
Party, through its own failure to perceive the profound difficulties 
of the issue, which is in some respects an inherent feature of its 
organisation, or to appreciate that a Labour Government could not 
act in a vacuum but had to respond to the restrictions of 
Government, succeeded in inflicting the greatest possible damage on 
itself . The policies of the 
Attlee Government were not reprehensible 
when viewed in the light of the unquestionable constraints 
imposed 
on any Administration of that period, they just simply appeared 
to 
be when judged against the party's previous pronouncements. 
The 
party presented itself as a hostage to fortune and regrettably was 
obliged to pay an exceedingly high price, 
in terms, at least, of 
moral censure within its own ranks; jibes at 
its inconsistency from 
the Conservative Party and, to this day, the judgement 
that this 
was the one issue on which Ernest Bevin, a representative 
of the 
Labour Movement, failed. 
If there are any lessons in Government/ Opposition tendencies to be 
learnt from the Palestine affair, they are undoubtedly succinctly 
encapsulated in Richard Rose's statement: "Without the ability to act 
promptly upon a statement of intent,, the Opposition may find that 
circumstances have changed greatly when it is next in Office and 
earlier commitments can become embarrassingly inappropriate. "(35) 
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